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PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH

BY

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE writers have not sought in conference an agreed point of view, nor have I judged it desirable to eliminate everything in the nature of overlapping. But we began by carefully considering one another's essay-plans, with a view to securing cohesion, and we submit our work, each accepting responsibility only for his own contribution, in the hope that it will usefully serve the practical purpose we had in mind—the purpose, namely, of removing some of the difficulties and of making available, especially for the clergy, some of the lessons, of a new way of thought which it will be very dangerous to neglect.

O. HARDMAN.

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I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT AND ITS
LIMITATIONS

BY

W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D.

I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT AND ITS LIMITATIONS

PSYCHOLOGY may be said to be both the oldest and the youngest of the sciences. Systematic investigation began in the West, so it is generally held, when Socrates turned from the speculations of the "physical" philosophers to study what he thought was knowable—the nature of man. The process of classification and definition of concepts which he inaugurated started with the mental and moral life of human beings. The main object of Greek reflexion was to carry out the word of the oracle, "Know thyself." This note is unmistakable. As Professor Pringle-Pattison has said, the leading thought of Plato and Aristotle is the supremacy of the *psyche*, the conviction that thought and reason are the most significant realities of the world. Science itself then begins with psychology, with the study of the mind. But psychology is also the youngest of the sciences. It is only within living memory that it has fully established its claim to be one of the natural sciences, based on observation and experiment. For almost the whole period during which rational thought has been systematically pursued, the theory of mind has been treated as a branch of metaphysics, depending for its conclusions on the gen-

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eral principles of philosophy. England has the honour of having produced the most influential pioneer in the movement towards the psychological standpoint. When Locke proposed to examine the limits of knowledge by an investigation of the powers of the mind according to "the historical plain method," he was laying down a programme for a psychology based on observation. It was not, however, until the latter part of the nineteenth century that psychology followed the example of physics, and, separating itself from the parent stem of philosophy, began to flourish as an independent study with the same purpose as its sister sciences—the establishment, through observation of facts, of causal laws.

Young things, when they sever themselves from parental tutelage, frequently manifest a melancholy tendency to arrogant self-assertion. Not only do they tend to forget the home from whence they came, but they sometimes react violently against the opinions and customs that were current there. Wise men do not take these symptoms too seriously, for they know that they are the less engaging signs of growth. Perhaps this phenomenon can be traced in some psychologists to-day. It is at least true that there are some who seem to hold that their science must ultimately supplant philosophy and theology. And this opinion has spread among the masses of the half-educated, who are easily impressed by confident assertion and a parade of long words. How often one hears the phrase "Psychology teaches us" spoken in a tone which suggests that the infallible authority has been found at last.

It would be absurd to attempt to minimise the importance of the achievements of psychology or the new power and insight which they have brought us, and most

absurd to do so in the opening essay of a volume which aims at applying some of its results in the field of religion. Such an attempt is far from the present writer's intention; but it may be useful, in view of exaggerated pretensions, to consider what kind of help we may expect from psychology in solving our ultimate problems, and what limitations, if any, may be assigned to its power.

1

Psychology, as we have said, claims to be regarded as a natural science. It asserts its right to a place in the hierarchy of disciplines, among which are parceled out all the phenomena of the universe. Now it is obvious that each science has a group of data with which it is primarily concerned. It is true that no science can be regarded as completely isolated from all the rest. Chemistry runs over into physics and so on, but the main concern of each study is one particular aspect of reality. We must ask, then, what are the specific data of psychology? From what special aspect of the universe does it take its start? It is somewhat surprising to find that we are met here at the very beginning with a serious difficulty. We reply to the question: It is concerned with mental phenomena. But at once the further question arises: What do we mean by this? We are confronted with a view which has had great influence, which would hold that, in effect, there are no such things as mental phenomena. On the naturalistic or materialistic hypothesis, so-called mental events are not events at all in the full sense. Huxley invented the word "epiphenomena" to describe the status of mental events on this view, intending to imply that they are effects but not

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causes. They are like the shadow cast by a train, which has no influence on its progress. If this theory were correct, it is clear that psychology could not claim to be one among the natural sciences, since the course of the world would be sufficiently described without its aid. From the point of view of an attempt to give a causal explanation of the changes which take place in the real world, reference to psychical phenomena would be a mere irrelevance. No doubt some study could be given to the causes which produced these strange by-products, but its results would not be a contribution to any general view of reality. This standpoint may appear absurd; and, indeed, in its extreme form it would now find few advocates; but an important school of psychologists, the Behaviourists, advocate a view which is not essentially different. According to them, consciousness should be assumed, at least for purposes of research, to be negligible, and psychology should restrict itself to the objective study of behaviour, taking its place contentedly as a branch of biology.

We may respect such views as attempts to avoid the dualism of mind and matter which most definitions of psychology presuppose. But the gain is secured at the price of violent paradox. It is possible no doubt that the dualism is not ultimate, but it exists for the common experience which is the starting-point of science. There are mental phenomena and the "inner sense" is different from the "outer sense." It is plainly incredible that the aspect of reality which we describe as conscious experience should be negligible or incapable of being investigated. Psychology has, in fact, been the study of events in mind. Psychology, as Professor James Ward

says, is the science of experience, and in the last resort of individual experience.¹

If we adopt a definition of this kind we are led to observe an important difference between psychology and all other sciences. Like them it is empirical, but unlike them it is subjective. In them we take our position without question in the objective world, but in psychology we are dealing with the processes of that mind by which the objective world is known. It follows from this that the data of our science have a totally different character from those of other sciences. What are the facts from which we must start? They are the facts of individual experience. It is moreover clear that we can have direct acquaintance only with our own experience, and it follows that all psychology rests, in the last resort, on introspection. It would, of course, be untrue to hold that psychology has no subsidiary sources on which to draw. The reports of other people about their experience, the observation of their behaviour under arranged conditions, the study of the behaviour of animals, all these furnish valuable data. But they are secondary sources. They derive their meaning from the knowledge we have of our own experience. They can have no significance apart from that. We have no clue to interpret them except one which we find within.

The fundamental importance of introspection compels us to ask how far this operation may be relied upon to give accurate information. A moment's reflexion will show that, apart from obvious practical difficulties, there are unfortunate theoretical perplexities about introspection. Perhaps insufficient attention has been given to

¹*Principles of Psychology*, p. 28

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the psychology of the psychologist while he is psychologising; it is, however, a subject which will repay reflexion. Can I really know as an object what I am at this moment experiencing? Can my mental state be at the same time the object of another mental state—that of knowing? To experience, to know that I experience, to know what I experience, and to know how I experience, are different experiences. It would seem obvious, though it is denied by some psychologists, that I can know what I experienced only when the experience is gone. What I know is the memory of the experience, and not the experience itself. And, moreover, the memory itself in order to be analysed must enter into another complex mental state—that of introspection—and be thereby, to an indefinite degree, transformed. There is, further, another disability to which introspection is subject. Experience is, almost certainly, a continuous process. What happens in our mental life is not a succession of sharply defined experiences, but one unbroken experiencing in which elements blend and fade indiscernibly into one another. In introspection, however, we artificially mutilate this living process. We say to the vital movement, Stand still, that I may look at you. Introspection begins with a necessary and unavoidable falsification.

These remarks are made with no sceptical intention. It is not denied that real and valuable knowledge can be obtained by the processes of mind. But the difficulties about introspection should warn us of the inherent limitations of psychological explanation. The conceptual scheme reared on the basis of data thus acquired may represent, but must also in some degree misrepresent, the reality of mind.

Before we leave this part of the subject we must glance at a topic which has played a great rôle in the history of philosophy—the “transcendental subject.” This formidable phrase is the technical expression for a very obvious and simple fact. All knowledge involves the relation of subject and object, of knower and thing known. But when the knowledge in question is knowledge of self or of the experience of a self, we are brought into a baffling complication. There seem to be two selves in the transaction, the self that knows and the self that is known—the “transcendental” and the “empirical” ego. It is impossible here to enter into a discussion of the very difficult problems that arise, but it is obvious that the knowing self cannot be identical with the known self, and that psychology can deal only with the “empirical ego.” It seems then to be an inevitable conclusion that there must always be an element in the self, and that the central and constitutive element, which cannot be scientifically known. There is no means of estimating the degree of ignorance and imperfection which this limitation involves; we can only recognise that a complete description of mind is necessarily beyond the power of scientific investigation.

2

We will now proceed to consider the method and aim of psychology regarded as a natural science. It has the same purpose as other sciences, and that purpose may roughly be described as “explanation.” This word, however, is ambiguous, and there are at least two meanings which need to be most carefully distinguished. There is the explanation which answers the question

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How? and that which answers the question Why? I am, for example, at this moment sitting at a desk and writing this sentence. I may explain this fact by giving a complete account of the events which led up to it, both physical and mental; but I may also explain my action by referring to the purpose which I have in view. Scientific explanation is of the former type: it answers the question How? not the question Why? It is not concerned with any teleological view of the universe, it does not raise the question of the reason for reality being what it is; it is concerned simply with the actual events and the connexion between them. Thus scientific explanation consists in the reduction of the infinite variety and complexity of the world presented in experience under general conceptions and formulas. A phenomenon is "explained" when it is shown to be an example of a general law which covers a great many other phenomena. It is often said that science is "descriptive." The word is accurate as a partial definition, but it may be doubted whether it does justice to the full significance of the results of science, since the descriptive simplifications which it reaches give to mankind power over phenomena and gravely affect the philosophical constructions which each age has to make for itself.

In the pursuit of this ideal of simplification and generalisation, the sciences which deal with the more complex types of phenomena have been led to adopt a very important method. They have postulated the existence of what Professor T. P. Nunn has called "scientific objects," and what we will call "hypothetical entities." By hypothetical entities I mean those of which we have no direct experience, but which are assumed for the purpose of explaining phenomena which we do experience. Thus the atom, the electron, the luminiferous ether, are

all hypothetical entities in this sense. Now the history of science shows us these entities undergoing a process of constant reconstruction. Some which were confidently accepted in comparatively recent times have quite disappeared. The chemists of the eighteenth century made use of a supposed fluid called "caloric" to explain the phenomena of combustion. Similar entities are not difficult to discover in contemporary physics. The ether which, until a few years ago, was accepted as almost certain appears to be in danger of losing its position in the world of scientific realities. The atom is another hypothetical entity which is suffering modification in the advance of scientific theory. We need not raise the question whether the reality of any hypothetical entity could ever be established: it is sufficient to note that all such entities with which we are made acquainted in the physical sciences have undergone revision, and are undergoing revision as the sciences progress. The hypothetical entities which are adopted at any given stage in the development of science are those which are most useful for the purpose of generalising phenomena and dealing with them. The history of science makes it probable that the concepts which are taken as fundamental now will in the future be radically transformed or supplanted by others. But we may observe a law in the development of hypothetical entities. As Professor Nunn has pointed out in his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society (1923), the evolution of "scientific objects" appears to take them always further away from the type of existence of which we have knowledge in perception. They become more and more abstract. Thus caloric is not difficult to imagine. It is closely analogous to fluids within our experience. The ether and the atom, however, have departed further from the imaginable,

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from concrete experience, while, at the same time, they have become ever more amenable to mathematical treatment and precise calculation. We might sum up the life history of a hypothetical entity in the words "from mythology to mathematics."

All this has a direct bearing on the significance of psychology. It is pursuing the same course as its sister sciences, and the further development will, we can scarcely doubt, be the same. In order to generalise phenomena it has conceived entities which cannot themselves be perceived or experienced. Recently these "scientific objects" have been increased by the very fruitful one of the Unconscious. It is highly important that these entities should be recognised as hypothetical. They are not given in experience, they are deduced from it, or rather they are invented to explain it. Nor can it be doubted that the science is still at the "mythological" stage. The Freudian "Censor" bears the marks of mythology to the most casual eye. The others, though less obviously anthropomorphic, are very far from the stage in which mathematical formulation is possible; but if the history of science has any light to throw upon the probable course of scientific thought, it may be confidently predicted that they will move from mythology towards mathematics. They will be transformed.

These reflexions must incline us to a certain scepticism about the hypothetical entities of modern psychology. Without doubting their usefulness we may doubt their reality, at least in the form in which they are now presented. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to carry our scepticism to the extreme point of writing them down as mere "fictions." Though it would be rash to regard them as established realities, they must, in some

degree, correspond with reality, since they have all, even including the Freudian "Censor," enabled us to gain a new control over the course of events.

3

We will now address ourselves more directly to the question, What are the limits of psychological enquiry? In so doing we are to consider not the actual limits, due to ignorance, but its inherent limitations, due to the nature of the study itself. The answer to our question is that, in one sense, there are no limits. There is no mental phenomenon, no experience, which falls outside its province. Nothing is so sacred or so intimate that it can claim exemption from scientific analysis; and it would be at once foolish and useless to say to the psychologist, Thus far and no farther, when he approaches the moral and religious consciousness. But though there are no limits to the phenomena which psychology can investigate, there are limits to the questions which it can answer. The problem with which we are confronted is, in fact, the general one of the relation between philosophy and science. On this question the prevailing view among scientific men used to be that metaphysics consisted of baseless speculations which could usefully be ignored by science, and it was the fashion to contrast the solid gains of scientific knowledge with the fluctuating constructions of philosophers. This attitude is being abandoned. The progress of physics itself has led to the raising of metaphysical problems; and particularly through the implications of the theory of relativity, the exponents of natural knowledge have found themselves compelled to entertain speculations

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about matter, space and time which have long been familiar to philosophers. The true position comes more clearly into view. Though the results of the special sciences have great importance as data for philosophy, they come at last to problems which are beyond the scope of their method. They cannot determine the ultimate nature of Reality.

This principle is nowhere more evident than in psychology. The empirical study of mental phenomena raises metaphysical problems more directly and more obviously than any other science. It suggests, though it cannot answer, the question of the nature of mind, the place of the individual consciousness in the whole order of the universe and the validity of the concepts which mind creates.

We may illustrate this point by referring to a subject which is specially relevant to the purpose of this volume —belief in God. It is doubtless possible to give a psychological “explanation” of the origin and development of the idea of God, both in the race and in the individual. Though such explanations are to a large degree hypothetical, they may have much probability. In any case it is clear that there is no theoretical impossibility in the way of an adequate psychological account of belief in God. It is frequently assumed that this has some bearing on the validity of the concept; that if we can trace the stages by which it has developed we have gone some way to show that it is worthless; that religion has some interest in maintaining that its origin is mysterious.

This is sheer illusion, as can readily be seen if we compare the concept of God with another concept which has less emotional interest. Most of us are convinced that

there is an "external world," an order of nature, an objective reality which is independent of our minds. Psychology can analyse this belief and trace the process by which the idea of "the world outside" is built up. It can show how the "sense data" are organised and interpreted in experience as "things" and "events." It can show further how the generalised conception of "Nature" arises. But it cannot decide the question whether there is really an objective world of objects corresponding to our perceptions. That there is such a world is one possible hypothesis, but the growth of the belief could be "explained" without any objective reference. Yet it would obviously be absurd to appeal to psychology as proving "subjective idealism." From the psychological standpoint we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outer world.

The belief in God is closely analogous. It is said that the idea of God is a "projection" of the mind, and in support of this contention it is urged that we can account for the idea without the need to suppose that it is evoked by any reality outside the mind. But, as we have seen, the idea of an external world is in the same sense, a "projection." Of course the idea of God is a "projection"; of course it is possible to trace the manner in which the conception is formed. But the question we want to have answered is, Does the projection hit any reality? That is the question which psychology cannot answer. Both in the case of belief in an external world of objects and in that of belief in God the decision rests with philosophy. But there is more to be said. If as philosophers we come to agree with common sense and hold that perception gives us a true, though inadequate, knowledge of real existence, then it is difficult to see any

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logical ground for denying the same limited validity to religious experience. If we allow the lower kind of experience to convince us of an objective reality, we should, unless we can give good reasons for treating it in a different manner, be prepared to admit that the higher kind of experience is not without its objective foundation.

The so-called argument from religious experience has therefore great value. It is certain that it cannot be shaken by psychology. The only radical attack which could be made upon it would come from an extreme subjectivist metaphysic which would deny all objective validity to our experience. Nevertheless, the analogy which we have drawn out above should warn us that the argument is open to grave dangers. It is easy to fall into the assumption that vivid or persistent experiences can be taken at their face value. But our knowledge of the external world of matter is not gained in this manner. It is only by the application of rational criteria to experience that, at any level, we can enter into a secure knowledge of Reality.

In these introductory remarks we have dwelt, perhaps excessively, on the limits of psychological enquiry. It seemed useful to do so because there are many who entertain an exaggerated notion of what psychology may do, expecting that it will decide for them questions which have been the standing problems of Metaphysics and Theology. But, as we have tried to show, psychology is in the same position as other natural sciences. Its conclusions furnish data for philosophical reflexion, but they cannot be a substitute for it. In maintaining this position we do not in the least minimise the practical importance of psychology, or the need for its application.

in the religious work of the Church. It is not too much to say that recent advances in the science have put new instruments in the hands of all those who seek to influence the minds and hearts of men. The industrialists and the advertisers have not been slow to realise the importance of the new knowledge. The children of this world have often been wiser than the children of light. Let us hope that in this case it will not be so. Psychology can give us considerable guidance in the subject of worship, and of the way to deal with minds distressed or burdened. It should be possible to reach a definite decision, based on scientific grounds, on some hotly disputed practices such as confession. It would be no exaggeration to say that no pastor of Christ's flock should consider himself adequately equipped for the work until he has gained some real acquaintance with the more important developments of modern psychology.

II

THE PROGRESS AND PRESENT
POSITION OF THE STUDY OF
PSYCHOLOGY

BY

L. W. GRENSTED, M.A., B.D.

II

THE PROGRESS AND PRESENT POSITION OF THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY

NOTHING is more difficult than to estimate the movement and direction of a science at the time of its greatest activity. History is best written in those periods of quiet when the successes of the past are in process of consolidation, and when there is little or no effort to discover or to occupy new fields, nor any of the zest and excitement which such discovery brings. The pioneer is seldom the best historian. Often, indeed, he fails even to record accurately the discoveries which he has made.

Psychology is at the present moment in just such an era of quest and discovery. In every direction pioneer work is being done, and the output of literature is already such that even professional psychologists find themselves obliged to specialise. Some are experts in education, some in industrial psychology, some in psychotherapy. A few are working along biological lines, trying to correlate the work of the mental observers with that of the neurologist. And book after book is being written by men who have little acquaintance enough with the whole range of psychological enquiry, and whose practical work, often of the very highest value, will require a stiff theoretical testing before it can be made the basis of any broad generalisation.

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The most that can be claimed for this essay is that it is written from an observer's point of view, and on the basis of what, it is hoped, may be taken as a fairly typical selection from the literature of the subject. To deal with all the ramifications of the most recent psychology would in any case be impossible, and it will be of more value, especially as a contribution to a collection of essays such as those collected in this volume, to make some attempt at the classification of the various tendencies which seem to be observable in the history of psychological investigation, in the hope that this may reveal the real direction of its movement at the present day.

1

As with all sciences, the problem of psychology has been largely one of definition and scope. Even to-day there is no agreement as to the definition of psychology, and undoubtedly many of the problems which arise in this connection for the philosopher and for the theologian are simply due to the continual trespassing by psychologists upon fields which are not their own. It is, of course, impossible and undesirable that the sciences should be kept in separate watertight compartments. The world is one, and not many. Geology, biology, chemistry, and the rest, all overlap, to their great gain. But psychology overlaps them all, just because it deals with the mind of geologist, biologist, and chemist alike. For the same reason, and in an even greater degree, it overlaps the field of philosophy (itself in sore need of exact definition), since both clearly deal with mind; and thought it is true that psychology deals rather with process and philosophy with the truth or reality which

lies behind proces, there seem to be few psychologists indeed who can keep the distinction clear. Whence arises some confusion (and not a little reprimination) between psychologists and philosophers, a confusion which is perhaps at its greatest when we pass to the sphere of religion. For it is here, where prescriptive rights are strong and well entrenched, that psychology makes some of its boldest claims. And if the assertions of certain psychologists are wild indeed, they must not blind us to the real scientific value of their method, or to its great usefulness in the understanding and practical guidance of the religious life.

The beginnings of psychology must thus be sought among the beginnings of conscious scientific enquiry, and that takes us back to the great Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. Empirical science, of course, goes back in a sense to the first attempts at observation and experiment. The first experiments in cookery by the first married couple were, in their degree, science, just in so far as they provided guidance, and warning, in connection with similar experiments to follow. But psychology, with philosophy, came later, when man began to ask questions about the mind which controls these experiments, whether as energy inspiring them, as reason directing and comparing them, or as feeling appraising them.

In this connection the name of Aristotle stands supreme. Under the inspiration of Plato, but upon very different lines, he systematised the field of knowledge, and thus created the method of modern science. His importance for psychology is that he treats the mind or soul as an object which can be investigated like any external object, and not merely as the thinking or feeling

subject. His Logic and his Ethics are definitely psychological enquiries into the ways in which mind works, and in many respects, as pieces of observation and even of interpretation, they have stood intact to the present day. The "Faculty Psychology" of the last century was unquestionably the lineal successor of the Nicomachean Ethics, and had not inherited by any means all the qualities of that deservedly famous treatise. Aristotle's list of "virtues" was a first attempt at that classification which has culminated in the modern study of the so-called instincts. And in his principle of "moderateness," the ethical *via media*, he saw, what some psychologists of to-day have missed, that it is not enough to sort out the primary impulses upon which behaviour rests. They must be controlled to right expression in the pursuit of right ends. Anger, the psychological principle of anger, is in us all, but we must not give it either too much or too little scope. We must be neither wrathful nor wrathless, but rightly angry (*Eth. Nic.*, iv. 11). There is something else, then, other than the virtues themselves which brings about this moderation, conforming impulse to the right standard of life. And here Aristotle simply assumes the soul, with mind or reason (*nous*) as its expression, and, rightly, leaves for metaphysics (the name is his own) the problem thereby raised.

There is little need to stay over the period between Aristotle and Descartes, the real founder of modern psychology and philosophy alike. The Schoolmen simply took over the main principles of the Aristotelian system, and elaborated them with but little real advance. Psychology was for them simply the science of the soul, and the soul was accepted as an entity without serious

question, on the basis of the Christian revelation. As a result, its scope was inextricably confused with that of philosophy and theology, and little development was possible. The metaphysical questions raised by Aristotle were left unsolved, while his Logic and Ethics became standard textbooks. From the Logic was developed the whole scholastic system of dialectic, based upon the principles of the syllogism. The list of virtues from the Ethics was combined with the "Theological Virtues" of 1 Cor. xiii. into an elaborate system, in which the functions of the soul were much more fully described, but still upon wholly unscientific and unsystematic lines.

2

Nothing more could be done until the nature of the soul itself came under discussion freed from theological assumptions. This was the task undertaken by Descartes, followed, in England, by Locke. It is from this point that modern psychology begins. The problem of the soul, its relation on the one hand to the body (Descartes suggested that they interacted in the pineal gland), and on the other to mind or consciousness, was faced anew and in a spirit of free enquiry unknown since the time of Aristotle himself.

The most important result of this new movement of thought was the gradual extrication of psychology as a science from philosophy as a method *sui generis*. Descartes in his darkened room did more than renew the ancient quest for the ultimate ground of Reality. He found himself faced by the fact of mind as at once the means of that quest and the assurance of its ultimate success. *Cogito, ergo sum.* It was bad logic, as a suc-

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cession of critics have proved, but it was an admirable starting-point for a metaphysical enquiry. And this enquiry, begun upon such a basis, was clearly an impossible one, unless it was accompanied by an investigation of the nature of thought itself, an investigation which speedily developed into a general investigation of mind, the organ of thought.

Such were the circumstances of the birth of modern psychology. Descartes did little more than thus bring it to the birth. Its passage through infancy to a robust life of its own is marked by the writings of Locke and of the group of British thinkers who carried on his work, the most famous being Bishop Berkeley and David Hume. From Hume the main stream of progress divides. In one direction it passes out through Kant to the manifold developments of modern philosophy, idealist, realist, and pragmatist. In the other it leads to the Mills, Bain and Spencer, the typical representatives of the scholastic period of modern psychology. It is not necessary to deal with these various writers, but the main principles upon which their work rested are fundamental to any understanding of the position to-day.

Locke's *Essay concerning the Human Understanding* is the foundation upon which the whole structure is built. In this book he undertakes an elaborate investigation into the nature of mind and the source of its very varied contents. His discussion forms the starting-point for the two main types of the older psychology, the Faculty Psychology and the Association Psychology, resting respectively upon the principles that there are certain faculties or powers innate in the mind, and that ideas are linked together in accordance with certain laws, known as the laws of Association.

The mind, for Locke, is primarily a void, the mere possibility of experience. It is like a blank sheet of paper, upon which experience, through its two modes of sensation and reflection, may write. From this two-fold action of experience arise the ideas which constitute our conscious mental life. The senses convey to our minds from external objects those sensations which are the basis of such ideas as those of colour, taste, warmth, hardness, and other sensible qualities. The mind responds to these sensations both actively and passively, by means of its various innate faculties—*e.g.*, those of perception, retention, discerning, compounding, and abstracting. In this way the whole system of ideas is evolved, simple and complex. In part they come from without and thus correspond directly with things as they are, and in part from within, depending, equally directly, upon the innate constitution of the mind.

Each part of this theory raised large philosophical questions, which occupied Locke's successors until a deadlock was reached. Berkeley showed that Locke's distinction between the external and internal sources of the ideas could not stand analysis. It is impossible in the last resort to argue that Locke's so-called "primary qualities"—*i.e.*, bulk, situation, figure, number, and motion or rest—are any more inherent in things themselves than the "secondary qualities"—*e.g.*, colour, sound, scent—which clearly depend upon the constitution of our senses. We cannot, in fact, Berkeley argues, know things as they are. Hume carried Berkeley's analysis still further, and showed that the same criticism can be applied to mind itself, regarded as an object of knowledge. We can know neither the mind itself nor its faculties. Only the experienced series of ideas remains,

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and how that series becomes coherent or continuous remains a mystery. Thus Hume brings Locke's sensationalism to the philosophical cul-de-sac which was inevitable from the very first, and Kant, "awakened from his dogmatic slumber," set to work in defence of sanity and ordinary common-sense to attempt the analysis of experience anew, and discover in what sense the plain man may be justified when he speaks of the existence of the world, the self, and God.

With the work of Kant, philosophy comes to its own once more, and the separation of philosophy and psychology becomes an accomplished fact. It is important to note this stage in the historical outline, because psychology has, for the most part, been content to acquiesce in the separation and thus, quite unwittingly, to base its speculation upon the philosophy of Locke and his school, sublimely ignorant of the fact that that philosophy is more than a century out of date. It has assumed mind, with innate faculties, and it has assumed the ideas as the basic elements of experience, without any clear thinking about their essential character. The results have been little less than disastrous. If psychologists to-day are so widely sceptical in their conclusions as to ultimate reality, it is not merely because they have been engrossed in the prodigious experimental development of their science, but also (as happened to the geologists and biologists before them) because they have given too little attention to the primary question of the nature and meaning of the very fact that there is an experience to be investigated, or that they themselves are there to conduct the investigation. And, after all, in the end, even to a psychologist, it is the psychologist that matters.

Locke's psychology was thus more lasting than his philosophy, being less critically examined. In its two main aspects it held the field almost to the end of the nineteenth century.

In the first place, he gives shape to the Faculty Psychology, already outlined, though quite unscientifically, by Aristotle and the mediæval Schoolmen. Locke devotes his first book to a destructive criticism of the theory of innate ideas, which had been largely used for the purpose of Christian apologetics. No idea, whether general and abstract or particular and simple, can conceivably be said to be in the mind from the first as a formulated idea. The modern exponents of racial symbolism would do well to take Locke's argument to heart. But the principle of mental activity underlying the formation of the idea must be there if the idea is to be formed at all. Faculties, not ideas, are innate, being part of the very constitution of the mind itself. Perception, retention, and the rest, clearly proceed from the mind, and not from any outside source. The blank sheet of paper may be blank, but nevertheless it is so constituted that we can only write upon it in certain quite definite ways. And thus the ideas which form our mental experience are the product partly of sensation and partly of these so-called faculties, the modes of the operation of mind. Locke works out his scheme of these modes on the basis of logical process, and it is interesting, in view of later developments, that he throughout compares and contrasts man with the animals, allowing for example, that animals have the faculties of perception and, in some degree, retention, but altogether denying them the faculty of abstraction.

The suggestion that the faculties should be analysed on the basis of mental process was a sound one, and has borne fruit in modern philosophy, especially in the discussion of the Categories. But the later psychology found the invention of faculties only too easy. It sounded like an explanation of morality, or art, or religion, to say that the mind had a moral, an æsthetic, or a religious faculty, and the confusion has been perpetuated in more recent times by the similar invention of instincts to explain activities of many kinds, activities which bear no relation to one another, or to the proper field of instinctive behaviour. The Faculty Psychology received considerable support from the physiological investigation of the brain, with its apparent differentiation of function on anatomical lines. For the most part it was subject to little criticism, and it held the field until quite recent times, when it gave rise to, and was displaced by, the study of instinct.

In the second place Locke's discussion gave rise to the doctrine of the Association of Ideas. Here, indeed, Locke had a predecessor in Hobbes, but it is his chapter on the subject in the later editions of the *Essay* that determined the subsequent tendency of English psychology. The starting-point is the simple and obvious fact that there is coherence in the mind. Mental elements, termed by Locke ideas, arising from the twofold process of perception and reflection do, as a matter of obvious fact, cohere in judgments and recur in memory. And certain principles, such as similarity and contiguity, can be seen to determine these relationships. The scent of roses may be associated with a certain name, because we first saw the bearer of that name in a garden full of roses. Two people may be closely linked together in our minds

for no other reason than that their noses are the same shape.

Association is clearly enough a fact, but it is a fact that has had far more than the honour which is its due throughout the classical period of psychology in this country. The most thorough-going attempt to make the principle of association explain everything was that of David Hartley in *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections, showing how each arises from Association, with an account of the Entrance of Moral Evil into the world. To which are added Some remarks on the Independent Scheme, which deduces all obligation on God's part and Man's from certain Abstract Relations, Truth, etc. Written for the use of the young gentlemen at the Universities. Lincoln, 1747.* This portentous programme is carried out by Hartley on the basis of three principles: (a) that there are vibrations in the brain substance; (b) that the principle of association governs the action of the Soul; and (c) that this principle depends upon the cerebral vibrations. For Hartley everything mental is capable of association with ideas. Ideas are, it would seem, identified with vibration, though it is vibration on a miniature scale. Sensory vibrations give rise to a disposition of the medulla to "diminutive vibratiuncles," and it is these that are linked by the laws of association. Thus he explains the connection of words with meanings. Assent to a proposition is due to an "inveterate association." Affections are accounted for by the association of the ideas of pleasure and pain with sensations, or with the ideas resulting from sensations. In short, association is the one principle needed to explain human behaviour. "All rea-

soning," says Hartley, "as well as affection, is the mere result of association."

The obvious flaw in Hartley's system is his failure to analyse the complex nature of human consciousness. He can confuse ideas and vibrations as happily as the most modern of Behaviourists, and with just the same blindness to the problem involved. He has no intention whatever of being a materialist, though his discussion inevitably leads to that conclusion. And indeed, even apart from the very unsuccessful doctrine of vibrations, any thorough-going Associationism is likely to end in materialism of some sort, since it must depend for its success upon the application to mental process of laws of causation just as rigid as those which science postulates in the material world.

Whether "the young gentlemen at the Universities" found Hartley's medullary vibratiuncles easy to understand we have no means of knowing. At least he exercised a considerable influence. Joseph Priestley and Erasmus Darwin adopted his theory, vibrations and all, and elaborated it with considerable insight.

But it was in the following century that the Association theory really came into its own, in the writings especially of the two Mills, Bain and Spencer. In these writers Hartley's confused theory of vibrations is abandoned, and a definite distinction is made between the physical and the mental. It is seen clearly that the laws of Association are mental laws, having no proper application in any other than the mental sphere. And these laws are worked out perhaps as adequately as was then possible. The weakness of this school of psychology does not rest here so much as in its assumption that there is nothing in the mind except sensations, ideas, and

associations between sensations and ideas or between ideas and ideas. The analysis of the idea is itself hopelessly inadequate. It is the mere residue when sensation has faded, a faint image of sensation, apparently like in kind to sensation itself. No sufficient account is given of the emotional tone or value of ideas, and still less of their meaning or relation to reality. Conation or effort seems itself to be reduced to an association of the idea of an act with the idea of the pleasure to be gained thereby. For James Mill the ideas are the simple terms from which all else is compounded. Conation, cognition, and emotion or feeling have to be explained, often by considerable ingenuity, in terms of ideas. We can now see that this inverts the true order of analysis. Whether we retain the term "idea" or not (and it has certainly done enough damage in its time), the units of mental life cannot be treated simply upon the basis of sensation and concept. It is safer to realise that even in the simplest terms or elements to which mental experience can be reduced there is at the least a fourfold complexity, of which the idea proper is only the conceptual aspect. We can distinguish, for purposes of analysis, the objective stimulus of perception, the conceptual activity of cognition, with its reference in the present to past and future, the emotional activity of feeling, and the practical activity of conation. These can never be wholly separated, though there may be difference of emphasis. And any one of the four may be taken as fundamental for purposes of analysis. The idea of a feeling is no more real or important than the feeling of an idea. A clear appreciation of this would have saved the psychologists of this school from some of their worst blunders, especially in connection with Hedonism. It

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is not the quest of the idea of pleasure that dominates human life, but the pleasure of the quest for some value, meaning, or reality which must be determined by quite other than hedonistic standards.

This equation of experience with the series of ideas has given rise to all manner of confusions. From the time when Hume put it, almost satirically, in its simplest and crudest form, it has played a very great part in modern theory. Questions of all kinds speedily arose. What is the meaning of saying that we can have the same idea a second time? What is the permanent element in the idea, capable of being linked by association with other ideas and so of being revived? And, above all, how and where are ideas stored when we are not actually conscious of them? Such questions drove psychologists back upon various solutions. Some simply said that ideas are capable of existing in two conditions, conscious and unconscious. Others preferred to avoid the obvious difficulty of saying what on earth an unconscious idea might be, and talked of a marginal consciousness or sub-consciousness. For such writers the idea does not pass into complete unconsciousness, but remains unchanged in essence, only differing in the degree of our awareness. Of which it can only be said that it is simply untrue to all experience.

A closely parallel solution was to make the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious a distinction in the mind rather than in the ideas themselves. In such systems as that of Herbart consciousness was regarded as a kind of illuminated region of the mind. Ideas were said to pass into this region across "the threshold of consciousness," and at other times to remain in a kind of darkened antechamber. To the philosopher such

language as this seems to border on mythology, and some modern psychologists, such as McDougall, are trying to escape from its influence. The objections, of course, are easily seen, and rest upon nothing more recondite than the obvious fact that philosophy and psychology alike are forms of conscious activity, and are therefore incapable of thinking about the unconscious without altering it in its most essential character—viz., that of unconsciousness. Theories of marginal consciousness are open to exactly the same objection. The psychologist cannot attend to his marginal consciousness without bringing it to the centre of attention, and then it has at once ceased to be marginal. Our whole knowledge either of an Unconscious or of a Subconscious must be inferential and not direct. They are hypotheses, for the solution of problems, not observable facts.

In recent psychology the cult of the Unconscious is very strong. Philosophers for the most part are contributing little except criticism, often of a rather contemptuous kind. The criticism will not be wasted if it keeps the eyes of psychologists open to the really speculative character of their hypotheses. But there can hardly be any question that the hypotheses in themselves are justifiable. They may, in the end, involve the reconsideration of the nature of the mind, and a revision of the whole philosophical system of ideas. But in view of the fact that idealism has never proved capable of a wholly coherent statement, the philosopher has little reason to complain. The Unconscious, even if we change its name, has come to stay.

Before passing to the more specifically modern developments, we should note in passing the importance for psychology of the concurrent progress of physiology.

Descartes, with his conjecture as to the purpose of the pineal gland, has had a host of successors. We have already noted Hartley's identification of ideas with vibrations, and at about the same date we have a whole series of investigators into the structure of the brain and the nervous system, setting out with the definite hope of proving that thought is a kind of glandular secretion. The hope was doomed to disappointment. No such secretion could be isolated, and no gland or cortical area seemed capable of assuming the rôle of mediator between mind and body. Nevertheless, the investigation has been extraordinarily fruitful. The psychology of the last century was greatly under its influence, most notably, perhaps, in the case of Bain. Both the Faculty Psychology and the Association Psychology lent themselves readily, if somewhat dangerously, to illustration of this kind. The former found support in the localisation of cerebral function, starting from the work of the phrenologists, led by Francis Gall. The various sections of the brain were mapped out, at first very unsuccessfully, but later with great scientific precision. It may, indeed, be said that this alliance proved fatal to the Faculty Psychology in its older form, since the recognition of the auditory, visual, sensory, and motor areas did not in the least confirm the various suggested schemes of faculties. Phrenology proper is now a mere parlour game, and the Faculty Psychology has vanished, only to reappear in another guise in the modern discussion of instinct. When journalistic psychologists and popular preachers speak of "the religious instinct," or "the artistic instinct," or "the moral instinct," they call up ghosts which should long ago have been well and truly laid.

The alliance of physiology with the Association theory was much more successful, so much so that the physiological study of the nervous system is now a necessary preliminary to the work of an ordinary psychological laboratory. The importance of this study of "neurones" and "synapses" and "reflex arcs" is indicated by the fact that a very large proportion of the brain, consisting entirely of nerve cells interlacing in apparently almost unending complication, is now known as the "Association area." And it is clear enough that, whatever association may mean in its mental aspect, here is the mechanism by which in actual practice it is able to operate. We have first of all the simple reflex arcs, centred in the spinal column, whereby a stimulus is met by the appropriate response without reference to the controlling brain. And then, in increasing complexity, we have the neurones which pass up the spinal cord, some to the cerebellum and some to the various areas of the cortex, the latter alone reaching consciousness. The functions of this complex system have been observed and tabulated with great accuracy, and there has been a tendency in some quarters to regard this physiological study of the nervous system as the only true psychology. In particular, the theory of mechanical reflexes, especially in the form of "tropisms," has had a considerable vogue. To this theory we must return later on, when our review of modern theories reaches Behaviourism, an eccentricity not of the nineteenth, but of the twentieth century.

It is clear to any observer, even if he is only a reader of the daily press, that at the end of the nineteenth cen-

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tury there was a sudden stir in the psychological world, a stir which had the effect of arousing public interest to an unprecedented degree. In the last few years the word psychology has been upon everybody's lips, and articles and books have been poured out in an apparently endless stream. Probably the tide of public interest, the kind of interest that is not prepared to think very hard, or to read very widely, is past the full, and psychologists can now turn from the profitable business of giving popular lectures and writing hasty and ill-considered books to the more serious task of finding out the actual position of their own science to-day.

It is not easy to estimate rightly all the reasons which have led to this sudden popularity. Probably it is to some extent accidental, and due to the concurrence of a group of causes which might have occurred separately without producing any such result. We cannot, for example, leave out of account the fact that William James, whose massive *Principles of Psychology* forms the link between the old and the new, was a great literary stylist as well as a great psychologist. Individuals sometimes count for a good deal in the history of thought. But two main factors of a general character must be taken into account, both being concerned with the widening and defining of the proper field of psychological enquiry.

In the first place, we have the enormous extension of the range of psychotherapy. This has excited very wide interest owing partly to the startling cures which it has been able to record, and partly to the almost equally startling theories by which it has sought to explain them. The real importance of psychotherapy for the general theory of psychology has been that it has forced psy-

chologists to study abnormal as well as normal human behaviour. The older psychologists set up a more or less arbitrary standard of normal human conduct, a lay-figure closely related to the "economic man" of the sociologists, a personage who would be of some value, if any actual man had ever resembled him. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century various writers, and notably Francis Galton and William James, introduced a new factor into the discussion by venturing to study the abnormal. Galton described and discussed, on associationist lines, such out-of-the-way phenomena as number-forms and colour-hearing, while James gave attention to a number of cases of dual personality, and also analysed, with an unrivalled brilliance of description, some of the more striking phenomena of religion in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Side by side with this, largely as a result of the growth of humanitarianism, went a new interest in people of abnormal mentality, from the point of view of treatment and cure. And this interest led to a study of a number of regions in the everyday life of normal men and women, which had usually been left on one side as of no particular significance, the most noteworthy being their dreams.

The development of this aspect of psychology started with Charcot in the school of the Salpêtrière at Paris. Charcot's attempts to study hysteria in his patients were based originally upon the theories of Mesmer, but his work gave the impetus to two of his pupils—Janet, who followed him in Paris, and who especially studied the problems of dissociated personalities, and Freud, who, working with Breuer at Vienna, developed his well-known theory of hysteria as due to the repression of the sex-instinct. In pursuance of this theory, based as it

was on the actual treatment of hysterical patients, he wrote his famous, if somewhat exasperating, book on dream interpretation, the well-known *Traumdeutung*, following it by his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, in which he applies the same general theory to common everyday slips in speech and conduct. It may fairly be said that these two books have been the main factor in arousing popular interest. Important as they are in this respect, they are not of great importance for technical psychology, since they simply use the methods and presuppositions of the Association Psychology. And though Freud's theories are in form revolutionary, it has been said, and truly enough, that he carried his revolution through by methods fifty years behind the times. The main significance of all this group of writers has been that they have forced upon psychotherapy the truth of the maxim, *Nihil humani alienum a me puto*. We must not leave the abnormal out of account. It is indeed only an aspect of the normal and must be studied with it. And the very fact that abnormal human behaviour is usually due to an isolation and exaggeration of some one factor common to normal humanity makes "Abnormal Psychology" abundantly useful for the study of normal individuals. As in many other branches of science, extreme cases are often the best means of testing a theory.

The second main factor in the sudden development of modern psychology has been the definite recognition that animal and human psychology must be studied together. This has been called the principle of Biological Continuity. It has been undoubtedly due largely to the impetus given by Darwin. Although Darwinism has itself never proved capable of a completely coherent

statement, it has at least shown that the human body must be studied in relation to animal bodies, and especially to those which most nearly approach man both in form and in behaviour. Modern psychology has applied this same principle to the study of the mind, with very striking and valuable results. In the older writers instinct was regarded as the special prerogative of the animals, while human conduct was supposed to be regulated by intelligence. A certain number of writers in the latter part of the nineteenth century recognise that instinct plays some part in human life too, and latterly Bergson, in his *Creative Evolution*, has gone so far as to suggest that the one great hope for human progress is that man should recover that intuitive and instinctive mode of reaction to his environment that he has so largely lost. But recent psychological thought tends to believe that man has his instincts, exactly as the animals have them, and that they are by no means lost or replaced by intelligence, but are, in fact, the driving forces upon which the energy of all life depends. This conception largely underlies the work of the Freudian psychoanalysts, though they are too busy with the detail of their theory to deal adequately with this fundamental point. The principal workers in this field have been W. McDougall and A. F. Shand, who have attempted the task of describing and differentiating the types of instinctive behaviour observable in man, and W. H. R. Rivers, whose *Instinct and the Unconscious* was a first attempt to correlate their results with recent enquiry into the history of the evolution of the structure of the nervous system.

It is interesting to note that the analysis of instinct replaces the older Faculty Psychology, with which in-

deed it has some affinity. But the Faculty Psychology was derived primarily, as we saw, from the analysis of the mental processes of judgment, while the modern psychology of instinct starts rather from the analysis of behaviour, and of the feelings specific to various types of behaviour. And this change constituted a revolution in psychological method. It set the science free from the tyranny of the theory of ideas and opened the door to a wider conception of the general character of mental process. For modern psychology the cognitive process occupies only a middle position in the complex unity of what is sometimes termed a "mental element," following upon the apprehension of some stimulus and issuing immediately in the response of conation, the impulse which issues in action. And this whole process is accompanied by its appropriate feeling-tone, or "affect" as it is commonly called.

Starting from this general conception of mental process, McDougall, in his *Social Psychology*, is able to classify the instincts in man by means of the characteristic behaviour in which each of them results, and the characteristic emotion or feeling-tone which accompanies the behaviour. He defines the instincts in the most general terms as "innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species." In the case of each instinct, the typical behaviour is evoked by a particular kind of stimulus. Thus fear, with its twofold motor reactions of flight and immobility (both well exemplified in a hare frightened by dogs), is typically aroused by anything sudden and strange, especially if accompanied by a loud noise. In some people this reaction to a thunderclap is never completely controlled. At every peal there comes the preliminary

leap of the heart, which is the first stage of flight, and the accompanying emotion of fear. In fact, so immediate is this physical reaction that, according to one theory (put forward by W. James and Lange), the emotion is simply the sensation of its first stages. It is perhaps hardly likely, in view of the dominant rôle which is now being assigned to the emotions, that the James-Lange theory will stand, but the general description of instinctive behaviour may be accepted for the present, subject to criticism in detail.

McDougall's list of the primary instincts in man may be tabulated as follows:

<i>Impulse.</i>	<i>Affect.</i>
Flight	Fear
Pugnacity	Anger
Repulsion	Disgust
Curiosity	Wonder
Self-assertion	Positive self-feeling or Elation
Self-abasement	Negative self-feeling or Subjection
Parental Instinct	Tenderness
Sex	
Feeding	
Gregariousness	
Acquisition	
Construction	

together with some simple primitive responses such as crawling and sucking.

McDougall argues that all other emotions and instinctive reactions can be reduced to the above, combined

in various ways. Admiration, for example, is wonder combined with self-abasement. If fear is added it becomes awe.

The general principles from which McDougall started have been very generally accepted, though he himself in his recent book *An Outline of Psychology* has pointed the way to their criticism and restatement. The details of his list have been subjected to searching examination by A. F. Shand, in his *Foundations of Character*.

Shand regards practically all the items in McDougall's list as complex, and thinks that the term "instinct" should be reserved for the simple primary combinations which are each found in several of the higher emotional systems. Thus the same innervation of the muscles serves both fear and anger. He then arranges the list of the simpler combinations in a series of increasing complexity:

Impulses.

Rapport and exercise
Self-assertion and self-abasement

Appetite.

Sex
Feeding

Emotions.

Fear		Curiosity
Anger		Joy (with Sorrow)
Disgust		Repugnance

It will be noted at once that there are both additions to McDougall's list and omissions from it. The changes

are largely due to Shand's theory of the Sentiments, which is his great contribution to recent psychology. He points out that these simpler emotions tend to be grouped together by reference to some object, and that some of McDougall's "instincts," notably the parental instinct and the gregarious instinct, have this character. They have, in fact, the feature that they bring together the tendencies of the other simpler impulses, and relate them in the one case to the child, and in the other case to the human society as their object.

Shand argues that this indicates the general characteristic of mental development. The whole life of the organism is gradually unified by the formation of these sentiments, of which the most typical are Love and Hate. It has now become customary to adopt this terminology. Psychologists speak of the Herd-sentiment rather than of the Herd-instinct. We can even speak of the Ego-sentiment or the God-sentiment, indicating thereby those mental dispositions which regulate and direct the primary impulses, appetites, and emotions by reference to either the self or God. And thus the function of religion can be very simply stated. Religion (objectively regarded) exists to foster the God-sentiment.

It should be noted that this theory presupposes, but does not prove, the reality of the object about which the sentiment is formed. Some psychologists have written as though they had explained the Ego (and themselves therewith) away altogether by tracing the stages in the growth of the ego-sentiment. It is worth while to point out that they have done nothing of the kind. If the ego is the object about which the sentiment is formed, then, clearly, the object must precede the formation of the

sentiment, not only logically, but in solid reality. And the same is true of God. The fact is that psychology is not directly concerned with such questions as are raised by the problem of the existence of the ego, the world, and God. But psychology does at least point us always to an object beyond the immediate self of experience. It looks beyond itself, and at least leaves open the door for metaphysics. And by that same door Faith may enter in.

The relation between these two extensions of modern psychology—that is between the Associationism of the Freudians and psychotherapists generally, and the amended Faculty Psychology of the students of instinct—is at present very obscure. In each of these directions a great deal of pioneer work has been done. The fields are well mapped out. But the underlying problems are by no means solved. The Associationists find themselves compelled to assume, for the sake of scientific precision, that some one or other of the instincts—to use the term in the broadest sense—constitutes the fundamental impetus of human behaviour, and that the stream of associated mental imagery is both the symbol of this fundamental impetus and the means whereby it finds expression. The idea, they urge, tends to bring about appropriate action. Imagination, say Coué and his interpreter Baudouin, and not will, is the dominant force in life. But they are in no sort of agreement as to which of the instincts must be treated as fundamental. The Freudians, with even more enthusiasm than their master, make sex predominant, though they extend the usage of that term to include large areas of the life of the child which are certainly remote from the sexual impulse as developed in adult life. Sidis in America and, on rather different lines, Rivers in England, have looked rather to fear, or,

on broader lines, to the group of self-preserved impulses. Adler has dwelt especially upon the self-assertive impulse, arguing that the other impulses are expressions of the will to power. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this last view, which adapts itself well to the general grouping of the instincts adopted by Shand. But it is of some importance here to distinguish the developed self-assertive impulse, as described by McDougall, with its characteristic physical signs, from the more fundamental self-assertion which is seen in every effort made by an organism, even the very simplest, to fulfil and satisfy the varied impulses of its life.

It is probably true to say that psychologists in general are coming more and more to think that the truth is not wholly with any one of these schools. The Freudian theory was based largely upon the study of hysteria, and it is doubtless true that the hysterias of civil life can, in many cases, be traced to conflicts connected with sex. But the recent war gave us a whole host of examples in which the conflict was concerned with quite different causes, and notably with fear. And Adler is probably quite right in claiming that in many of the cases where sex is involved, it is not primary, but that some form of the demand for self-assertion is the real cause of the trouble. It is thus probably true, as indeed it is *a priori* probable, that any of these fundamental impulses may be the disturbing factor in a case of mental disorder, and if this is so it follows that, so far as the needs of the Association theory are concerned, we must look to the whole group of instincts rather than to any one as predominant. And we must expect that, in different individuals, at different times, and in different environments, we shall find marked differences, as our war

experience of the neuroses has shown, in the extent to which the various instincts are finding expression alike in normal conduct and in the formation of neuroses.

The divergence of the various schools on this point is symptomatic of the general position of recent psychology. It has been immensely successful on the descriptive side. There has been a great amount of careful introspection and of accurate laboratory work. New methods of investigation have been invented, such as the method of free association, with its precise noting of reaction times. The application of these methods, especially to industry and to education, has gone on apace, as, for example, in the study of fatigue and of vocational tests. But the more fundamental discussion as to the nature of mental process is not nearly so far advanced. There is, indeed, a good deal of danger that the very dogmatic assertions of some psychologists as to the ultimate meaning of life (or, in some cases, its lack of ultimate meaning) may be accepted without sufficient challenge, on the ground of their great knowledge of descriptive psychology. It must never be forgotten that description is not explanation, a mistake which science has often made, though less commonly to-day than fifty years ago.

It may broadly be said that the central issue for modern psychology is the problem long ago raised by Aristotle when he analysed the four types of cause: material, formal, efficient, and final. As to the first two of these, modern psychology raises no doubts. It accepts the principle of cause and effect and applies it to mind as confidently as science in general has ever applied it to material things. But the questions of the motive power and of the purpose of life remain, and here lie the main issues for psychology to-day.

The problem of the efficient cause has already come across our path in our attempt to relate the psychology of instinct to the Association Psychology of the analytical schools. Even within the units of mental life, the "mental elements," we must at least ask the question, Why does apprehension pass over, by the way of cogniton and affect, into conation and action? We can see, by descriptive psychology, the presence of the material and formal causes. We can investigate stimulus, environment, and mental disposition. But, when all is said, why does anything happen? Is there a driving impulse, and is there anything that can be called purpose?

These two questions must be taken separately. On the first a great deal has been written, and the debate is still keen. There have been parallel movements here in psychology and in philosophy, movements which have, in some degree, affected each other. Among the philosophers there has been a movement in the direction of "Creative Evolution," to use Bergson's phrase. The Neo-Idealism of Croce and the Italian School conceives reality as the eternally creating self-expression of ideas. In the Realism of S. A. Alexander, as set forth in his recent Gifford Lectures, reality itself, starting from the lowest level, that of "space-time," is eternally producing that higher thing that is to be, rising to new and unforeseen levels. Bergson himself conceived the driving force of life, the *élan vital*, as operating rather from the past, an inherent creative tendency which thrusts forward against the static resistance of a dead universe until its living resources are exhausted. Bergson hints, though it is no more than a hint, at the possibility that

the life-impulse may, in the end, be victorious, conquering even death itself in its onward rush.

The problem has been forced upon psychology mainly by the needs of psychotherapy. The healer of the mind must know whether he has an ally in the mind itself, a life-force which is alike the source of the disorder and, if rightly handled, the source of the cure. It has been customary, though not at all fortunate, to name this life-force the "libido," a term used alike by the Freudians and by the followers of Freud's pupil and critic, Jung. The unhappy sexual connotation of the word has caused a good deal of unnecessary misunderstanding, though, of course, it makes it peculiarly well adapted to the Freudian system. In connection with the libido, two main questions arise. In the first place, are we to regard the libido, with Freud, as a life-energy fixed in kind and capable of using the instinct-channels provided for it only in certain specific ways? In this case it is simply a force, unknown in its exact nature, but strictly the equivalent of the steam in a locomotive or the electrical current in a dynamo. Or are we, with Jung, to see in the libido something closely akin to Bergson's *élan vital*, a power with the character of free creation, continually striving to build up a unified mental structure in harmony with environment? There is all the difference in the world between the two positions, a difference which finds expression in the widely different theories and methods of psychotherapy as practised by the followers of Freud and Jung respectively. It is ultimately upon Jung's broader theory of the libido that the whole complex system of cure by suggestion depends.

The place of suggestion in modern psychological practice is very great, and it is important in connection with

the problems of religion, especially in connection with prayer and worship, but it is impossible to give it more than a few lines here. Suggestion depends upon the principle that an idea or mental image presented to the mind tends to be accepted by the mind without question, and to result in the appropriate response unless there is reason to the contrary. In the various systems of psychotherapy advantage is taken of this "primitive credulity" of the mind to varying extents, and a considerable technique has been evolved for the purpose of rendering suggestion effective. The Freudians claim that psycho-analysis proper does not involve any element of suggestion, but Freud himself has admitted that the prestige of the method, and of the analyst, together with the hope of cure, are factors which cannot be ignored. And the critics of the Freudian method declare, not without some plausibility, that the results of the Freudian analysis are not wholly derived from the patient, but are at least in part suggested by the analyst, often quite unconsciously. Jung and the Zürich School admit the place of suggestion, but urge that it must be given along lines which represent the patient's own constructive effort towards mental health. This is to be discovered by analysis, since it lies in the unconscious. The popular auto-suggestion school, led by M. Coué, has little psychological background, but falls more or less into line with the followers of Jung in its insistence that hetero-suggestion must become auto-suggestion before it can be effective. There has been some little danger in religious circles that prayer may be confused with auto-suggestion, from which it differs in practically everything that is of importance. Conscious intercourse with a personal God has little resemblance to a mechanical

implanting of ideas, however pious, in the Subconscious, even though that may be one of its secondary results.

The whole theory of suggestion is thus simply an extension of the general discussion of mental mechanism. And the very elaboration with which this mechanism has now been analysed has led to a series of attempts to explain mind on wholly mechanistic lines. These attempts fall into two main classes. In the first place there are the Freudian analysts, who obtain their results by a rigid application of the old Associationist determinism, dealing with the mind exactly as science had dealt with matter. The law of cause and effect is unconditionally accepted, and freedom, with value and meaning, are thereby banished. The revolt of the Zürich School, with its conception of the libido as free and curative, is of the first importance here (despite Jung's own disastrously ill-informed handling of religion in his *Psychology of the Unconscious*, which unfortunately omits to reckon with the existence of historical facts and accepts Drews as a typical Christian theologian!). The fact is that Freud, with all his masterly power of detailed observation, has left out some of the most fundamental elements in human personality, and has thereby simplified it to the point of unreality. The majority of psychologists to-day, so far as they accept analytical methods at all, prefer the leadership of Jung.

In the second place we have Behaviourism, for which we are indebted to our brethren in the United States. It is difficult to deal patiently with a system so persistently perverse and blind to the essential facts. The Behaviourists find their test in McDougall's definition of Psychology as the science of behaviour, but make a use of the definition which its originator never contemplated,

and which has led him to modify it in his latest work, *An Outline of Psychology*. They assume that the physical aspects of behaviour are the only aspects of any importance, and thus they reduce psychology to a form of biology, and almost of physiology. Here we have again that influence of the study of brain anatomy which we found affecting the older Association Psychology in Hartley and Bain. And though the study is more detailed and more accurate in description, it remains as unsatisfactory as ever in its treatment of the fundamental questions of the nature of consciousness and of freedom, with its corollary of moral responsibility. Some writers of this school, such as J. B. Watson in his *Psychology from the Standpoint of the Behaviourist*, simply treat consciousness as irrelevant. It may occur as an "epiphenomenon," but we can say nothing about it. The only thing that matters is the study of behaviour, and behaviour is governed entirely by "conditioned reflexes." One prominent exponent of this type of psychology, E. B. Holt, in *The Concept of Consciousness*, goes even further, since he denies the most outstanding fact of consciousness—viz., the fact that it is conscious, and reduces all experience, whether of effort, knowledge, desire, or feeling, to movements of particles or of streams of energy. But this, as the Freudians would say, is merely a regression into psychological infantilism, recalling David Hartley's unhappy "vibratiuncles," and without the inconsistencies which enabled Hartley to retain a sane view of human life in the end. For, after all, even if consciousness were always a consciousness of vibrations or of movements of particles, which is, at the least, by no means certain, it is simply meaningless to say that it is itself a vibration or movement. The veriest

moment of introspection, despite Holt's lengthy explanation of the way in which the illusion came about, is sufficient to destroy his case.

Bergson's refutation of mechanistic theories, in his *Creative Evolution*, seems to be conclusive, though probably they represent a mode of thought which will be with us to the end. But what of the alternatives?

McDougall, in the book just quoted, has recently put forward a strong plea for the recognition of purpose as the central factor in behaviour, and though he has not yet developed his case fully (his promised second volume has not appeared at the date when these words are written), there is no doubt that the psychology of the future must take purpose into account. Of course Bergson's drastic criticism of "finalism" must be taken into account, but the finalism with which Bergson deals is merely an inverted mechanism, a pull from in front substituted for a push from behind. This is not purpose in the sense intended by McDougall. Purpose is in itself a thing present rather than future, though always looking to the future. It is a free creative activity, and by that very fact introduces into human behaviour an element that is unpredictable. This, however, does not mean an element of mere arbitrary chance, which is the least free of all things. That which is purposed must be purposed in accordance with the law of cause and effect. In fact it is by the aid of that law that it finds its freedom, as T. H. Green has shown (*Treatise on Political Obligation*, Introductory Lecture).

It is easy to see that this thesis put forward by McDougall is in line with many of the accepted facts of human behaviour. It is especially clear that the activities of the instincts are invariably directed to ends be-

yond themselves, either to the preservation or the reproduction of the organism or the species. In the same way Jung's theory of the libido, which in this respect agrees with that of Adler, reveals it as a creative and constructive impulse looking to the adaptation of the organism to its environment. The very mental disorders which form the field of psychology are themselves regarded as efforts at self-adaptation by the organism. Illness is frequently, if not always, an attempted solution of some problem created by man's environment, and the cure is sought by an alternative solution, a solution to which the patient's own mental tendencies supply the clue (so, at least, Jung has suggested, with considerable practical success). Clearly a psychology which omits purpose, like a psychology which omits consciousness, fails in its own first and foremost obligation as a descriptive science. A true psychology must cover all the facts and not merely a selection.

McDougall includes purpose, or direction towards an end, in his definition of behaviour, thus contrasting behaviour proper with mechanical reflex action. He has no difficulty in showing that even the lowest forms of life, the Amœba or Paramecium, show many of the marks of behaviour, and that this is even more clear as we rise to the Insecta and the Vertebrata. His latest definition of instinct is as follows: "An innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object." Here the relation of instinct to an object, end, or purpose is definitely recognised. As against Bergson, McDougall urges that

intelligence is not an alternative to instinct, but its companion and ally. Intelligence is developed in the higher animals to provide for that plasticity in the attainment of the purposes of instinct without which the adjustment of the species to its environment would become dangerously rigid. The elaborate instinctive behaviour of the Yucca moth renders it wholly unfitted to play any large part in the life-order of the world. Those species which have the most generalised instincts, served by the most adaptive intelligence, stand by far the best chance in the struggle for dominance. This does not, of course, mean that these generalised instincts are not powerful, or that they play but a small part in the life-history of the individuals of such a species. Even in man they are fundamental. And from the very beginning, and throughout, they are, in the broad sense, purposive, directed, however unconsciously, towards ends beyond themselves, and finding their proper climax in the conscious purposes of adult human life.

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This brings us to some of the problems with which the psychology of to-day is faced, problems closely related, and in each case passing ultimately beyond the scope of psychology proper and into the sphere of philosophy. The first is this problem of the purpose or end of life. It has crossed our path again and again, in various forms. Partly it appears as an inner demand of the organism itself, continually looking beyond itself to some higher thing, as in the *élan vital* of Bergson, the libido of Jung, the instincts (resting upon a fundamental life-energy which operates through them), of McDougall.

Partly, as in Shand's theory of sentiment-formation, it is the external demand of some object drawing the primitive instincts into emotional dispositions directed towards that object. Psychology has interested itself in the analysis of the emotional dispositions, and on this side there is still much to be done. But the analysis of the object is probably more important still, not merely for the theoretical issues involved, but for the actual guidance of life. It at once appears, upon the least reflection, that the only objects which are capable of undertaking this rôle of sentiment-formation are personal, ourselves, others, God. All other objects are secondary, and can only become objects for the unifying of mental disposition in relation to one or other of these three. As the Freudians rightly say, though they give an unnecessarily limited meaning to the phrase, it is the "love-life" alone that really counts.

The second of these problems is that of the nature of the Ego or Self. Just as in theology we are faced with the fact that life may be self-centred, withdrawn from the love of others or of God, which is the sin that is unto death, so in psychology we find that the Ego may become its own object, in some cases with disastrous results. The problem of the nature of the Ego has been forced upon the analytical psychologists by the group of intractable disorders which seem to depend upon this withdrawal of the Ego from object-reality to the object-self. Freud has endeavoured to give even this a sexual turn by calling it Narcissism and connecting it with childish auto-sexuality. But in his later work (*e.g.*, in his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*) he practically admits that the psychoses, as these disorders are termed, involve causes distinct from those which under-

lie hysteria and anxiety-neurosis. He has attempted an analysis of the ego in its relation to the group in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, in which he makes all group psychology go back to the relation existing between the "primitive horde" and the father-leader, the development of the individual ego from its original self-centred state being due to the pressure of the "ego-ideal," the common mind of the group for its members. There is, of course, no doubt that the life of the family, and of the wider social organism, exercises an almost all-powerful influence upon the development of the individual, but this is not the same thing as the development of the fact of his individuality. Given self-consciousness, we can easily see how it comes to be filled with content. But the origin of the Self-consciousness itself remains as much a mystery as ever. The problem has been handled by a good many writers of different psychological schools, but all the discussions that claim to give a solution fail in the same vital point. They confuse the subject-ego with the object-ego, and think that they are explaining the existence of self-consciousness when they are merely explaining its states. The sooner psychology recognises self-consciousness as the central and irreducible fact from which all investigation must begin, the better for psychology.

This does not, of course, mean that there is no task for biology and psychology in this connection. The whole history of the differentiation of the biological unit is in itself a most interesting one. It would be fascinating to work out the psychology of a colony of coral polyps, if we had any means of entering into its experience from within. But external study of its behaviour takes us no part of the distance. Even when we come to the animals

nearest to man, the monkey and the dog, we still stand outside their consciousness, and can make no inference from their behaviour as to its existence. As a direct datum of intuition we find it in our own lives, a fact not to be explained away, and a starting-point for a train of metaphysical enquiry which lies wholly beyond the scope of psychology.

And so we come to the third of the problems which psychology is facing to-day—the problem of moral responsibility. The fact of moral responsibility is unquestionably an element in normal human experience. But what is its meaning? Again the psychologists explain it, to the point of explaining it away. The problem is closely bound up with those of the purposive character of life and of the existence of the ego. Moral responsibility finds its place readily enough in the experience of an ego capable of purposive self-development. And it will not unnaturally relate itself to the fact that the individual ego has its place as the member of a group. But this is by no means the same thing as to say that conscience is merely the pressure of the “herd-instinct” resting upon a basis of paternal admonitions. These things account, doubtless, for much of the content of conscience in any given case, but that is all. The fact of the existence of conscience, with its implication of an absolute standard of moral values, lies beyond the explanations of a merely descriptive psychology.

Our general survey of the progress of psychology may close at this point. The later essays in this volume will deal in detail with the application of the various theories to the problems of religion, so that there is no need to point the moral here. The history of psychology is certainly a story lacking its last chapters, and it is by no

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means clear yet how the plot will work out. But that is because it is an adventure of humanity, and humanity, despite the Behaviourists, is free.

III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAYER AND
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

BY

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III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAYER AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

THE utmost that a psychological study of prayer and religious experience may be expected to yield is a description of these phenomena. A description, however, is not an explanation. Psychology is not concerned with objections to prayer, but with the fact and the analysis of its content. When we attempt to move from description to explanation, we pass the bounds of psychological enquiry and enter into the realm of philosophy and metaphysics. It may be impossible, however, to keep this investigation of the psychology of prayer and religious experience strictly within its legitimate limits, and that because some psychologists have ventured from the results of their enquiries to deduce conclusions of a highly disputable character. On psychological grounds, for example, the ultimate validity of religious experience and the objective reference in prayer is seriously challenged. The hypothesis that our beliefs are a subjective delusion and our prayers examples of auto-suggestion is put forward in all good faith by some writers as the best explanation which a psychological analysis of the data yields. Clearly, then, psychologists, in reaching these conclusions, have passed beyond descriptions

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of the data to theories adequate, in their opinion, to explain them. They have thus thrown out a challenge to the defenders of religious beliefs and have raised afresh ultimate questions. The reality of the supernatural, the objective existence of God, the meaning and value of finite individuality, and its relation to ultimate reality—these clearly are problems for the philosophy of religion and cannot be settled offhand only by the unaided evidence psychology furnishes. The data for the defence or the repudiation of Theism are derived from many and varied sources. Every science, psychology included, may furnish its quota, but the verdict reached will not be one based only upon a descriptive analysis of mental and spiritual states and religious experience apart altogether from other evidence. Even if the psychological analysis of the prayer life and religious experience were to yield irrefutable evidence of the purely subjective character of man's communion with the Unseen and justify at the utmost its merely psychological objectivity, this would not in itself be the death-blow to Theism. It would simply demonstrate the negative character of the approach to Theism *via* psychology. It would be a warning that nothing beyond a psychologically objective reference could be deduced from a psychological investigation of the data of religious experience. It would leave the problem of the ultimate objectivity of God unsolved, and the question whether man in prayer can and does reach Him would have still to be discussed apart from anything psychology could furnish for or against the Theistic hypothesis.

It will be the aim, then, of this Essay to examine the psychology of prayer and religious experience, having in view these negative conclusions some have drawn from

their study. We have felt it necessary, however, at the outset to utter this caution as to the very limited scope of psychological enquiries into spiritual states, and their non-conclusive character as evidence for the hypotheses some have sought to substantiate by their means. We hope to show, moreover, that the psychological data, carefully analysed, by no means substantiate the purely subjective character of religious experience, and certainly do not yield anything like conclusive evidence of the illusory nature of man's communion with the Unseen, nor do they justify our dismissing the prayer life as an æsthetic sentiment or a product of auto-suggestion.

The apologetic character of our work is thus due not to our own failure to recognise the strictly descriptive function of religious psychology and the very limited nature of the results we may be expected to reach from such a study. It is rather due to the fact that this has not been observed by some who have strayed beyond their legitimate tasks as psychologists, and have endeavoured to prejudice the validity of the Theistic argument by means of conclusions drawn quite illegitimately from psychological data and by introducing explanations which, strictly speaking, lie outside the boundaries of psychological enquiry.

It may be well at the outset to give in brief outline the kind of explanation of religious experience and the prayer-life with which we are presented by certain modern psychological theories and the findings of some psycho-analytical investigations.

In essence they amount to this—viz., that religious experience is purely subjective; the fruit of certain temperaments in the case of persons of varied intelligence and culture. It is due, we are given to understand, to

the urge or libido, the life-impulse; it is the expression of the dream fantasies of the race or the subconscious desires of the individual. Thus Jung in his *Psychology of the Unconscious* finds the true explanation of Christianity in racial dreams. He thus reduces it to an illusion of the experient, the creation, in fact, of the experiencing mind. Here we have the real significance of myths and religions. They are transformations of the libido, interpreted in the widest sense of that term, the equivalent, if we will, of Bergson's *élan vital*. This is the hypothesis which solves the problem of the origin and worth of religion. It is a product of earth. In its origin it is "fantasy-thinking." In its reference it is a dream-created supernatural. As to its intrinsic worth or ultimate validity, we must answer the question by the value we attach to that stuff that dreams are made of. We must, in any case, give up the attempt to seek for the metaphysical origins of religions. We are assured that we can find all we want and a sufficient "explanation" in its psychic and physiological origins. Moreover, to find it there is plainly of great value, since we are moving strictly all the time within a province open to "scientific" investigation. We have not to seek for the "Given" in some metaphysical entity called "Heaven" which forever eludes the grasp of the scientific explorer. The "Given" is within the scope of the psychology of religion, and the method of psychological investigation called psycho-analysis in the hands of the Vienna or the Zürich schools is all we need to employ in order to enable us to lay bare the phenomena of religion and to dissect religious experience and the prayer-life. By such a method we are at least enabled to reveal it for what it really is—viz., fantastic forms created by the

life-force, the unconscious activity of the libido. Thus religion takes its place with myth, magic, art, poetry, music, dreams and neuroses of all kinds, the product of what is at bottom that formidable stream of natural instincts and desires of a fleshly kind which is the real basic source of our life. The fairest forms of art, the finest products of literature, all the fruit of æsthetic activity, are sublimations of the instincts. So the purely natural and animal instincts, on this hypothesis, may become sublimated into the supernatural—that more purified and elevated cuckoo-land of fair dreams and hopes. Truly a wonderful sublimation which can produce the spiritual from the natural, the moral from the sensual, heaven from earth, that which is above nature from that which nature is! In dealing with all these psychological theories, whether in the hands of psychologists generally or in those of the psycho-analysts in particular, we have always to remember that they are based upon a whole-hearted acceptance of a thorough-going evolutionary theory, and, so far as we can judge, necessitate a whole-hearted acceptance of Naturalism. The lowliest beginnings in the subconscious "emerge" finally in forms which bear the stamp of heaven itself upon them, and Freud will undertake to show us exactly how it is done. First the *libido*; then that against which it reacts, the *censor*; issuing in *repression* or, if rightly directed, *sublimation*. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis! What would we more?

Many of us may have found Jung's *Analytical Psychology*, if in places unpleasant reading, at least suggestive of a scientific investigation. We are bound to confess, however, that we are strongly tempted to wonder whether he means us to take his *Psychology of the*

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Unconscious seriously. Yet there seems to be no doubt whatever that it is meant to be a scientific investigation. We are left wondering whether the allegorical method in Biblical interpretation ever reached the height of improbability attained by this author. In any case the Biblical exegetes did not work in the name of "science," whilst Jung does. His English translator, Miss Beatrice M. Hinkle, tells us in the preface that in *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* Jung has plunged boldly into the treacherous sea of mythology and folklore in order to apply psychologic analysis to the productions of the ancient mind and that of the common people in order to reveal the common bond of desire and longing which unites all humanity. He is thus seeking to bridge the gaps presumed to exist between ancient and widely separated peoples and those of modern times. The discovery of this under-current affecting and influencing ancient and modern races, we are told, is Jung's starting-point for a new ideal, a new goal of attainment which can be intellectually satisfying as well as emotionally appealing—the goal of moral autonomy. We are thus promised "a new evaluation of the whole of human life." Jung offers us "an understanding not only of the symptoms of a neurosis and the phenomena of conduct, but the product of the mind as expressed in myths and religion."

Psycho-analytical study thus proposes to present us with a completely new reading of the true place and significance of religion and prayer in our daily life. Science, by the method of psycho-analysis, is to produce a religion free from all needless superstitions, rooted and grounded in empirical reality, open to the test of scientific investigation, and furnishing for one and all

a new way of developing our personalities "by converting certain psychological tendencies which could produce useless symptoms or destructive actions into valuable productions." Thus the magic word of the future, which is to define our life's task and produce the scientific "Utopia" in place of the nebulous "Kingdom of Heaven," is the word *Sublimation*, which is defined as "the utilisation of the energy of libido freed by removing the repressions and the lifting of infantile tendencies and desires into higher purposes and directions suitable for the individual at his present status." The religion of the future has, then, we assume, for its central task not the regeneration and sanctification of men through Divine agency and supernatural Grace, but rather the remaking of man by himself. Ignorance of the "battle of the tendencies" within him and lack of knowledge of how to utilise these forces to the best ends alone prevents to-day the advent of the Superman. Psycho-analysis in all seriousness proposes to dispel our ignorance and increase our knowledge in this direction.

We trust that we may not be accused of attempting anything in the nature of exaggeration in this outline sketch of the aim and scope of Psycho-analytical Psychology. All we wish to do at this stage is to see clearly what is at issue for religious belief if we accept any such psychological description of its origin and any such descriptive analysis of its content. It constitutes a real challenge to the Christian hypothesis as to the meaning of religious experience and the prayer-life.

Let us see, then, what is the Christian hypothesis and what are its religious implications.

What is prayer? A religious definition of prayer would be that of the Psalmist: "Unto thee, O Lord, do I lift up my soul." In this sense prayer is an activity of the whole human personality in its effort to respond to, and to form contact with, and to hold on to Another, after whom it is consciously or unconsciously seeking, with whom it has at least some vague if indefinable communion. The reference, then, in all true prayer is to an Object other than itself towards which the soul is drawn by an impulse which St. Augustine best described when he said: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find a rest in Thee." The motives which give rise to this spiritual activity in the quest after the Living God may be varied. There is the sense of dependence, the feeling of weakness and consequent need for help from supernatural powers. There is, again, the effort of the soul to secure deliverance or salvation by casting itself upon what it feels to be a hidden but beneficent Power greater than itself and able to help. However varied the motives to prayer, they are one and all secondary and subordinate to the primary urge of the soul-life, itself seeking to form contact with the source of its inmost being and the principle of its deepest life. "Thou couldst not have sought Me, had I not already found thee." Why? because "in Him we live and move and have our being." We are His offspring.

"Religion," says Auguste Sabatier, "is an intercourse, a conscious and voluntary relation, entered into by a soul in distress with the mysterious power upon which it feels itself to depend, and upon which its fate

is contingent. This intercourse with God is realised by prayer. Prayer is religion in act; that is, prayer is real religion. It is prayer that distinguishes the religious phenomenon from such similar or neighbouring phenomena as purely moral or æsthetic sentiment. Religion is nothing if it be not the vital act by which the entire mind seeks to save itself by clinging to the principle from which it draws its life. This act is prayer, by which term I understand no vain exercise of words, no mere repetition of certain sacred formulæ, but the very movement itself of the soul, putting itself in a personal relation of contact with the mysterious power of which it feels the presence—it may be even before it has a name by which to call it. Wherever this interior prayer is lacking, there is no religion; wherever, on the other hand, this prayer rises and stirs the soul, even in the absence of forms or of doctrines, we have living religion.”¹

All this is a description of prayer in the language of religion, but it is sufficient if from it we conclude that we must be careful, in seeking to define prayer, not to confine it narrowly to any one of its many forms or aspects. The forms prayer has taken are a revelation of the richness of the experience of which they are the expression. We have not exhausted its meaning when, for example, we have named petition, intercession, thanksgiving, worship, and adoration as forms in which it expresses itself. We have ever to bear in mind the fact that in itself it transcends all its forms and overflows them. To describe it adequately would be to describe in all their infinite variety the relations of the human soul with God. The material for such a description is to

¹Quoted by William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 484. Auguste Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, 2me ed., 1897, pp. 24-26, abridged.

hand in religious biographies, the world's sacred books, the accumulated data from the comparative study of religions, the varieties and uniformities of religious experiences as these have been disclosed in the history of man's religious life. It has been left to our own day, however, to witness an attempt at a systematic study of these sources. Pioneers like William James, Starbuck and others paved the way, and now there is a rapidly growing accumulation of material which is being scrutinised and sifted with a view to the building up of something in the nature of a science of religion. It is hoped that a minute analysis of religious experience in its varied forms over a wide field may enable us to deduce the principles and formulate the laws which govern this realm of man's nature. We are thus possibly in sight of a study of religion as an empirical science. Let us assume, however, that all this psychological investigation issues in something like a successful elucidation of the laws which govern the prayer-life and the principles which underlie man's religious experience. Should we have succeeded in exhausting the meaning of prayer? Would it not still present us with elements and aspects which baffle psychological analysis? This raises the whole question of the limits of descriptive psychology. Can it ever explain knowledge at all? If the answer is in the negative, it is a strong point against those psychologists who have attempted to undermine the evidential worth of religious experience from an analysis of the data and a psychological description of their processes.

Now the limits of descriptive analysis are, or should be, becoming increasingly recognised in all branches of psychology. Is any emotion, we may ask, ever exhausted

in a description of it? Are not all these descriptive analyses of feeling states and mental activities, when dissected by the psychologist's knife, simply the bare bones and inanimate tissues of an experience which, somehow, like life itself, escapes from and eludes the grasp of the physiologist and the anatomist? No introspective observation of our states of feeling and our emotional experiences, it may be urged, can ever yield us the full content of the living experience as lived. The analysis is always subsequent to, and not contemporaneous with, the feeling analysed. We should submit that, because of this time-interval between experience felt and experience analysed, the psychological observer is forever doomed to let escape just that in the experience which constitutes its fullest reality, and which we venture, therefore, to name the transcendental element in it. And if this holds good for all feelings, it is valid pre-eminently for the religious feeling. Why? Because in the religious feeling man is stirred to the very depths of his inmost being, and chords are vibrating in this experience in a way of which no subsequent descriptive analysis can give others any adequate idea.

G. M.

"Oh, could I tell, ye scarcely would believe it!
Oh, could I only say what I have seen!
How can I tell, or how should ye receive it!
How till He bringeth you where I have been!"

If experience must always transcend a description of it and contain more than words can express, then no empirical description of prayer, however exhaustive, can fully cover its content.

Psychologists may claim that their scientific approach to the study of the phenomena with which they deal en-

ables them to ignore such a hypothetical entity as the soul as a thing in itself apart from its activities, and, in fact, the only knowledge we have or can have of it from the empirical standpoint is a knowledge of its activities. Hence the modern "psychology without a soul." The data with which the psychologist deals are intellectual, emotional, and volitional activities. He knows nothing of an Ego behind these activities and presumably the source of them. He is concerned with sensations, perceptions, volitions, thoughts, emotions. Professor James expressly discarded the idea of an abiding substance, the soul, as necessary or useful to the psychologist. For the empiricist, the self is a "stream of consciousness." It may, though it need not, be more. In any case the question is one for philosophy and not for psychology to settle. We are not here concerned to traverse the arguments for or against the existence of a self or soul as the more adequate hypothesis to account for the unity and continuity of consciousness. Our point for the moment is this. If, as we are told, the hypothesis of a soul is unnecessary in psychology and is needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear, it follows that a psychology so circumscribed and purely empirical can never claim the last word on the subject of the ultimate validity and objective reference in all experience. If psychology overlooks the individual in describing his states and ignores the creative activity of the mind itself in all descriptions of resultant mind-states, then it is disqualified to pass a judgment upon what is or is not contained in the full content of an experience, religious or otherwise. The experient alone can claim to know what the content of his experience is, and even he cannot fully describe it. An external observa-

tion or even an introspective examination of self-consciousness may quite easily miss that in it which makes it what it is.

In his endeavor to vindicate the evidential worth of religious experience, and more particularly the mystical element in religion, Dr. Rufus Jones has pointed out that there are many forms of human experience in which the data of the senses are so vastly transcended that they fail to furnish any real explanation of what occurs in consciousness. This, he contends, is true of all our experiences of value, which apparently spring out of synthetic or synoptic activities of the mind—*i.e.*, activities in which the mind is unified and creative. Dr. Rufus Jones calls attention in this connection to the true significance of Leibnitz's famous addition to the scholastic formula that there is nothing in the mind that has not come through the senses, *except the mind itself*. Modern study of human personality, he says, has emphasised the creative activity of the mind, which is always an important factor in experience and one that cannot be ignored in any of the processes of knowledge. An important conclusion follows. If psychology ignores this factor and claims that in its purely descriptive function as a science it cannot do otherwise than reject hypothetical entities, then Dr. Rufus Jones is right in his contention that the prevailing psychologies do not explain knowledge at all. "The behaviourists," he writes, "do not try to explain knowledge any more than the astronomer or the physicist does." The psychologist who reduces mind to an aggregation of describable "mind-states" has started out on a course which makes an explanation forever impossible, since knowledge can be explained through unity and integral wholeness, never

through an aggregation of parts, as though it were a mental "shower of shot." His conclusion is that "Knowledge is always Knowledge of an object, and mystical experience has all the essential marks of objective reference, as certainly as other forms of experience have."

To the same effect Dr. Waterhouse in his thesis on *The Philosophy of Religious Experience* has warned us that the significance of religion in life is not revealed wholly by its extent. In some part, at least, he says, it is found in its subjective intensity. No psychological analysis of a sensation can reproduce its "feltness," and no objective representation of religion can do full justice to the actual experience.² And again, he reminds us that whilst it is impossible to present to those who have not felt it, the quality or tone which yields to the experient the deepest conviction of the worth and reality of his experience, psychology can at least mark its outward effects by not overlooking the individual and his experience.

Let us now turn to the more careful consideration of the dynamic effects on human life and conduct which result from prayer and religious experience. Our question is this, What more precisely is the effect upon the human when it achieves real contact with what it thinks is the Divine?

Here we shall follow closely one whom we have come to trust as a sure guide in the treatment of what he has aptly called "spiritual energies in daily life." Dr. Rufus Jones has laid us all under a sense of gratitude for the way in which he has treated the mystic's experience of God, and its effects in human life. He points

out that there are many different degrees of intensity, concentration, and conviction in the experiences of different individual mystics, and also in the various experiences of the same individual from time to time, and he warns us that it is a mistake to regard the state of ecstasy as *par excellence* mystical experience. "The calmer, more meditative, less emotional, less ecstatic experiences of God are not less convincing and possess greater constructive value for life and character," he says, "than do ecstatic experiences which presuppose a peculiar psychical frame and disposition. The seasoned Quaker in the corporate hush and stillness of a silent meeting is far removed from ecstasy, but he is not the less convinced that he is meeting with God. For the *essentia* of mysticism we do not need to insist upon a certain 'sacred' mystic way, nor upon ecstasy, nor upon any peculiar type of rare psychic upheavals. We do need to insist, however, upon a consciousness of commerce with God amounting to conviction of his presence."

What is the result? Take the case, for example, of Brother Lawrence, who, as we are reminded, was not an ecstatic; but simple and humble as he was, he acquired through his experience of God "an extraordinary spaciousness of mind."

"The more normal, expansive mystical experiences," Dr. Rufus Jones says, "come apparently when the personal self is at its best. Its powers and capacities are raised to an unusual unit and fused together. The whole being, with its accumulated submerged life, *finds itself.*" Again our author points out that there are many human experiences which carry a man up to levels where he has not usually been before, and where he finds

himself possessed of insight and energies he had hardly suspected were his until that moment. One leaps to his full height when the right inner spring is reached. And, again, we are familiar, he says, with the way in which instinctive tendencies in us, and emotions both egoistic and social, become organised under a group of ideas and ideals into a single system which we call a sentiment, such as love, or patriotism, or devotion to truth. So also are we familiar with the way in which a well-trained and disciplined mind, confronted by a concrete situation, will sometimes—alas! not always—in a sudden flash of imaginative insight discover a universal law revealed there and then in the single phenomenon. Literary and artistic geniuses supply us with many instances in which, in a sudden flash, the crude material at hand is shot through with vision, and the complicated plot of a drama, the full significance of a character, or the complete glory of a statue, stands revealed.³

It is along these lines that Dr. Rufus Jones bids us seek to understand the most important mystical experiences. "They occur," he tells us, "usually not at the beginning of the religious life, but rather in the ripe and developed stage of it. They are the fruit of long-maturing processes." "Clement of Alexandria called a fully organised and spiritualised person 'a harmonised man,' —that is, adjusted, organised, and ready to be a transmissive organ for the revelation of God."⁴ "Clement's 'the harmonised man' is always a person who has brought his soul into parallelism with divine currents, has habitually practised his religious insights, and has finally formed a unified central self, subtly sensitive.

³Op. cit., pp. 137-142, abridged.

⁴P. 140.

acutely responsive to the Beyond within him. In such experiences which may come suddenly or may come as a more gradual process, the whole self operates and masses all the cumulations of a lifetime. They are no more emotional than they are rational and volitional. We have a total personality, awake, active, and 'aware of his life's flow.' Instead of seeing in a flash a law of gravitation, or the plot and character of Hamlet, or the uncarven form of Moses the Law-giver in a block of marble, one sees at such times the moral demonstrations of a lifetime, and vividly feels the implications that are essentially involved in a spiritual life. In the high moment God is seen to be as sure as the soul is."

Such is Dr. Rufus Jones's subtle and penetrating descriptive analysis of the mystical experience, and it affords us all we need in our approach to a study of the psychology of prayer and inspiration. Whether such experiences are to be regarded as normal or abnormal is a question to be answered by a pragmatic test. "An experience," he says, "which brings spaciousness of mind, new interior dimensions, ability to stand the universe and the people in it, and capacity to work at human tasks with patience, endurance, and wisdom, may quite intelligently be called normal, though to an external beholder it may look like what he usually calls a trance of hysteria, a state of dissociation, or hypnosis by auto-suggestion."

2

Bearing these considerations in mind, let us now examine the implications of the Christian hypothesis that in the prayer-life and religious experience there is a real Object with which man achieves communion.

Prayer in this case is not a monologue but a dialogue. Man in prayer speaks to God. God hears prayer and answers. How far is this reference to an Object legitimate? Is there really existing a God or gods with whom the soul of the religious man in prayer forms contact, or is the whole process purely subjective and illusory?

An adequate answer to such questions would, of course, take us far beyond the limits of a psychological study. For our present purpose we must confine ourselves simply to an examination in outline of the distinctive features of religious experience, and such an analysis of its content as will serve to enable us to adjudicate upon its fitness as data for an appreciation of its evidential worth.

Now, in the first place, what is the verdict of religious experience over a very wide field as regards the objective reference in prayer and worship? From many current works of an apologetic character on this question we may select for our purpose that of Dr. Waterhouse, who, we think, is on strong ground when he asserts that, in whatever way the religious relationship is expressed, it is always held to be a relation between a human subject and a god or gods actually existent. The objective existence of the gods is unwaveringly believed in at all stages. When the belief wanes the religion breaks down. If religion be a form of auto-suggestion, it has existed only because of the entire ignorance of mankind of that fact. Recognition of it would instantly have been fatal to religion.⁵ And again: "If the idea of God refers to no objective reality, if man's faith is but the echo of

⁵Op. cit., p. 58.

his own heart's cry, religion has not been simply an unparalleled blunder, it has been the most piteous tragedy of humanity. . . . Unless faith brought its own justification to the faithful, religion would have perished as magic has perished amongst educated races. Neither the rational nor the pragmatic criterion, after all, has the last word in religion. Through all its vastly differing expressions, from lowest to highest, there is a psychological unity in the religious consciousness. It seeks human values through a superhuman ground of value. That is its most fundamentally common characteristic, and through all its long history it has always been satisfied that it has not sought wholly in vain.⁶

This is certainly a striking fact. The man of prayer prays because he believes, and the reality and intensity of his prayer is the measure of his belief as well as that of his need. Convince him that the gods are fictitious and the Unseen World a land of fair hopes and illusory dreams, and his prayer life will sooner or later reflect the death-sting administered to it. A creeping paralysis of the prayer life is the issue of unbelief. Whatever others may think or say about the objective existence of the Deity, the man who prays witnesses by that fact to his own belief in the real existence of God. But this fact does not necessarily exclude the hypothesis that prayer is auto-suggestion. The verdict of the man of prayer is not itself a proof of the existence of God, nor is his belief any guarantee of the objective reference in prayer. Prayer may quite well be a form of auto-suggestion without his knowing the fact.

Let us look, however, a little more closely at the argument. Is prayer auto-suggestion? If the two were

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 75.

identical, the question is whether the habit of prayer would persist after the experimenter had definitely harboured in his consciousness the conviction that there really was no God to whom he was praying. Would he continue with any real ardour or intense spiritual wrestling to seek for Grace when he had come to the conviction that it was self-generated, and a product of his own manufacture? How long would a man continue to derive benefits from a series of false self-suggestions after he had come to believe that they were false—*i.e.*, after he knew that he was deliberately deluding himself? This raises the real issue as to whether the efficacy of auto-suggestion does not depend ultimately upon the truth of the idea suggested. For example, would Coué's method as expounded by Baudouin in *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion* really work if the ideas suggested to the subconscious mind were utterly false and known to be so? If in prayer-life there were no such thing as supernatural Grace coming from a real God in answer to prayer, would the habit of prayer survive amongst intelligent people? We have long been familiar with the reflex action of prayer, but this has only been regarded as a by-product in an experience which first and foremost is an activity of the soul outward from self towards a definite goal other than self. The question is whether such reflex action of prayer would continue or could continue apart from its indissoluble connection with the primary reference in prayer of the soul to God. If the valuable by-product, in reflex action, of prayer is bound up with the reality of the whole prayer-experience in its objective reference, in all probability it could not, and evidence could be produced that it does not, continue without it.

The assumption in all prayer, as we have seen, is the existence of a real Object, God, wth whom the soul seeks to come into contact and with whom it believes itself in prayer to hold communion.

Now let us assume for a moment that this hypothesis is the true key to the phenomenon of the prayer life: can we point to any subjective results from such communion, and, if so, is their character such as to militate against the rival hypothesis of the illusory nature of the prayer-experience?

The question is, What kind of results may be reasonably expected from such a source? Can we point, for example, to any fresh knowledge of or real insight into Divine Truth? Have we any body of knowledge claiming to be derived through Revelation and Inspiration, Prayer and Communion, and of such a character as justifies us in maintaining that it could not have come to us from any other than a Divine source, and that it cannot be accounted for in human experience in any other way? Has prayer in any well-authenticated cases given to the world new light or new discovery in any sphere of knowledge, sacred or secular?

It would be difficult to answer these questions in the affirmative, and to attempt to do so would in any case involve us in an excursion into the whole field of comparative religion. We should have, moreover, to examine minutely the whole history of the People of God with a view to demonstrating the unique character of Jewish Ethical Monotheism as a revealed religion. We should have to canvass the argument, for example, of Dr. Hamilton, and defend the validity of his thesis in claiming for the Jews a privileged position as the mediators of a special Divine Revelation through Inspiration in con-

trast to the methods adopted by God for other races whom He enabled to discover Himself in and through His immanent activity in the Gentile world.

Such a line of enquiry, even if satisfactorily and exhaustively pursued, would scarcely yield the sort of decisive evidence we feel we need, if we are to present it to psychologists as a conclusive refutation of the thesis that prayer is auto-suggestion and nothing more. Would any evidence be conclusive? We think not. The kind of evidence which would satisfy a scientific mind working merely with empirical data can never be furnished by religion, since the Supernatural, *ex hypothesi*, cannot be demonstrated merely in terms of sense-experience, and God can never be so produced in time and space as to be available for physiological examination or psychological analysis.

The thesis that prayer is auto-suggestion and that its fruits show no necessary reference to a Supernatural Objective Source, a God with whom man has come into intimate touch through prayer, and from whom he has received authentic tidings and otherwise undiscoverable news of things Divine, can only be met by showing that the Christian hypothesis is a better and more probable explanation of the facts.

The utmost we can hope to do is to examine the nature of the effects of prayer in human life. Whether people have been the unconscious subjects of delusion and self-hypnotism, or whether verily they have been touched by the finger of God, is to be answered by a study of the effect of prayer in human life. What then is the effect upon human life when it achieves what it believes to be real contact with the Divine at a sensitive point?

That, broadly speaking, prayer has had beneficial re-

sults in human life will scarcely be disputed. We want, however, to point in particular to the revolutionary effects of religious experience, and ask whether such results can be adequately explained on the hypothesis that the saints have grown in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ simply by prolonged internal talk with themselves and an unusual capacity for self-communing with their own subliminal consciousness? Dr. W. S. Bruce has a helpful treatment of this question in his work on the *Psychology of Christian Life and Behaviour*. In his chapter on the Psychology of Prayer he reminds us that in the evolution of a Christian life prayer is always a correlate of the transformed character, and he goes on to show that auto-suggestion can never explain the fact of continuance in prayer.

"Every saintly life," he says, "the longer it is lived, finds prayer ever more helpful. What is the explanation? It is found in the region, not of illusion, which is weakening, but in that of resultant power. Illusion only exhausts our spiritual energies. It depresses and it ends in doubt. The power generated in prayer confirms resolution and strengthens morality. All neuropaths, as Professor W. James shows, are pithless weaklings. The men of prayer have ever been the men of power."

But not only is the place of prayer the place of power to the individual. It is also the place of a force which generates power in the Church and Nation. History justifies such an assertion, as Dr. Bruce goes on to show; and he gives an apt quotation from the late Professor Gwatkin's Gifford Lectures to the effect that "this illusion has been the great nation-making, nation-binding, nation-breaking force in history."

What is the conclusion? "Such moral forces," says

Dr. Bruce, "do not spring out of auto-suggestion. They have their source in something more firm and abiding than subjectivity or the subliminal consciousness. That source is nothing less than Reality. And the universe backs this experience."

The argument is that an experience of prayer and fellowship with God which achieves such revolutionary results in human life both individual and national has a most genuine title to the name of reality, and is scarcely covered by the new explanation of the prevalence of prayer put forward by Psychology.

What is the value of this argument? Its strength may be perhaps the better appreciated if we dissociate it from a form in which it is sometimes put, and which we feel only tends to weaken it in the eyes of those who have reached the conclusion that prayer only rests on suggestions and auto-suggestions of a purely psychical origin.

It is suggested that the experient's own explanation of the phenomenon has evidential value. Is this so?

Dr. Bruce, speaking of those who pray, tells us that men pray from some sense of inward necessity coupled with the assurance that the need of which they are conscious will in this way, and in no other, meet its satisfaction. "They are convinced," he says, "that in prayer something for their benefit is genuinely transacted. They are sure that they talk to some One, or some Force, that it is a dialogue, not a monologue; not solipsism; not a mere meditation, but an act of communing with one who is willing to answer." And again, speaking from personal knowledge of the religious experience of common people, he says that if we could only penetrate these experiences and report some of them, "the poorest crofter on the hillside, the humblest dweller in the city lane,

would possess undying interest for us. We should discover most uncommon experiences of communion with God in common people, which, if correctly told, would rival those of Jacob Boehme, of St. Francis, of George Fox, or of Fred W. H. Myers."

It is well for us to bear this in mind, because it enables us to dismiss the charge brought against the religious experience of the outstanding characters of history, that it is merely mysticism and presumably worthless from the point of view of evidential value. Professor Pratt, in his able treatment of *The Religious Consciousness*, has shown the real continuity in content between the humblest experiences in the prayer life and the intenser forms met with in the religious biographies of the more famous Mystics. The one he calls the milder form of mysticism, and the other the more intense. In this way we are enabled to link on mysticism proper with its antecedents, and to show that the prayer-life in all its forms is really a unity of experience. If this is so, then what is known as mysticism cannot be isolated and treated as an abnormal phenomenon, nor can it be rejected as simply a rare type of experience, since it is differentiated from normal religious experience in degree only, and not in kind.

Now we should admit at once that the verdict of the experient is not in itself of much worth, still less is it in itself a proof, and the only proof that can be adduced, of the objective reference in prayer. This would amount to saying that the experient himself alone could give an explanation of the experience, and that his explanation was the only one that carried with it any guarantee of its truth. It must be what he says it is, because after all it is *his* experience, not *ours*, and he alone is com-

petent to explain to us what it really was. Were we to accept the argument in this form we should simply end in pure solipsism, and we should be forced to accept as objectively true the claims of those who admittedly are suffering from delusions of any kind without their being themselves aware of it. The argument from experience on these lines would be of little value.

What we can say is that in a very real sense the experient alone can claim to know the content of the experience, since, as we have seen, there is no possibility of reproducing in descriptive form an exhaustive account of the "fehlness" of a feeling. The experient's own explanation of the experience is to this extent entitled to a fair hearing, and cannot lightly be dismissed in the absence of conclusive proof from other sources that his interpretation is plainly erroneous.

If then the verdict of men of prayer and the mystics is, broadly speaking, unanimous, it ought to carry some weight in helping us to decide between the rival hypotheses of subjective illusion or objective reality; but it is not conclusive, and by itself is of little evidential worth.

What we can do, however, is to test mysticism, as we have tested its milder forms, by the question of its fruits. If mysticism be merely religious hysteria, will this account for its results in life and conduct? Dr. Bruce is right when he says that the supreme test of the truth of such intuitions lies in their results for life and conduct. He puts the case strongly when he says that "these are highly ethical and individual. They invariably deepen the sense of sin. There comes a stronger dislike to all that is evil, a desire, often an intense craving, after God-likeness, a devotion to

Christian service, a growing delight in the life of prayer and communion. These are the fruits of faith which are incontestable. They are proof of the reality of the experience. Epilepsy and hysteria have never produced them. Hypnotism in its effects is as far from them as the heavens from the earth. Uncontrolled emotionalism never strengthens, but weakens. It is a mark of the degenerate more than of the mystic. It never creates men like St. Paul or St. Dominic or St. Augustine or Savonarola. With these men faith was a life-force, co-operating with reason and every other power of the mind. They could reason with cogency. But their reasoning had a power and their life an influence which cold, hard thinking has never attained. Their experiences of spiritual life gave them an enthusiasm and a weight of character that made them great spiritual forces in their day and generation.” “It is doubtful,” he adds, “whether any Christian leader of great power ever was without a large element of the mystic in him. It has usually been the secret springs of his influence. He was ‘not disobedient to the heavenly vision.’ ”⁷

Now it is not necessary from our point of view to overstate the case, and we are well aware of the force of the counter-argument which would point us to the immense harm religion has wrought in human life and conduct. Mysticism in particular has laid itself open in its history to the charge that its fruits have often been of a barren and unprofitable character. These are serious charges and part of the general indictment urged against religion in all ages. Their reappearance in the argument from psychology as to the illusory

⁷*Op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

character of religion was to be expected. We admit the weight of the charge, but we think it can be met. Perhaps the most suggestive treatment of the whole question is to be found in Baron F. von Hügel's *Essays and Addresses*, more particularly his two weighty papers on "Religion and Illusion," and "Religion and Reality," which will repay any amount of time spent upon their study. Mr. H. Balmforth in his lucid and searching treatment of the problem, "Is Christian Experience an Illusion?" gives us a convenient summary of the general indictment which we will reproduce.

"Another closely allied group of objections to the validity of religious experience with its claim to know supreme and unchanging Holiness," he says, "dwells on the effects on social well-being of supernatural religion, which, it is alleged, has largely ignored or tried to tyrannise over wholesome legitimate human activities. Wherever we look among the higher organised religions (to say nothing of more primitive types), there is evidence of narrow-minded obscurantism and other anti-social ignorances, follies and crimes, not merely proceeding from men who happen to be religious, but caused by their religion. Human sacrifice, the fires of Moloch, the temple prostitution, devil-terrors and grovelling fears of all kinds, are hideous inhumanities of primitive superstition which have not left themselves without a progeny in the more advanced religions to vex mankind and bar its progress. Religious intolerance has been one of the greatest scourges in history. Jewish fanaticism fought against art and Hellenism. The Mohammedans burnt down the great library of Alexandria on religious grounds. Most important of all, Christendom has to answer for a long tale of sins

against the advancing spirit of enlightenment. The death penalty for the heretic, however conscientious and upright, was first imposed in the fourth century, to become terribly frequent against the Albigenses, and an organised part of social machinery under the Inquisition. Short of the cruel death at the stake, torture, imprisonment and confiscation were freely employed. ‘Religious’ wars occupy much of the historian’s time, and in France, Germany and the Netherlands there was plenty to give sting to Montaigne’s quiet irony, ‘It is setting a high value on one’s opinions to roast men on account of them.’ Protestants and Anglicans were as culpable as Roman Catholics. Luther had no mercy for Anabaptists, nor Calvin for Servetus. Three or four persons were burnt at Norwich in Elizabeth’s reign for unchristian opinions, and at Tyburn and elsewhere numbers of Roman priests suffered death for their faith. Roger Bacon, Bruno, Copernicus, Galileo, made courageous efforts to correct scientific error and establish truth: they all met ecclesiastical censure; and none can read the story of religion’s relations to science without shame and sorrow. How is it possible, we are asked, to reconcile a valid experience of supreme Wisdom and Goodness with all this criminal folly done in the name of that supreme Reality? Is it not a sufficient indictment of super-human religion to point to its history and its fruits? *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*¹⁸

It is a serious charge, we repeat, and one that cannot be ignored by those who wish to press the argument for the validity of religious experience upon the ground of its beneficent results in human life and conduct.

¹⁸Op. cit., pp. 42-4.

It can, however, be met, and to meet it we should have to refer, for example, to works like Brace's *Gesta Christi* or Mozley's *Achievements of Christianity* to remind ourselves of the debt the world owes to religion. Mr. Balmforth devotes a chapter to the *Crimes of Religion*, and frankly faces the worst that can be said, in his endeavour to substantiate the contention that the crimes of religion, distressing as they are, do not actually invalidate the truth of religious experience. He urges four considerations.

1. The true facts of human nature in its historical development, as von Hügel shows, are that man's advance is uneven; now one energy, now another, spurts ahead, but a harmonious progress is hardly ever found. And this is true both of nations and of individuals. Intellectual and æsthetic development need not, and as a matter of history does not, keep pace with ethical and spiritual advance.

2. Man's moral responsibility has not always been what it is now, and an historical study of ethics and religion would show moral advance in comparison with what had preceded, where we now, from a higher altitude, can see nothing but a defective morality. If, as von Hügel says, we are always to compare the conviction, command, or practice of one time, race, or country, not with those of much later times, or of quite other races or communities, but with the closely or distantly preceding habits of one and the same race or community, we should discover that in many cases which now shock us the belief that God had spoken was attached to genuine, if slight, moves or to confirmations of moves in the right direction; and in all such cases the belief was, so far, certainly well founded.

3. Religion is actually responsible for much less crime than appears on the surface. Here Mr. Balmforth turns the results of modern psychological enquiry into the mainsprings of human motives against the psychologists themselves. The reasons given for human conduct are not necessarily the ground of such actions. In normal life, as Mr. Balmforth shows, we can detect everywhere the same gap between the reasons assigned and the motives actually operative in human action. So it is when we examine the psychology of religious persecution, intolerance, and hostility to new truth, with their train of evils. "Frequently," says our author, "these things have not proceeded from the religious complex at all, though done deliberately and avowedly in the name of religion. They have masqueraded under the cloak of religion, but they have emerged from quite other sides of man's psychic life."

4. We have to make allowance for the historical fact of the tares amongst the wheat. Christianity has had to struggle with the handicap of large numbers of unconverted or partly converted adherents, and this has seriously weakened the corporate character and insight of the Church. The general Christian conscience has been dulled, and as a necessary consequence the religious experience of the Church as a whole has never had that purity and intensity which it should have had, and therefore its refining influence on moral action and moral insight in Europe has been laboured and slow with grave set-backs.

"Such considerations as these," Mr. Balmforth rightly says, "do not lessen the grave burden of guilt which lies on the shoulders of religious societies. Only a disingenuous special pleading can evade the plain

lesson of history that religion has been stained throughout by crime. But they do tend to cut the ground from beneath the feet of the critic who seeks to deny the validity of religious experience on the basis of this criminal record. Imperfections and dimness of religious apprehension can most readily be admitted; but that admission would be made without hostile attack. To go beyond that is to go beyond the rights of the case and the weight of evidence."

We have felt it necessary to reproduce somewhat fully Mr. Balmforth's treatment of the question, relying as he does upon Baron von Hűgel's general argument, because we think that along these lines a sound defence of the Christian hypothesis can be sustained in face of the worst that can be urged against it from this standpoint.

We should claim, then, that on the whole the fruits of prayer and religious experience have been beneficial in human life and conduct. Further, that the counter-argument of the ill-effects of religion in human history, whilst weighty, is not conclusive evidence against the Christian hypothesis of the reality and objectivity of the source from which it is claimed such fruits are ultimately derived—viz., a Personal God in communion with His finite creatures. We have also seen that an examination of the character of the effects wrought in human life and conduct as the result of such communion does not justify us in claiming that we have data furnished from this source of an undeniably supernatural kind. We cannot, in other words, point the sceptical psychologist to these fruits and maintain that they bear unmistakably marks of their Divine origin, and that their presence in human life cannot be otherwise ac-

counted for except on the Christian hypothesis. We have to admit that their evidence is rather indirect than direct. We agree entirely with the conclusion reached by Dr. Rufus Jones, that "mystical experience does not supply concrete information. It does not bring new finite facts, new items that can be used in a description of 'the scenery and circumstance' of the realm beyond our sense horizons. It is the awareness of a Presence, the consciousness of a Beyond, the discovery, as James puts it, that 'we are continuous with a More of the same quality, which is operative in us and in touch with us.'"⁹

Leuba, in his book on the *Belief in God and Immortality*, gives the results of his questionnaire as to the form or image or symbol under which God is conceived, and he says that two-thirds of the men and nearly half the women disclaimed any mental image of God. The larger number of the remainder distinguished between image, or symbol, and reality. In a remarkably large number of cases, however, a description in sensory terms was held to represent God adequately. That young people having reached the mental development of college students should think of God as "actual skin and blood and bones, something we shall see with our own eyes some day" is, he says, almost incredible; but the evidence is compelling. Seven per cent. held apparently to a thoroughly anthropomorphic conception of God.¹⁰

It is worth while quoting his figures: "Of 290 men, 39 per cent. imagine God in human form. To 80 of these the form is a mere symbol; to 20 it is a reality; while 7

⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 158.

¹⁰*Op. cit.*, pp. 204-5.

find it impossible to decide whether the image represents the reality or is a symbol. Of 640 women, 34.5 per cent. picture God in human shape. Of these, 166 state definitely that the image is a mere symbol, 42 think it actually represents the reality, while 13 cannot decide." Again, on the question of the personal or impersonal nature of God, Leuba tells us that as many as 31 per cent. of the men, and only 11 per cent. of the women conceived God as impersonal. If the "doubtful" cases are added, the percentages rise to 40.5 per cent. for the men and to 15.7 per cent. for the women.

Now, if in prayer and religious experience we are in touch with a real God, how are we to account for such a diversity in the description of Him given by those who presumably have had a genuine experience of Him in the prayer life?

We put the question simply to show the justice of Dr. Rufus Jones's remark as to the meagre stock of knowledge the genuine mystic reports. The notorious difficulty of expressing in words or of giving others any adequate idea of the experience is sufficient to account for the diversities and even contradictions in the accounts given by religious people of the God with whom they claim to have been in communion. "It was not an accident that so many of the mystics hit upon the *via negativa*, the way of negation, or that they called their discovery 'the divine Dark'!"

We are not, then, to expect concrete information as the fruit of the mystical experience. What are we to expect? Let Dr. Rufus Jones answer the question for us, since no one is more competent:

"The most striking effect of such experience is not," he says, "new fact-knowledge, not new items of em-

pirical information, but new moral energy, heightened conviction, increased caloric quality, enlarged spiritual vision, an unusual radiant power of life. In short, the whole personality, in the case of the constructive mystics, appears to be raised to a new level of life, and to have gained from somewhere many calories of life-feeling, spiritual substance.

"We are quite familiar with the way in which adrenalin suddenly flushes into the physical system and adds a new and incalculable power to brain and muscle. Under its stimulus a man can carry out a piano when the house is on fire. May not, perhaps, some energy from some source with which our spirits are allied flush our inner being with forces and powers by which we can be fortified to stand the universe and more than stand it! 'We are more than conquerors through Him that loves us,' is the way one of the world's greatest mystics felt."¹¹

Such is the religious explanation, and we should submit that a review of the phenomena of the prayer life, the mystical experience both in its milder and more intense forms, and religious experience generally whether viewed in its varieties or its uniformities over a wide field, justifies the rejection of the hypothesis that it can all be accounted for adequately as the fruits of self-contemplation, self-communion, self-introspection, auto-suggestion or subjective illusion of a purely psychological origin. At least we are entitled to say that the evidence derived from a psychological investigation is not conclusive against the Christian hypothesis, and, if anything, points rather in that direction. In other words, the objective reference and the ultimate validity

¹¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 153-4.

of the experience is not ruled out, and we are free, therefore, to attempt to substantiate it on other grounds, and submit it to a philosophical treatment, in spite of anything that psychology as such may say against it.

3

It remains to say a word on the question of some recent constructive efforts to substantiate the religious explanation, and we will suggest that psychology itself in its study of human life and behaviour really allows room for the Christian hypothesis as the best explanation of the phenomena of religious experience.

Of current attempts at such a task we should single out that of Dr. Waterhouse in his dissertation on *The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, from which we have already quoted, and the work of Dr. R. H. Thouless in his *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*.¹² Both are very promising, and give us helpful lines of argument along which we believe that a sound apologetic may be built up. We should like to include also the work of Mr. Balmforth, to which we have already referred, and that of Dr. Rufus M. Jones. The treatment of the question by Dr. Rufus M. Jones which we have followed throughout this essay, although it comprises only a few pages in his book on *Spiritual Energies in Daily Life*, contains more suggestive thought than can be found in many larger works, and will repay the closest study. It is much to be hoped that a comprehensive treatment of the whole problem may be forthcoming in view of the fact that the issues raised, by psychological study and the theories put forward by the Psycho-analysts go to the

¹²This essay was written before Dr. Selbie's work appeared.

very root of the whole Theistic problem and present a more searching challenge to religious belief, in our opinion, than anything we have so far been called upon to meet in the whole history of Christian apologetics. The difficulties of the challenge are enormous, since at almost every turn the psychological investigations open out into the field of metaphysics and question all the postulates of a Christian philosophy. The defence, therefore, cannot be conducted strictly within the limits of psychology, but must be carried on in the larger sphere of the philosophy of religion and embrace all the arguments for or against Theism, and must meet a new Naturalism fortified by such evidence as psychologists believe they can furnish in support of it. We are thus faced to-day not simply with a denial of the adequacy of the Theistic belief, but with such an explanation of it as deprives it of any ultimate reality. Psychology, by explaining religion in its origin, development, and the variety of its forms, succeeds in explaining it away. This is a more deadly attack than a mere denial. If the explanation is adequate, the triumph of Naturalism is complete. We should have to admit that, on the premises of Psycho-analysis, all religious experience was an illusion, and could lay no claim to ultimate reality. What we shall have to do sooner or later is to submit these premises to a most searching examination and attempt to refute them. This is a formidable task, but it must be undertaken, since the issues are vital for Theism and must be faced.

We cannot now examine, even in outline, the efforts at a constructive apologetic made by, for example, the two writers referred to, but we cordially recommend them to the careful attention of those of our readers who

wish to pursue the study of the subject in greater detail. All we can attempt here is to indicate what we think is a fruitful line of enquiry opened out by that vast trans-marginal field which the psychologists refer to as the subconscious or the unconscious, and which is only just beginning to be explored. The question we want to ask in the light of this is, whether man has any way of approach, except through the senses, to knowledge of reality. Is the assertion of some psychologists true when they maintain that "all conscious processes are based on sense-stimulation, and all thought as well as perception depends on reaction to sense-stimulation"? Such a statement raises metaphysical issues of a highly disputable kind and involves a theory of knowledge by no means universally accepted. Let us revert for a moment to the dictum of Leibnitz in his appropriation of the scholastic principle, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.*¹³

Have we, in view of this revelation of the creative activity of the mind itself in all knowledge, fully accounted for the whole of man's experience when we have laid bare that only in it which can be adequately accounted for as derived from sense-stimulation? We will not now criticise the concept of the "subliminal region," nor contend for the unity and continuity of consciousness through all its supposed states and stages. Probably in the end we shall see reasons for rejecting any artificial boundary lines dividing the self and postulating arbitrary lines marking off the various levels of consciousness. Without, however, binding ourselves to any acceptance of the hypothesis of the subconscious, and referring to it as the supposed origin of much which

¹³*Nuov. Ess.*, II. 1, 2.

emerges into consciousness and the presence of which is otherwise difficult to account for, at least we can claim that the psychologists are themselves teaching us to believe that we are greater than we know. If we are the possessors of a consciousness of which we are unconscious, then we are open on all sides to impressions which we can receive from any and every world in which we live and move and have our being. Besides the unconscious which links us to the animal kingdom and gives us our roots in the lower stages of the anthropological tree, there may be also a supraliminal sphere to which the deepest in us has access, and to which we may become vitally linked by invisible but real ties in so far as man, by means of his highest faculties—what in theological language we should name his spiritual self—is enabled to reach out to the Beyond which is in him. If the subconscious witnesses to his origin from below, and, as the Psycho-analysts remind us, smells of the earth, our habitation, the sensual and the beastly, the supra-conscious witnesses to his higher destiny above, and both together reveal to man his true place as a being poised between two worlds and linked to both—the one from which he has come, and the other towards which the urge of life bids him ascend.

Now the man of prayer and the mystic in the experiences of the religious life claims to have access to this other world of spirit through the exercise of his highest faculties. Through a spiritual activity he finds himself *en rapport* with a spiritual environment, just as through a psychological activity he finds himself adjusted to the world of sense-impressions. If we admit the validity of the one world, the external world, on the evidence of sense-experience, why are we forbidden

to claim an equal validity for the other, the spiritual world, on the evidence of religious experience? Not that we wish to postulate a kind of sixth sense by which man is enabled to intuit God and experience the Divine. All we contend for is an extension of the avenues of knowledge beyond physiological and psychological sense-stimuli, and to claim that by an activity of his whole personality at its highest levels man can apprehend reality in a richer and fuller degree than is possible for a less richly endowed being—e.g., the animal or the merely psychical man. We should defend in this connection the Pauline distinction between the psychical and the pneumatical, and claim that what is hidden from the carnally minded can be spiritually discerned. Bergson has been urging upon us the need for man “to sink into his own inner nature and try to catch the deepest meaning and worth of his experiences in their duration through time.” He would teach us that we can pass from a conceptual to a metaphysical and intuitive level, thus reaching “a foretaste of eternity in the midst of the fluctuations of the world and the illusions of sense.”

One thing at least is clear. Psychology is revealing something of the unfathomed depths of human personality. Something more than a psychological analysis is needed to reach the deeper levels of our life. Man’s range is not only outwards to the world of appearance, and inwards to self-introspection, but upwards to the world of ultimate Reality; and he can form contact with this last only because of his Divine endowment, as made in the image of God, and destined to become a partaker of the Divine nature. Authentic tidings of such a world, though gained as the result of a direct intuition of the Divine in religious experience, cannot

be communicated except by a process of translation, and hence the form in which they reach the laboratory of the psychologist bears little resemblance to their actuality. The real difficulty of the mystic, as we have seen, is to translate his knowledge. The categories available for his use are fatally infected with materiality. The thought-forms at his disposal are necessarily spatial and temporal. Hence his problem as to how to describe in temporal and spatial imagery a reality which, in its very nature, is not extended in time. Hence he is forced to employ metaphors and to use the language of symbols. He must needs speak in parables or become ensnared in anthropomorphisms. We should not be surprised at Leuba's discoveries as the result of his *questionnaire* method. When, by an intuitive process, "God ceases to be a proposition and becomes an experience," the subsequent effort to translate this into the thought-forms of our terrestrial life breaks down, and a man finds himself employing symbols to clothe an experience which as such transcended and overflowed all the vessels in which he strove to confine it. If psychologists then set to work upon all that is left, and fail by analytical methods to discover its real content, their negative conclusions are no proof of the unreality of the experience. The transcendental element in it has escaped them, and with it goes the only proof the mystic could offer, and which he is precluded from offering because he cannot. The human spirit grounded in God and rooted in the Divine Reality knows that it has taken hold of the Divine, and experienced it at a sensitive point. How to convince others of that fact is a task beyond him. He must speak to others in parables, and must not be surprised if the result is as of old in the

case of them that are without—viz., “because they seeing, see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.”¹⁴

4

In conclusion, whilst the main object of our essay has been to dispute the negative conclusion of some psychological and psycho-analytical theories regarding the objective validity of religious experience and the prayer-life, we do not wish by any means to suggest that this new science and its methods have nothing to teach us on the question of the religious life and our human methods of developing it. Religion in company with other branches of human knowledge and action is being rethought out in psychological terms, and we are bound to question its precise bearing upon the life of prayer and Christian experience. What can it teach us, and what is its practical application? We do not accept it as a new religion or a modern substitute for religion. Can it be used, nevertheless, as “a new weapon added to the Christian armoury”? We think that it can, and that it is being offered to us as a new scientific method which deserves and will repay our careful study and use. We do not propose here to enlarge upon its practical application, but we must content ourselves with referring our readers to a book, e.g., like Dr. W. S. Bruce’s *The Psychology of Christian Life and Behaviour*, which attempts to map out the bearings of Psychology upon all sides of the Christian life, secular no less than religious, and which claims, we think rightly, to be a help to parents, teachers, Christian workers and preachers in their daily duties. Side by side with this book we should like to mention that of

¹⁴St. Matt. xiii. 13.

Professor F. R. Barry, who in his *Christianity and Psychology* deals with some of its practical and theoretical implications for religion and theology. There is also an earlier work by Mr. T. W. Pym, *Psychology and the Christian Life*, and a study of *Christian Auto-suggestion* by Mr. R. E. Roberts, which may be found helpful. We venture to suggest that all those who are engaged in the religious education of the young, and not least those responsible for Confirmation Classes, should make themselves acquainted with the empirical study of the growth of the religious consciousness which Dr. E. O. Starbuck gave us in his *Psychology of Religion*. These are but samples of a large and rapidly growing literature, the reading of which ought to convince even the most conservative and cautious Christian believer—who may be suspicious, or even contemptuous, of psychology—that this new science, rightly regarded not as a rival but as the handmaid of religion, is really reminding us of long-neglected treasures in the Gospel, is throwing fresh light upon religious phenomena such as conversion, is making fruitful suggestions regarding the training of religious sentiments and the consolidation of religious attitudes. Many methods of prayer receive confirmation from this new science, and Catholic practice in the prayer-life will find in the suggestions of psychology much by way of scientific justification.

Whilst we reject the hypothesis that prayer is auto-suggestion, we may quite well entertain the idea that auto-suggestion is one of its forms. Along this line we may legitimately speak of *Christian* auto- and hetero-suggestion as in accord with the principles of healing set forth and applied by our Lord Himself. We may thus for practical purposes adopt the maxim, “Christianise

your Coué, and Coué your Christianity." The daily thoughts for Christian auto-suggestion given at the end of Mr. R. E. Roberts's little book afford an outline sketch of the kind of use to which the principles of M. Coué and the Nancy School may be put by a Christian believer in his prayer-life. It is sadly true that many Christians to-day are living below the level of their Christian heritage. Were we, in the prayer-life, to dwell more upon the thought of the riches of our possession in Christ Jesus, we should be enabled to enter more fully into the vitality of the Evangelical doctrine of assurance. We shall cease to be obsessed by doubts and misgivings, and in place of timorous questionings be able, with St. Paul, to say: "The life that I now live in the flesh, I live in faith; faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself up for me."¹⁵ The keynote of true Evangelicalism has been and still is *assurance*. The act of meditation in the life of faith can and should bring with it a more blessed assurance of the reality of saving grace, and make us more fitted to receive the fulness of the Spirit, the fulness of joy in believing. This assurance, where it is manifested in the members of a household, is itself a dynamic force and radiates its influence. In a very real sense in a home-life of this kind, prayer is "caught, not taught."

Psychology has much to teach us on the efficacy of prayer from the point of view of its conditions, bodily and mental. If the psychology of religious experience succeeds in laying bare the laws and principles which govern the prayer-life, so far as these can be deduced from empirical study, it can teach us much as to how best to mobilise this force, both in the private life of

the individual and the public worship of the Church. The power of suggestion in congregational worship is a fact with which we have been long familiar, but a scientific investigation in the light of the modern psychology of the crowd is certainly bringing home to us afresh the value and best use to which we can put our corporate worship and mobilise the power of intercession. Private prayer, family prayers, Church services, all these can be justified, and their relative value exhibited by a psychological study of the conditions, if not the forms, under which they are enacted. Psychology can teach us how best to utilise the available spiritual resources at our disposal. It can and does remind us in the name of science that we need not remain spiritual paupers when we might become spiritual millionaires.

Another discovery awaiting us when we examine the findings of modern psychological method in relation to the prayer-life will be the wisdom of the saints and mystics of old, who were psychologists before their time. For this reason the growth of a mass of new literature dealing with religious experience from the psychological standpoint will not exempt us from a study of the best the past has produced in the way of guides to the prayer-life and the practice of the Presence of God. From one point of view psychology has nothing fresh to teach the Catholic Church on the question how to pray. What it is doing is to dot the i's and cross the t's of many wise counsels given in the past history of the Church in its endeavor to fulfil its function in the world for the "cure of souls." At the same time it must be recognised as a distinct gain if in our generation we may claim something in the nature of scientific sanction from the findings of modern psychology for

many of the Church's methods in dealing both with the "once born" and the "twice born," the "healthyminded" and the "sick" souls. If modern scientific methods applied to spiritual therapeutics condemn some and sanction others, amongst the means at present employed by the Church, all the better.

The great need to-day is not so much more "saying of prayers" and attendance at church services, but more real prayer and sincerity in worship. Undoubtedly the causes for our failure here are many and varied and are not wholly due to the fault of the Church, but we are on safe ground when we admit that one cause is a failure in method in the cultivation of the prayer-life. If, as Professor Barry reminds us, "prayer misdirected is spiritual poison," we shall do well in all humility to listen to anything modern psychology can legitimately claim to teach us as to how best to fit ourselves for the reception of that Divine Grace and Spiritual Power which we believe to be all around us and pressing in upon us, and which none the less we succeed only partially in gaining, because we have not studied aright the method by which we may claim it and receive it as our own.

Now, whilst the books upon prayer are legion, we do not hesitate in this connection to recommend warmly the study by an unknown author of the subject in two works published in recent years by Messrs. Mowbray under the titles *The Splendour of God* and *The Riches of Prayer*. We do so because we are convinced that whilst these two were written without any primary reference to the findings of modern psychology on the subject, yet they are profoundly in accord with the best that the psychological analysis of religious experience can teach us. We cannot justify this statement at length, but we

can illustrate it briefly, and, in doing so, indicate at the same time a line along which a practical application of the psychology of prayer is possible. One of the chief points of emphasis in modern psychology is the power of suggestion.

Now what is one of the most frequent laments of the experiments in the prayer-life? Is it not the poverty of our goodness, the faintness of our endeavours after the Christian life and the coldness of our devotion? The unknown author to whose books we have just referred would point us at once to the key, in his reminder that we must begin with God. Prayer is not one long self-commiseration and one dismal communing with ourselves over our many faults and failings. Consider what such a course of suggestion must lead to in filling our minds with utter depression and despair! The *primary* reference in all prayer is not downwards to self, but upwards to God. Hence the remedy for coldness and weariness in the saying of our prayers is not an increased time for prayers, nor the use of a more varied assortment of books of devotion, still less an increased dwelling upon our lack of faith and our need for Grace. The remedy is simple. Let us begin by a concentrated effort of mind and will to lift up our hearts to God, steadfastly waiting upon Him and deliberately recalling to our minds His Love; His Holiness; His Redemption through Christ Jesus; the commendation of that Love which was revealed in the Sacrifice of His Son; the great price He paid that we, although sinners, none the less might be reckoned other than we are and called "sons." Time enough afterwards in the light of all this to turn the attention of our minds to ourselves and the exceeding sinfulness of our sins. We are then in a right attitude to ponder

afresh the meaning of the great evangelical fact that we are not forgiven because we repent in love, but that we repent in love because we are forgiven!

Consider again the *form* our petitions would take if in our prayers we had begun by filling our minds with thoughts of God and His character. If, by this method of suggestion, we have charged our souls with the thought of *Him*, are our petitions likely to aim exclusively at getting our will done in Heaven rather than that His will should be done upon earth? Is not the outstanding difficulty over and over again in the prayer-life the stumbling-block of a silent Heaven? We complain that God does not answer our prayers, and so faith grows dim and prayers die away. If, however, we begin with God, we are more likely to reach the right tone in prayer, and we shall go on, (a) to an increased intensity of utterance, as in the case of the Canaanitish woman, because at first He answered her never a word, putting forth a fuller strength of faith; since (b) we learn that "Be it unto thee as thou wilt" must wait upon His commendation, "Great is thy faith"; and finally, (c) an increased appreciation, in the light of this experience, first of the greatness of the gift we desire, and secondly, of the greatness of our need, over and over again results in our realisation of the fact that our prayer in its first form was really asking for a stone which we thought was bread. This knowledge enables us to change the form of our prayer, and we live to praise Him because He did not give us what we thought we wanted, but something better—viz., what we really needed. The secret of true prayer lies in a right knowledge of God's character.

Now if suggestion has such power in colouring the mind, and if our whole prayer-life in its tone is so in-

fluenced by suggestions for good or evil, does not modern psychology confirm the advice of the leaders of old in their spiritual directions when they one and all bid us begin with God and think Him aright before we go on to ask for our daily bread and all things needful both for our souls and bodies? The spiritual ascent of the mind up to the Mount of Vision, that we may, from that altitude, survey the world and our own human needs, is psychologically justified and brings us into such close *rappo*rt with Him as to enable us to see as He sees, to behold light in His Light and Truth from His stand-point. Then and then only can we rightly apply the vision to the affairs of earth and go forth from His Presence fully assured that this is a God who answereth prayer.

Psychology would teach us afresh that the real enemy of the spiritual life is despair, and the real quickening power is Hope informed by Love and issuing in a charitable spirit.

A profounder study of human life is bringing home to us afresh the moulding power of ideals, and teaching us in this sense that it is not so much the inheritance of the past as the hope of the future which can be the decisive factor in character-building. We tend to become that for which we pray. If suggestion can fashion us anew, then Christianity is justified when it bids us seek nothing less than the highest—the crowned Christ—and hope for nothing less than perfection in accordance with His promise, “Ye shall be perfect even as I am perfect.”

In all this we do not wish for a moment to be taken to mean any depreciation of the vital need and value in the prayer-life of self-examination, self-introspection,

repentance and confession, as essential factors for spiritual health. What we wish to emphasise, and what we think that the Psychology of suggestion justifies, is the Catholic principle which puts God first in all religious experience and deprecates a narrower religion which is primarily occupied with the states of the individual soul and forgets that our first duty is not with self, but to know God and to enjoy Him. The aim of prayer in its primary reference is to God, and it is offered to Him. Hence we commence with the *Sursum corda*.

Another issue from the same principle is the emphasis to be placed upon the cultivation of positive virtues as the best way of overcoming temptation and uprooting evil in human life. We must not rest content with a negative resistance, but must press on towards a positive drawing near to God.¹⁶

Psychology is teaching us the relative value of the methods of resistance and counter-attraction. It is this last, what Professor Barry describes in a felicitous expression as "falling in love with Jesus," or what the author of *Ecce Homo* named long ago as the "expulsive power of a new affection," which is the true key to progress in the Christian life and the way to enter more fully into the riches of prayer.

In an age distinguished by its weariness of spirit, the superficial character of its work, and the ever-increasing strain of its feverish restlessness, we may come to present afresh the ancient Christian remedies clothed in a modern psychological garb in the hope that the scientific disguise may win for them a hearing in quarters least responsive to the direct appeal of the spiritual physician.

¹⁶Jas. iv. 7.

The Divine remedy which alone can minister to a mind diseased and pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow is Supernatural Grace, mediated to the souls of men through human agencies. One pre-requisite, however, is essential—viz., prayer. Men must learn afresh the meaning and value of real prayer, be the forms it takes however many and varied. Prayer it is which can secure the repose of the soul and its issue in a spiritual mind, producing as that does upon those who come under its influence a twofold impression, that of remoteness and that of nearness and sympathy. Prayer it is which Jeremy Taylor so beautifully describes as “the stillness of our thoughts, the evenness of recollection, the seat of meditation, the rest of our souls, and the calm of our tempest; prayer is the issue of a quiet mind of untroubled thoughts; it is the daughter of charity and the sister of meekness.”

Such indeed it is, and the world needs it badly. If anything we have written here concerning the “psychology of prayer and religious experience” proves helpful either in demonstrating its therapeutic value or removing intellectual difficulties, so as to enable some to employ it with a more whole-hearted assurance of its spiritual efficacy, we shall not have laboured in vain.

IV

**THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT**

BY

O. HARDMAN, M.A., D.D.

IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

FROM the point of view of one who seeks to learn what help modern psychology has to offer in the making of Christian character, its exponents fall into three groups. The first is comparatively small, and its numbers are rapidly shrinking. It insists on the interpretation of spirit in terms of matter, and therefore it finds life to be a physically determined, mechanistic process, and man "a plausible mechanical dummy," to quote some words of Dr. McDougall. The second school is large, vociferous, and immensely popular. Boldly appropriating for its own teaching the title of "The New Psychology," it explores the recesses of man's psychical nature, reveals the alarming modes of operation of the instinctive forces hidden there, and proclaims the error and moral inutility of rational processes and the illusory nature of volitional choice. The third school is of uncertain size, probably larger than its literary output suggests by comparison with that of the second school. Distinguishing between psychology and physical science, it yet recognises the proper limitations of its subject as a department of scientific study, it is not wholly obsessed by the Unconscious, and in its investigations of man's

conscious activities it approaches with respect, and even reverence, the mystery attaching to the conscience and will of the human personality.

While it is difficult, in view of its subject-matter, to understand how psychology can be content to be strictly confined within the limits of science, as generally understood, it is evident that, where it is so confined, there is nothing really hostile to religion in a mechanistic interpretation of mental process and of human conduct. For then, as Professor E. J. Price puts it,¹ "Psychology is concerned solely with what goes on *within* the conscious process. On this purely scientific view it is inevitable that the mind should be treated on mechanistic lines. Science wins its way by excluding from its sphere of operations all non-natural causes. Such causes may be all-important for a final and all-comprehensive view, as worked out by a philosopher. Science, however, must limit itself to secondary causes operating mechanically. So far, then, its view, though justified by utility, is partial and incomplete. It enables us to win command over the phenomena by restricting the range of inquiry. Obviously, therefore, psychology, so far as it is scientific, must proceed in the same way. It will exclude from its purview all causes which lie outside the conscious process, and will invite us, at least provisionally, to regard mental phenomena as finding their complete expression within the mental series." There is no doubt that the terms "science" and "scientific method" are already undergoing modification as a result of the development of the new sciences of sociology and the comparative study of ethics and of religion, and of psychology itself; but if the accepted meanings are to be retained without change,

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1924. p. 664.

then this position is sound, and psychology is limited accordingly. For all who thus regard it there is, strictly speaking, no conduct properly so called to be discovered in human beings, but only reflex action. When an object suddenly approaches the eye, when pepper gets into the nostrils, when the sole of the foot is tickled, there follow inevitably certain fixed responses to these external stimuli. In exactly the same way, from this particular standpoint, a human being is apparently compelled, by the physical constitution of his body with its own peculiar nervous system modified by all its former activities, to make response to a situation in which, for example, he has the opportunity to steal or to tell a lie at a time of need. He supposes himself to be deciding between stealing and not stealing, between lying and speaking the truth; but in reality, so far as the psychologist can report, he is moved by the inescapable compulsion of his physical organism to take the course which he imagines himself to choose. Thus, in individual lives, and in human society as a whole, results are produced infallibly by preceding causes, and themselves become in turn the causes of further fixed results, so that the whole order moves forward ceaselessly and helplessly on a path which is strictly determined at every step of the self-deceiving psychical process.

The New Psychologists constitute a separate group, not because they are agreed in rejecting the determinist views of the first school, for that is certainly not the case, but because their chief interest lies in another battle, that of *Instinct versus Intelligence*. By far the greater number of them are undoubtedly on the side of the determinists, but it is their main task to demonstrate the full force of the instinctive powers in the determina-

tion of man's conduct rather than to relate the psychical process to the physical. For the most part they show an unconcealed hostility to Christianity, representing the New Psychology as nothing less than the science which has, at length, arrived to disabuse men's minds of fallacies proclaimed by the Church as truths fundamental and assured, to set them free from the power of sin by revealing its true nature as consisting of hitherto unrecognised forms of mental disease, and to point the way to the peace and happiness of self-realisation by a curative discipline which is simplicity itself.

The third group, again, are not to be regarded as wholly opposed to the theory of determinism, for there are varieties and degrees of opposition to the belief in human freedom; but they are impressed by the evidence of a constitutive, organising, directive power contained within the life-energy, and they are convinced that life is purposive. For them conduct is distinguishable from reflex action long before the human level of life is reached. "The difference is that instinctive conduct does and reflex action does not presuppose the co-operation of intelligent consciousness, including under this head interest, attention, variation of behaviour according as its results are satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and the power of learning by experience."² Further, this power of intelligent co-operation in the individual is regarded as no arbitrary and irresponsible possession, but as a power which is in some way cognate and definitely associated with the corresponding power in others, and tending towards the same end, whether unwittingly or in varying degrees of conscious appreciation of that fact. "In all the root impulses," says Dr. L. T. Hob-

²G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*, p. 343.

house,³ "if we except the bodily appetites, there is some thing that points beyond the self. This is true, not only of the social impulses that connect us with our fellows, and of the cognitive and constructive impulses that relate us to the entire external order, but also of the self-regarding impulses of pride and self-respect which imply a sense of our function in a larger whole. Thus, the tie to a wider whole is common to all the specifically human interests, the point in which they all unite, or more probably from which they take their origin. For, in the last analysis we are in presence of one ultimate impulse taking manifold forms in various directions."

In his presidential address to the Psychological Section of the meeting of the British Association held at Toronto in August, 1924, Dr. McDougall recommended the adoption of this conception of purposive striving as a fundamental category of psychology, and urged that psychologists should dare to abandon the abstract conceptions of physical science and be boldly anthropomorphic in describing man. "Let us frankly acknowledge," he said, "that man is that thing in all the world with which we have the most intimate acquaintance. Let us begin by accepting him for what he seems to be, a thinking being that strives to attain the goal he desires, to realise his ideals, sometimes succeeding, often failing, but always striving so long as he lives. Let us try to understand the history of these tendencies to strive, as they are revealed in the individual and the species; to understand more nearly our knowing, our imagining, our recollecting, our judging and reasoning, as they serve us in our strivings for the attainment of our goals." Dr. McDougall suggested that in the progress of science

³*Social Development*, p. 169.

it might come to be seen that of these two apparently different processes, the mechanistic and the purposive, one is merely an appearance of the other, an appearance due to the present limitations and imperfections of our understanding ; and he expressed the opinion that in that case it would be the purposive type that would be found to be the more real of the two. Whatever the future may hold in that respect, there can be no doubt that for the present Christian students of psychology will attend with a much greater degree of expectation to those who are of Dr. McDougall's way of thinking than to the others. But even then they will remember that psychologists, as such, are never free to claim for themselves the unfettered liberty with which philosophers and theologians explore the "other side" of those powers which are at work in man; and while they may expect to find psychological truth dovetailing with theological truth, they will not complain because the former does not include the latter.

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The contrast between the two is very strikingly revealed on a first rapid survey of the psychological report of the moral struggle that has its place in the development of every mature human life, by the side of the Church's long-established and clear-cut statement of the same thing. On the one side we have a familiar and readily intelligible picture of a war waged by the human soul against the world, the flesh, and the devil, the soul being enlightened in its conscience and strengthened in its will by the secret operation of the Holy Spirit of God. On the other side there is a forbidding array of instincts,

impulses, emotions, and sentiments, variously defined and grouped according to the opinions of the individual psychologist, with much strange talk concerning the evil results of repressions and complexes, the delusions of fantasy, projection, and rationalisation, and the all-available efficacy of sublimation. Instead of impatiently dismissing "the weird terms of a new-fangled science," let us dispose ourselves to learn from those who expound it.

The psychological study of human conduct and character is defined as an endeavour to discover the original elements out of which character is organised, and the stages of the process in which these elements are systematically combined by the formation of habits and by the mental activities of the higher thought-centres. It is clear at the outset that a considerable degree of uncertainty yet prevails as to the precise nature and number of the primary elements and also as to the early stages of their association. This will be brought home to any student who takes up the works of, say, Shand, McDougall, Hobhouse, and Hadfield, and seeks to gain from them exact ideas of instincts, impulses, and emotions. Dr. Hadfield apparently finds emotion and instinct so nearly identical, or at least so intimately associated, that he does not stay to distinguish between them in his recent work on *Psychology and Morals*, but is content to use the phrase "the instinctive emotions" without explanation. His view of the impulses is that "they are the expression or activity of the complexes and instincts."⁴ "When the instincts and complexes function we call them Impulses."⁵ "An impulse may spring from an instinct, as when we have an 'impulse'

⁴P. 71.

⁵P. 70.

to steal, to be morbidly curious, or to take vengeance; or from repressed complexes, as when we have an ‘impulse’ to twitch the face, to throw ourselves in front of a moving train, to be cruel to our friends.”⁶ Dr. McDougall, on the contrary, makes a clear distinction between instinct and emotion, closely associated as he finds them to be, understanding by the latter “the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts.”⁷ Mr. Shand, while agreeing as to the distinction to be made, joins issue with Dr. McDougall, as to the matter of their association, pointing out that the position taken seems to obscure three important points: “(1) That an instinct may be excited, and even evolve the behaviour which is characteristic of it, without exciting an emotion; (2) that in the system of an emotion there may be not only one but several instincts; (3) that sometimes the same instinct may be found organised in the systems of different emotions.”⁸ Dr. McDougall in turn criticises Mr. Shand’s use of the word “instinct,” arguing that “if he would turn his attention to the birds and insects, he would see that his position is untenable.”⁹ As to the word “impulse,” Mr. Shand would use it to name the most rudimentary of the emotional systems. He says, “Impulses, with their connected instincts and acquired tendencies, are constituents of our primary emotional systems; but the latter are not constituents of the former; they are more comprehensive systems. Impulses, in fact, function in emotions, and are subordinated to their general ends.”¹⁰ For Dr. Hobhouse,

⁶P. 71.

⁷*Social Psychology*, p. 47.

⁸*The Foundations of Character*, second edition, p. 188.

⁹*An Outline of Psychology*, p. 116; cf. p. 142.

¹⁰*An Outline of Psychology*, p. 459 f.

yet again, an instinct is “an innate interest guiding impulses, one or many, to an end which is not foreseen”;¹¹ and he asserts that “in the simplest forms of action which are not mechanical, we trace two elements, impulse and feeling, very closely allied, yet not identical.”¹²

These differences are not a little confusing. They are partly due to the want of an agreed terminology, but they also show that much remains to be done in the investigation of that groundwork of instinctive behaviour on which human character is built. Two truths of great importance may be regarded as established, however. The first, which is now generally recognised, is that that groundwork is still the essential support of the wonderful rational structure which man has reared upon it—is, indeed, more truly conceived as the roots of a mighty tree, vitally related to its topmost branch and leaf, and the hidden source of all its life-energy. It is no longer admissible to assert boldly that man is distinguished from the lower animals by the fact that he governs himself by reason, whereas they are governed by instinct. For again—and this is the second truth, not so generally recognised—psychology is no more able completely to deny reason to the animals than it is to assert man’s emancipation from instinct. As Dr. Hobhouse says,¹³ “It would be a mistake to regard animal behaviour as limited to reflex and instinctive responses whether modified or unmodified by experience. Quite low down in the animal scale we find evidence of power to deal with the situation, not merely by some established method,

¹¹*Op. cit.*, p. 136.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹³*Op. cit.*, p. 137; cf. W. H. Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, pp. 40-43.

but in accordance with the requirements of the root interest in the individual case." Thus the barriers between instinct and intelligence are broken down, and modern psychology is not yet able to resolve with certainty the difficulties created by their combined operation.

Experience and increasing rationality, these are the two factors at work in that modification of the original instinctive responses of the creature which is to issue in the formation of human character. Directed at first to the preservation of the individual (by nutrition, flight, concealment, and aggression) and to the preservation of the species (by the production and care of offspring), these instincts are extended in the case of some creatures to serve the interests of a group or herd; and a nice question is raised as to whether this is effected by the transference or redirection of instincts already existing, or whether this extension points to the fact that those existing instincts were only particular applications of more generalised powers possessed from the first. It will be seen that this has an important bearing on the question of the sublimation of instinct, to be referred to later.

The possibility of the formation of human character lies, at any rate, in this permanent association of the individual creature not only with its mate and offspring, but with other members of the same species. For in this common life individual experiences are multiplied, and valuable lessons are learned by imitation, a widened range of stimuli is brought to bear upon all the members of the group, and requirements other than those of individual and family need are imposed upon them; and out of these things occasions of choice and of conflict continually arise, and there is discovered within the individual the beginning of that "conscience" which,

according to Dr. W. Trotter,¹⁴ is but “an indirect result of the gregarious instinct.”

The inner aspect of this process of development has so far received its most convincing treatment at the hands of Mr. A. F. Shand, whose theory as to the formation of the sentiments has been widely approved. He considers that there are broadly three stages in the organisation of the instinctive powers, or, as he phrases it, “in the evolution of the emotional systems.” First come “the lesser systems of the impulses and emotions”; in the third stage are found “the greater systems of the sentiments”; and between the two there is an intermediate stage when the emotions are “dangerous and independent systems.” “It is with them,” he says,¹⁵ “as so often with children, who, at first, have to obey a rule imposed on them which they cannot understand, and afterwards, when they grow up, break from its control, but only to fall under their own unregulated impulses, until at length their disasters teach them to make a new law to replace the old one they derided.” That is to say, in the first stage there is a minimum of choice and a maximum of necessity. Certain stimuli representing root interests effect in the creature the excitation of primary impulses or rudimentary emotional systems, and the organism, strictly limited in its choosing, yet not altogether without choice, calls into play some of its instinctive powers of action and makes its response. These lesser mental systems include the appetites of hunger and sex, the impulses for repose and sleep, for self-display and self-abasement, and the primary emotions of fear, anger, joy, sorrow, curiosity, repugnance, and

¹⁴*Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 41.

¹⁵*On. cit.* p. 196.

disgust. Each of these constitutes "a single system innately determined to the pursuit of a particular end."¹⁶

Development from this earliest stage proceeds according to the fundamental law of organisation found in the psychic life. "Every primary emotion tends to organise in its system all instincts that are serviceable to its innately determined end, and to acquire many serviceable tendencies which modify such instincts."¹⁷ Having thus associated with itself a considerable range of instincts, an emotion may become "an independent system, unrelated to the welfare of the organism," and may work grevious harm. Herein lies the danger of the second stage, a persisting danger, moreover, which presently challenges the inferior stability of the third stage and threatens to effect debasement of character. But this danger is fortunately countered to some extent by the fact that there is an innate bond between the emotions, making readily possible their own intimate association. "Every primary impulse, whether it is independent or belongs to a primary emotion, is innately connected with the systems of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, in such a way that, when opposed, it tends to arouse anger; when satisfied, joy; when frustrated, sorrow; and when it anticipates frustration, fear; these systems being similarly connected together. This law must also be understood to imply that there is in the very structure of the nervous system an innate base for the organisation of the dispositions of these primary emotions with one another and with the disposition of any other primary impulse."¹⁸ Thus it comes about that the sentiments of

¹⁶Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 457 *f.*

¹⁷Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁸Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

love and hate, respect and contempt, are developed, in manifold variety of form and degree, and the emotions are subordinated to the particular ends of the individual sentiments. Just as the emotions gather up the instinctive powers, and make them serve their ends, so the sentiments purposefully gather up the emotions, rejecting from their systems those which are antagonistic or useless to them, but appropriating all those which are serviceable. And in order to conserve its particular interest and to pursue its end with success, each sentiment devises for itself what may be termed a relative code of ethics, setting up ideals of conduct, such as loyalty, courage, and perseverance, creating special emotions of aspiration, enthusiasm, self-reproach, self-approval, to assist it in striving to carry out those ideals, and recognising for itself the obligation of certain duties suited to its proper manifestation and calculated to promote its development.

Over against these sentiments, some of which are formed in every human being, certain other mental structures known as complexes are frequently, but by no means invariably, found. Like the sentiment, the complex is a psychological system¹⁹ embracing various emotions and instinctive powers, known generally by its dominant emotion or interest as a fear-complex, sex-complex, and so on; but it has been thrust out of the sphere of consciousness by deliberate repression, because of its shameful or distasteful character, by unconscious suppression through mere refusal to face something unpleasant and painful, or simply by unconscious auto-

¹⁹But simple by comparison with the sentiment. As Dr. Rivers points out, "they differ first in complexity, the sentiment being far more complex in its nature than the process which has been denoted according to this feature" (*Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 88).

matic suppression. The complex, being thus formed, proves a lively and persistent source of trouble. It produces nervous disorders, it finds expression in troublesome dreams, and it not infrequently leads to conduct which, apart from the explanation afforded by the psycho-analyst, would be accounted sinful, and therefore reprehensible.

There is a strong tendency to claim that the area hitherto covered by the term *sin* shall now be very considerably restricted, and that the psycho-analyst shall be employed to do scientifically and satisfactorily work that was formerly ill done by the priest through lack of knowledge. The claim must be allowed in part. There is a distinction, often by no means sufficiently clear, however, between moral disease and actual sin; psycho-analysis has established the right to be regarded as the proper method of treatment for some of those who suffer from moral disorder and inertia; and, further, the priest is himself under no small obligation to those who have thrown new light on the causes of certain types of mental and moral disturbance. But there is a grave danger lest actual sinners shall be encouraged to confound the psychological with the ethical, and to excuse themselves lightly for sin which is really sinful. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that in the formation of complexes there is often an original element of shirking which is the cause of all the trouble; and it is to the credit of some of those physicians who most fully appreciate the value of psycho-analysis, both as a theory and as a method, that they also realise and declare the truth that it stands for the recognition of a wider individual responsibility, rather than for any tendency to limit the power of the personality. As Dr. H. Crichton Miller

says,²⁰ "Both in the individual and in the social sphere, the outlook of analytical psychology is tending to enlarge the field of consciousness and of responsibility. The neurotic patient feels himself the victim of circumstances. His obsessions, phobias, compulsions, inertia, or physical symptoms: his neurosis, whatever form it takes, mean to him a loss of freedom and happiness; and this, in itself, proves to him that it is something that has come upon him against his will. It is only as he is brought to recognise the parts of his experience and the dynamics of his life with which he has lost contact, that he comes to realise that his problem lies within his own personality. Until he is thus reassociated, he makes no secure adjustment to the demands of life." Dr. Hadfield equally maintains that moral responsibility attaches to such cases to seek the right means of cure, and also to exercise such self-control as is found possible even while they are still suffering. "Whilst the pervert cannot control his psychological impulses, he can frequently control the expression of these impulses in outward conduct. There are hundreds of homo-sexuals or exhibitionists who have never given way to their impulses in perverted acts. To that extent, therefore, the pervert may be held responsible. Nevertheless, even in these cases, there may come a point where the mind, constantly obsessed by an impulse, can stand the strain no longer and falls."²¹

The nemesis attendant upon the mind's refusal to face the issues of life is but the obverse side of the truth that where choice is boldly and honestly made between competing sentiments, the personality develops

²⁰*The New Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 236 f.

²¹*Psychology and Morals*, p. 50.

into a close-knit unity having a definite type of character and a will to be reckoned with. By deciding in favour of a particular sentiment on any occasion of conflict, the self modifies its own constitution accordingly. It now possesses a will strengthened in favour of the accepted sentiment, and correspondingly weakened for the rejected sentiment; for the will is the whole of the organised life-impulse, and expresses what may be regarded as the purpose or direction of the life. So too, since each sentiment is dynamically related to the whole character and strives to extend its influence over it, the more frequently the biddings of a particular sentiment are performed the greater is its power of spreading itself, and the character of the personality becomes increasingly coloured by the sentiment.

It might naturally be supposed that conflict would arise chiefly between the self-regarding sentiment and the sentiments which are attached to others; but, as Shand and Hobhouse recognise, this is not the case. The sentiment of self-love is admittedly found to be "generally pre-eminent" in men, but "joined to this self-love in subtle and intimate ways . . . are a variety of disinterested sentiments: as conjugal and parental love, filial affection, friendship, the sentiment for some game or sport, and in the higher characters one or other of the great impersonal sentiments, patriotism and the love for some science or art."²² As Dr. Hobhouse says, "We have to distinguish between the self as an exclusive centre, and the self as pervading everything within the reach of its activity, and even of its thought."²³ Hence, in the conflicts which arise between the sentiments it is not

²²Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 457 *f.*

²³*Op. cit.*, p. 159.

mainly a question of the self-regarding sentiment opposing the others, but, as a rule, of a struggle for supremacy between those which are of social utility and those which are anti-social. "These conflicts of the first sociological importance arise out of the conditions of the evolutionary proces which begins with a chaos of unorganised relations and develops through partial unities, self, family, class, group, nationality. Each of these unities has its own self-assertiveness and potential antagonism to others. We may even say that it has its own self-regard—*i.e.*, that its members feel about it the same pride, and for it the same ambitions and fears, that each may feel for self. With these the wider social feeling has to do repeated battle, and so develops an idea of self-negation—a necessary corrective, but one that must be seen in due relation. Mind fulfils itself, not by destroying its deepest impulses, but by finding for them their function in a harmonious whole. Similarly the social union, if truly organic, does not destroy the elements on which the deepest emotions are concentrated, but gives them the form in which their vigour rebounds to the strength of the whole."²⁴

Temptation at any given time, then, lies in the appeal of that particular impulse, or of those associated impulses, which will prove injurious, or of inferior service to the whole life of the individual, regarded not as an isolated unit, but as a member of a community. Each organised emotional system makes its separate claim repeatedly, and all are judged by a mysterious Self or ego, which sits, not apart from them as an independent arbiter, but in close association with each of them, weighing them all in connection with the whole Self,

the ideal Self, which is greater than the sum total of all the separate or departmental selves represented by these separate systems. This central personality is frankly recognised as an inscrutable mystery. Mr. Shand says of it, "Our personality does not seem to be the sum of the dispositions of our emotions and sentiments. These are our many selves; but there is also our one self. This enigmatical self which reflects on their systems estimates them, and, however loath to do it, sometimes chooses between their ends, seems to be the central fact of our personality. If this be the fact, it is not the kind of fact which we can take into account. The science of character will be the science of our sentiments and emotions—of these many selves, not of this one self. It will try to understand those forces with which our personality has to reckon, to trace the laws of their organisation, of their growth and decline, of their action and interaction; but it will leave out of account the mystery which lies behind them."²⁵

2

At this point we may presume to introduce the question of religion, expressing mild astonishment at the readiness with which many psychologists relegate this department of their subject to the specialist. Mr. Shand's study of the foundations of character cries aloud for a full recognition of the religious sentiment; yet, after describing the sentiment of "respect for conscience" as a "system of unique importance," in most

²⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 66 f. A passage in Joseph Conrad's *The Arrow of Gold* is interesting in this connection: "The observer, more or less alert, whom each of us carries in his own consciousness, failed me altogether, had turned away his face in sheer horror, or else had fainted from the strain. And thus I had to live alone, unobserved even by myself."

men "combined with the religious sentiment," he dismisses both of them in a brief paragraph.²⁶

No one can dispute the great importance of the religious or God-sentiment as a factor in the development both of individual character and of the social organism; and it must be obvious that that importance would not be in any way diminished for the psychologist and the sociologist, even if psychology completely satisfied itself that there is no objective reality corresponding to man's persistent faith. The eternal God is, however, still a part of the scheme of things for many psychologists. If the God-sentiment is explained as merely the result of a "projection" from man's mind, there would seem to be no need to dispute the explanation, as a purely psychological explanation of a mental process. As Dr. G. F. Stout says at the conclusion of his *Manual of Psychology*, "Truth and freedom are ultimately topics for the metaphysician. As psychologists, we deal not with the ultimate possibility of will and thought, but only with their mode of occurrence as time-processes taking place in the individual mind." In terms of religious thought this "projection" is the return of the immanent Spirit of God upon Himself. It is the work of mind-spirits created, equipped, urged from within and stimulated from without, by the God whose being and nature are thus "projected"; and the degree of error in the mental picture is recognised as proportionate to the immaturity of the projecting mind-spirits. The conscience of the individual is without doubt largely the result of the social influences that are brought to bear upon him; but it is not to be wholly explained without the acceptance of the religious hypothesis. For, when psychology has dis-

²⁶Op. cit., p. 57.

posed of God by assuming that the knowledge of a mental process invalidates its results, and has satisfied itself as to the origin and growth of conscience by unduly magnifying the influence of the social group, it is faced with the problem of the moral genius; and it can offer no word in explanation of the specially enlightened consciences of the individuals by whom the corporate or group-conscience is advanced. Dr. Hobhouse, whose testimony as a sociologist is particularly valuable, fairly recognises the importance and the problem of these moral leaders: "The higher scientific, philosophic, religious, and ethical interests have no doubt survival value to the community in which they are sufficiently strong. But in their progressive advance they are generally disadvantageous and often fatal to their individual possessors. . . . However advantageous an ethical standard, once firmly established, may be to a community, we are left without explanation of its growth in individual minds."²⁷

The religious man is free, therefore, to trace out for himself the undoubted connexion between the religious sentiment and that ideal Self which plays so large a part in the process of voluntary decision; and, further, to find the inspiration and strength of the Conscience, as distinct from those inferior consciences which attach to the other sentiments, in the special nature and direction of this sentiment with its characteristic complex-emotion of reverence. The Conscience is for him the self-consciousness of the human life-impulse in its contact, mediated (through the community) and direct, with the Spirit of God, ever seeking to organise the whole life in the interests of super-biological—that is, moral and spiritual—ends; and the Will, which is the whole of the life-

²⁷Op. cit., p. 309 f.

impulse so far as it is organised, is the more or less imperfectly equipped servant of that Conscience.

The special form taken by the religious sentiment in the life of one whose moral standards are, in some sense, Christian, is determined by the inclusion of a more or less strongly developed Christ-sentiment. This may be a sentiment for the Person of Jesus Christ as God, or as the supreme ethical teacher, commonly but not invariably in association with what may be called a Church-sentiment; or, again, it may have no conscious attachment to the Person of Christ or to any Church, but may be a sentiment for a partly Christian code of morals adopted, with individual modifications, from the general community, and, within that, from a particular group connected with school and business or professional life. In so-called Christian countries in the modern world, that is to say, the conscience of one who is really entitled to be known as a Christian draws on three separate sources. In its early growth it is mainly dependent upon the moral standard of the racial and national group, and of the particular class or section of the community in which it is produced and fostered, and upon that of the particular Christian organisation and system to which it is attached by family tradition, the two overlapping to a greater or less degree. When, gradually or suddenly, as a result of spiritual development, there is added to these a direct sentiment for the Person of Christ, the conscience of the individual will comprise elements derived, in varying proportions, from all three sources. The peasant child born in an Italian mountain-village, the heir of a wealthy American manufacturer, the infant son of a Kikuyu convert, and the child of an English country vicarage, may all, in the end, come to

be morally dominated by the Christ-sentiment, and be found in general agreement on all moral issues. But they breathe at first the moral atmospheres into which they are born, and these are clearly by no means identical. Again, not to go so far afield, and avoiding all differences of race, nationality, and social class, it is possible to imagine four children born in a day in some English town, one in an Anglican home, a second in a Baptist family, a third in a Wesleyan, and a fourth in a Roman Catholic, and to feel assured that the moral standards of the four children will vary, in respect of the ideals of sainthood which are held by them, in respect of their codes of ecclesiastical duties and offences, and more generally in respect of certain departments of conduct in worldly affairs. And such differences are, as a rule, never entirely eliminated. Frequently, on the contrary, they become fixed and hardened, where there is a growth of Church-sentiment in perverse distinction from Christ-sentiment.

Psychologists have devoted much attention to the religious experience known as conversion, with the general result that the apparent differences between conversions of the sudden or explosive type and those of gradual growth have been considerably reduced. Both types are found to be characterised by a process of development, though in the one case it is conscious, while in the other it is largely unconscious until its apparently sudden consummation. In either case the result is seen in the possession of a strong Christ-sentiment by the converted person. "The problem of the growth of a given sentiment," as Mr. Shand points out,²⁸ "is, first, to understand how this innate system at the base of love"

²⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 158.

(that is, the organisation of emotional dispositions in which the primary systems of joy, repugnance, sorrow, fear, and anger are included) "comes to be attached to a particular object. In a great many cases," he says, "the emotion of joy is instrumental in effecting this connexion in the first instance, because joy directs or holds attention to the object." Certainly it is so in the case of the formation of the Christ-sentiment. Whether the convert is one who has become painfully aware of his own sinfulness and of his inability to deliver himself from it, or whether, apart from any tormenting stings of conscience, he has been led to seek a truly satisfying love-object, the object of his new-born sentiment is One who, by His message of love in the Incarnation and His promise of life through the Cross and Resurrection, has wrought in the believer a conviction of redemption from all ills and great gladness of heart. And the sentiment thus formed is strengthened by every subsequent emotion of joy arising out of the sense of forgiveness of sin confessed and out of the sense of a realised fellowship of love.

"But joy alone can never form a durable bond, so as to render us 'attached' to this person rather than to another. For this the opposite emotions of sorrow and repugnance are essential, which ensue, if at all, when the object of joy is absent, or destroyed, or injured."²⁹ Thus is it that the contemplation of the Cross in ever-growing appreciation of the quality and significance of the sorrows of Christ, together with the sorrowful and sinful experiences of individual and social life, issuing in a deepened spirit of penitence, co-operates with the abiding sense of joy in the Beloved to promote devotion

²⁹Op. cit., p. 158.

to Him who was dead for man's sins, and, for their salvation, is alive for evermore.

The means by which this combined development of joy and sorrow is sustained in the life of the Christian are found in the Church's sacramental system and corporate worship, in the intellectual and devotional use of its sacred scriptures, and in the private exercise of the spiritual powers in meditation and prayer. In all these things there is a "beyond" which psychology cannot reach, and an operative force from the other side which psychology can measure only by the effects produced on the human side. Thinking, however humbly, in terms of the philosophy and theology of his religion, the Christian interprets his experiences as the direct result of fellowship with the Eternal God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and his own inner life gives him an assurance, which goes beyond intellectual demonstration, of the validity of the interpretation. Approaching experiences of the same quality, whether by introspection or by examination of the written and spoken records of others, the psychologist is restricted to the observation of the working of what his science terms, "suggestion"—auto-suggestion, or direct self-suggestion, and hetero-suggestion, or suggestion made by others, which must be consciously or unconsciously adopted and so become auto-suggestion before it begins to operate. In the baptismal washing away of the defilement of sin, in the solemn partaking of the consecrated Elements, in the memorial of the Passion, in the various acts of benediction and enabling by the laying on of hands, as in all other of the Church's sacramental usages, the psychologist sees precisely the same sort of suggestion being powerfully made to the individual Christian by the corporate society to

which he belongs as the individual makes to himself when, after hearing or reading the messages of the Gospel, he disposes himself to pray for divine assistance in his striving away from evil towards the good. And he recognises the greater value of all such suggestion, especially of that which is made corporately by the group, in the building up of the Christ-sentiment, which may thus be so strengthened as to become the predominant factor in the ordering of the moral life.

Here it may be noticed incidentally that, while psychology is, strictly speaking, incapable of either denying or affirming the truth of the Christian's belief as to the reality of the Power with whom he is in contact, there is none the less what may almost be called a psychological argument for the existence of God, in the fact that the sacramental system and the life of prayer "work" only so long as they are used in faith. When faith is wanting, it is of no avail to use the sacramental system as mere magic or the activity of prayer as a piece of conscious deception devised to lend added strength to auto-suggestion. But in proportion to the strength of the faith that is exerted the moral power of the Christ-sentiment increases, and avails for the discharge of the duties attaching to the sentiment and for growing conformation to the ideals associated with it.

It is claimed by the Church that Christianity is distinguished from all other religions and from all other moral systems by its possession of a unique moral dynamic. The direct and irrefutable answer made by it to those who would dispute that claim lies in its steady and persevering success in the work of weaning men from lives of gross sin and in its production of saints. Psychology may, however, help to give an intelligible ex-

planation of the mode of operation of the Christ-sentiment in this work, and, at the same time, to deliver Christians from the mental confusion which sometimes troubles them when they observe that there are many people in their midst professing no allegiance to Jesus Christ who yet live lives morally indistinguishable from those of the best of their Christian neighbors. To take the latter point first, it should be clear that the Church has no interest in asserting, in the face of facts, the impotence of a high moral ideal, least of all when the ideal is derived in large measure from its own. The morality of the English gentleman, for example, reaches a high standard, and affords valuable testimony to the power of an ideal maintained by a fellowship and also to the pervasive quality of the morality of the saints. But at its best it is by no means above criticism; and it would appear to be the case that such moral dynamic as its ideal possesses depends for its operation on the existence of congenial social conditions, to say nothing of a persisting background of vital Christianity. The Church, however, is able to transform character, in the face of highly adverse social conditions, by implanting and developing the Christ-sentiment in lives of low moral standard. This transformation it attributes to the operation of Divine Grace, an explanation which suggests to many people a belief in the magical transfusion of moral energy. The true psychological explanation is, no doubt, not that the superior moral power of the Christ-sentiment is due simply to the fact that the individual is hereby brought, according to the Christian belief, under the influence of a larger and more exalted social group than that which influences the merely moral man: for God and the saints must not be denied their

part in the making of a gentleman who is no professing Christian. But the superiority lies, first, in the awakened consciousness of the Christian that he is under the personal influence of Christ, who, to speak psychologically, is thus enabled to make powerful suggestions to him, directly and through his communion with those in whom the same personal power has already achieved notable results. For the developed Christian consciousness is not a passive awareness, but an active apprehension possessing a strong emotional content; and God's outpouring of the Holy Spirit is ever conditioned as to measure by human capacity to receive. Secondly, this superiority lies in the vividness of the ideal self, seen by the Christian not merely as a possibility, but as something already existing in the sight of God. Conviction of justification by faith exercises an incalculable power in the moral reformation of a life.

So, in the case of infant baptism, granted the Christian premises of a wider society, psychology would accept the claim that there is an admission of an unwitting child into a corporate society in which the personal power of Christ has established a greater degree of freedom to operate than is to be found elsewhere; and the child would accordingly be regarded as living "in a state of grace" from that time forward, it being clearly understood that the operation of the divine power, which is both mediated and direct, would be mediated rather than direct through the early years of the child's life. As its powers mature, so the Christ-sentiment may be progressively formed, with its ideals and duties, and with its strong personal suggestions from beyond, looked for, recognised, and accepted.

When the Christ-sentiment, in this sense of direct at-

tachment to the Person of Christ, is strongly established, its moral pull is felt in the direction of idealistic and other-worldly aims, and it inevitably finds itself in some degree of conflict with the less direct Christ-sentiments, social sentiments rather, derived from the moral life of the community, ecclesiastical and civil. For these latter are bound to some extent to represent codifications of an ideal which can never be codified without loss. They are essentially practical and compromising, and they necessarily include in their systems some degree of convention: whereas the pure Christ-sentiment urges those in whom it is strongly formed to work out in their lives the principle of the atonement, to undertake such an unshrinking war with evil as must often appear quixotic to onlookers, and to pursue such a fervent quest of God's Kingdom and His righteousness as cannot fail to be derided by many as childishly utopian. This is most strikingly seen in the lives of the saints, who are wholly governed by the Christ-sentiment, whatever the way of life which is accepted by them as their special vocation. In a man like St. Francis of Assisi, that which is normally only a relative system of ethics in the life of the Christian who is citizen, father of a family, and a man of business, has become an exclusive system, completely dominating the life, by the extension of the Christ-sentiment, until it embraces and controls the whole of the saint's emotional and instinctive powers. The world's standards and the Church's standards, so far as these are practically expressed at the time, are observed by such a one just so long as they coincide with the moral standard of the individual Christ-sentiment; but in any situation in which conflict arises, all goes down before the absolute demands of the ruling system.

Two important questions arise in the consideration of such lives. The first is that of the authority of the individual conscience in conflict with the corporate conscience; and the second is that of the adequacy of the moral resultant of the pure Christ-sentiment. Psychology is not of itself competent to answer either of these closely related questions, but it has its contribution to make to their solution.

To the individual whose conscience leads him to challenge his group, psychology presents balancing considerations; on the one side, the grave dangers of subjectivism, on the other the necessity of self-realisation. Instancing fantasy and rationalisation as typical of the self-delusions and aberrations of the individual mind uncorrected by submission to the testing and guidance of others, psychology would thereby promote the safety of some who were in peril of mere eccentricity; but it might succeed equally in silencing the moral inspiration of the saint, and so rob society of its chief means of real progress, unless, indeed, the saint preferred to follow the psychologist's exhortation to achieve self-realisation, judging that the way to that satisfaction lies in the acceptance of the ultimate authority of the individual conscience for its possessor.

The adequacy of the moral resultant of the Christ-sentiment has for the psychologist a very different meaning from that which it has for the sociologist. The latter regards it as a subject for investigation by the comparative study of ethics; but for the former it is a question of the degree of satisfaction afforded to the individual by the progressive unification of his personality; and, while the satisfaction resulting from the acceptance of the Christ-sentiment may not be more intense at any

given time than that derived from certain other sentiments, there can be no doubt that it is more stable and more enduring, and that it alone is capable of unlimited increase. Psychology will, perhaps, be disposed to find an indication of marked superiority in respect of adequacy in the possibility of the complete identification of the Christ-sentiment with the religious or God-sentiment, since that leads to the identification of the conscience of the Christ-sentiment with the Conscience of the central personality, according to the Christian conviction, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." The pursuit of Art, Science, and Morality, the quest of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, may carry a man far and hold him steadfast over a long course of years, as may the love of another human being; but there will always be an element of incompleteness in such cases, because the sentiment that is formed is incapable of complete identification with the God-sentiment, and will always be subject to disturbance by the contrary directions of the supreme voice of Conscience.

3

As a result of the apparently sudden formation of the Christ-sentiment in adolescence or later, by the process known as conversion, there is frequently found not only a remarkable interior sense of newness of life, but also a real access of moral power sufficient to express that inner sense in terms of conduct. The convert has literally fallen in love with Jesus Christ, and in the joy of this new experience his former way of life is abandoned without difficulty, in so far as it is found to be in conflict with the requirements of the new relationship. In psychological language, a new-born sentiment has come to life with

such a fulness of power that it entirely dominates all other co-existing emotional systems and makes it impossible for them to operate in any way that is opposed to its own continuance.

To the grave loss and injury of many Christians this fact has been misunderstood to prove that Christian character is altogether a gift conveyed from without, and in no sense an achievement from within. It has somehow been supposed that the grace of God changes a man's character by superseding his power of self-determination and relieving him of all effort; and the irony of the situation lies in the fact that this error has been held chiefly by those who have offered the keenest criticism of others who appeared to them to put their trust in the magical operation of sacramental grace. In season and out of season, they have dwelt on St. Paul's teaching concerning the necessity and the power of the abounding grace of God, and have forgotten that the same apostle repeatedly represented the Christian life as a persistent striving, and that, not counting himself to have apprehended, he died daily, keeping his body under strict control and so bringing it into subjection.

The truth is that the Christian sentiment is not peculiar in that, when its first enthusiasm has been enjoyed and wonderfully expressed through a striking moral transformation, it changes its mode of activity in view of the necessity of providing for its continued operation in the great variety of situations which life inevitably brings. As Shand states it, "While in the first freshness of a sentiment its virtues often develop in this spontaneous way—as, for instance, the qualities of generosity, gentleness, kindness and sincerity, in love and friendship, and in the sentiments for truth and art,

the qualities of industry and perseverance—yet a little later these qualities are often checked, and effort and reflection succeed to the first stage of spontaneous growth.³⁰ It is a heavy disappointment to the Christ-lover when he finds the moral energy of his love weakening in the face of the old perils. In some cases he is content to behave as a disillusioned man, and gradually to resume all his former manner of life, with evil additions. “Then goeth he, and taketh to him seven other spirits more evil than himself; and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man becometh worse than the first.” But others accept the new situation in a right spirit, and set to work to maintain and strengthen their sentiment for Christ by proposing to themselves associated ideals, and by acknowledging the obligation of a certain range of duties. In this they are both prompted from within and directed and encouraged from without. The whole life of the Church, on its Catholic side, is organised with a view to the assistance of the soul in this task of achieving Christian character through fellowship. It is a society of men, women, and children, who are called to be saints; and, with the example of the saints prominently before it, it counsels and insists upon a rule of life in all its members, and provides through the ministerial priesthood for spiritual direction, and for the healing and strengthening of the soul by the ministry of absolution, and by the administration of penitential discipline. The duties of prayer, fasting, and almsgiving are imposed upon all who would seriously apply themselves to the achievement, by the power of God that is in them, of that perfection to which they are called. There is no question of substituting

³⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 111.

human power for divine, but of receiving with understanding and gratitude, and of using with a full sense of responsibility, that power of the Holy Spirit which enlightens the eyes and quickens the will.

The New Psychology pronounces the Christian system completely mistaken in that it represents sin as a positive evil and sets out to defeat and kill it by strengthening the power of the will. In place of this it teaches that the mind should be turned away from all consideration of evil to dwell only on the good that it desires. Positive quest of good rather than any negative uprooting of evil is said to be the true way of progress. To this Christianity can make answer that the element of truth that lies in the criticism is no new thing, and that, in spite of the aberrations of some of those who profess the Christian faith, it has never failed to produce moral athletes who have valued, practised, and recommended that truth. Understanding Christians in every age have fully recognised the wisdom of St. Paul's injunction: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." To-day there can be no doubt about the necessity of countering the evil suggestion that thrusts itself indiscriminately upon all, through the agency of papers, magazines, and books, theatres and picture-palaces, and through the exhibition of vice parading in a thousand forms as an inevitable factor in the modern social system. To enable the human organism to absorb without injury the poison of these things an antidote must be found in the observance of set times of retirement for meditation and

prayer, and for the enjoyment of literature, art, and music, possessing the quality of inspiration.

As a result the instinctive powers will be marshalled in the cause of the dominant sentiment so securely that the formation of revolutionary emotional systems will not easily be found possible, and there will be a steady redirection of instinctive desire, in the sense that powers which are incited to make direct response in the most obvious line of their activity are exercised instead in some less obvious but associated path. Here again Christianity has long known and practised that which the New Psychology has rediscovered for itself and emphasised under the name of *sublimation*. In a rich ministry of love the Church has provided a way of issue, in particular, for the instinctive desire of those who, by reason of the need of their generation, and by their own vocation, have been cut off from the life of the family; and in its general guidance of seekers after moral well-being, it has shown a fertile invention in the diversion of desire from injurious and forbidden ways into paths of usefulness, honour, and true satisfaction.

But this knowledge and a long practical experience in these matters have by no means disposed the Church to a ready acceptance of the far-reaching claims of the New Psychologists in respect of sublimation. It is clear to all who have experience of this process that sublimation is always a second best from the point of view of the instincts themselves, and that it can never carry with it a guarantee of complete safety. This is seen most evidently in the attempts that are made to provide an alternative outlet for the sexual and parental instincts. From time to time these instincts will assert themselves in a demand for natural or direct satisfaction and break rudely in

upon the peace and satisfaction which have been won by a long-continued practice of sublimation. Then there is nothing for it but self-control, a self-control which is not to be discovered by a stroke of luck in a moment of crisis, but which must have been slowly built up by patient and systematic discipline. If there is to be success in meeting the sudden impulse to evil, or again in slowly weaning the self of some bad habit, there must be watchfulness and the hardness of training. Filling the mind with good thoughts and desires, avoiding danger as far as may be by the sublimation of the instinctive powers, the Christian will yet count it his wisdom and his duty to mark his life with the sign of the Cross, not only in the sense of self-sacrifice for others, but also in the sense of self-regimen on behalf of the soul he has to save.

“A charge to keep I have,
A God to glorify,
A never-dying soul to save,
And fit it for the sky ;
To serve the present age,
My calling to fulfil :
Oh may it all my powers engage
To do my Master’s will !”

Well aware that the progress to sainthood is over a rough and forbidding way, he will not suffer himself to be turned aside from the rigours of a Christian asceticism to the pleasant delusions of those who put their trust in sublimation, any more than, in seeking to guard the health of his body, he will be persuaded of the truth and sufficiency of the teaching of Christian Science. The will

must learn to say "No!" and it must gain its power by practice.

Here the New Psychology immediately states the Law of Reversed Effort and points, at length, to Christianity's crowning error in the sphere of morals. Whenever it is a question of conflict between the Will and the Imagination, it says, the Will always goes down; and again, in these circumstances, the failure of the Will is in direct proportion to the effort which it puts forth. Let the Will therefore be lulled to sleep; trust only to the Imagination. Do not try to bring your desire to pass, but in a relaxed, half-dreaming state of mind assure yourself that it has already come to pass.

But, if the will is to be lulled to sleep, what is it that decides so and takes control? It looks rather like another will, a will with imagination on its side. Then the first will is only the will of a partial system. It is not the whole Will of the personality, though that is the meaning that is conveyed when the phrase *Will versus Imagination* is used. It seems, then, that the Law represents, after all, nothing more than a glimmering apprehension of the mode of activity known to Christians by the name of Faith. When a man tries to do the right and to accomplish his desire, having already persuaded himself that he is certain to fail, he fails. When a man tries to do the right, having already persuaded himself that he can do it if he will, he may or may not succeed. When a man tries to do the right, and has faith that God will enable him to achieve it, succeed he must. But so far is his faith from supplanting his will that it strengthens and directs it for its own increase, and, apart from it, languishes unto death. Christians can never cease to pray, therefore, "Excita, quaesumus Domine,

Tuorum fidelium voluntates: ut divini operis fructum propensius exsequentes, pietatis Tuae remedia majora percipient. Per Dominum nostrum."

For the direction and assistance of the individual in his work of moral self-development the Church provides, through the priesthood, a ministry both general and particular. As to the former, counsel and systematic instruction are imparted to general congregations and meetings, and to assemblies representing special groups, by means of sermons and addresses. At the conclusion of the form of service prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer for the Ministration of Publick Baptism of Infants, godparents are instructed to remember that it is their "parts and duties" to see that the newly baptised child be taught, "so soon as he shall be able to learn, what a solemn vow, promise, and profession" has been made in his name, two-thirds of it relating to the moral life. "And that he may know these things the better," it continues, "ye shall call upon him to hear Sermons." These, then, are to be concerned in large measure with the moral standards of the Christian life, not only by way of exhortation, but also by way of counsel and instruction directly relevant to the needs and circumstances of the people to whom it is addressed. But, while the general moral teaching of a wise and instructed preacher will be of great service to some, at least, of his hearers, there remains for most people a need of individual teaching, direction, and exhortation, not only during the vitally important time of preparation for Confirmation, but throughout life. It is a matter of grave doubt whether, apart from such private counsel, any soul can be assured of clear vision at all times as to its own condition and progress. The revelation made by recent

psychology concerning the general tendency to rationalisation and self-deception fully justifies the wisdom of the many Christians who, though possessed of more than common moral and spiritual power, have, nevertheless, seen fit to put themselves under direction. Pride, false independence, and blind self-satisfaction, make it harder for the very imperfect Christians in whom they are found to accept the help of which they stand in greater need.

It is evident that the responsibilities and opportunities of the director demand special qualifications and special training. There must be spirituality and moral uprightness in a man who would usefully discharge such an office, sound common-sense and practical wisdom, a good knowledge of psychology and of ethics, much earnestness, zeal, and patience, unbounded faith and a supernatural gift of intuition and analysis, sustained and strengthened by an intensive prayer-life. For this reason systematic spiritual direction is normally to be undertaken by a priest rather than by a layman, seeing that by training, by appointment, and by way of life he is more likely to develop the necessary power in these matters, and to be free to give his attention to them: and, further, the work of direction is commonly associated with the ministry of absolution, which is committed to his office. But, while every priest is required to be in some sort a director, it is not to be supposed that every priest will show a special aptitude for this work, or that aptitude without training will suffice. There is great need in the Church of England for a general training in spiritual direction for all the younger clergy, and for the recognition and encouragement of those in whom special gifts are discovered. The higher degrees of spiritual

progress are probably missed by some devout Christians through lack of that competent direction which is an important factor in the making of a saint; and even in the lower ranges much evil may result, does undoubtedly result, from the dull perception, unwisdom, and want of knowledge of earnest but ill-equipped directors.

The present stress laid by psychologists upon the duty of self-realisation in no way contradicted by the office of the director, whose aim is direction as opposed to domination. He will constantly seek to strengthen and develop the individual whom he assists by promoting his dependence upon God by means of prayer, and will ever guard against the error of making himself an indispensable support. The only exception to this will be in the case of the scrupulous penitent. When people are found to display a morbid anxiety about comparatively petty failings and to be incapable of attaining to peace of mind through distorted vision and unjustifiable fears, they may require to be controlled for a time by the spiritual director just as completely as patients sometimes need to be controlled by the psycho-analyst; but when the phase of scrupulosity has passed, the domination of the director must also be withdrawn. The growth of moral personality is by the very nature of the resultant product an achievement from within.

Just as in the work of education the experienced schoolmaster is prepared to recognise a number of types among the pupils who come under his care, so the practised spiritual director finds himself dealing for the most part with a certain limited range of typical cases; and in both spheres the benefit of psychology is that it gives scientific interpretation to experience and assists ma-

terially in the equipment of those who have not yet had time to acquire experience. There is a danger, perhaps, that the stubborn fact of individuality may be forgotten in the attempt to classify all comers under a few heads; but there is none the less a considerable gain to be looked for from the psychology of temperament when that particular study has been carried further. At present there is need for experienced directors themselves to make their contribution to the better understanding of the subject. It may be remarked that, in addition to the scrupulous type already referred to, there is an all too common class of people who seek mainly to secure for themselves attention and sympathy, claiming much time and care, and producing nothing in themselves to justify such expenditure, but rather growing worse as their craving is ministered to. A very different but equally large class is that of the recidivists, who are much in earnest, and for a time make good headway, only to fall back again repeatedly, and to need encouraging and spurring to fresh effort.

It is in the case of these people especially that the question of confession and the problems attendant upon it come to the front. Apart from the possibility of full reconciliation, of complete readjustment of relationship after the commission of sin, there is no hope for such people; and the method of sacramental confession has the strongest psychological support in their case. The opportunity of telling the precise nature of an offence in a solemn way in the presence of an official representative of the Church, the sense of receiving an authoritative declaration of forgiveness, and the knowledge of the binding nature of the seal of confession, all possess considerable psychological value, and conspire to create a

sense of restoration to fellowship in a manner that permits of, requires even, the making of a fresh start. There is a something truly purgative in vocally and definitely naming one's sin and in declaring, "I am heartily sorry": there is something profoundly assuring in the judicial pronouncement of absolution: and in the seal of silence imposed by the Church there is a powerful suggestion that the sin confessed is no more remembered in the sight of God, but is utterly done away.

As to frequency of confession and the much debated question as to whether it is to be regarded as food or medicine, psychology suggests that it is needed immediately after any serious lapse in order to prevent the evils of unchecked remorse and to institute recovery without delay, and that, apart from these special occasions, it should be used, where it is used at all, with such frequency as to promote continuity in the development of the spiritual life. There may be lives in which a single act of confession bears a close analogy to submission of treatment at the hands of an expert psycho-analyst, when the cure is effectual and permanent. But far more commonly, as in the case of the recidivists so generally, confession will be associated with the receiving of direction, and it will be found necessary to repeat it at intervals of not more than three months. Greater frequency than this will usually be found to involve the danger of formalism, or of scrupulosity, or of lack of a proper degree of self-confidence and self-determination. Over-direction and an unwise advocacy of frequent confession are undoubtedly responsible for most of the failures of this system where it is honestly and zealously followed.

In the imposition of penances constant care is

needed to guard against any suggestion of earning forgiveness or of balancing accounts with God. Acts of reparation made to persons against whom offences have been committed, and discipline imposed for its corrective and remedial value, are in grave danger of being misconceived as compensation in a purely commercial sense. The best corrective to this would seem to be the prescription, in addition to any necessary reparation and discipline, of small acts of gratitude for forgiveness, offered in love as a pledge of the soul's intention, suggested and accepted by the penitent rather than imposed by the confessor. At all costs the central truth of the adequacy of the merits of the death of Christ is to be guarded from perversion.

In any case of sin committed against the body, it is a fatal mistake to impose penance or discipline having the nature of bodily chastisement. This will assuredly strengthen the evil which it is designed to overcome.

In conclusion, psychology has something to teach in explanation of the growing self-depreciation of the Christian who is advancing towards sainthood. Psychologically he is being conformed to an ideal which arises out of the dominant sentiment of the life. As that sentiment—the Christ-sentiment—is strengthened, so the ideal grows in clearness and in content, and since the moral achievement of the saint proceeds at a slower rate than the growth of the ideal, there is developed in him an increasing appreciation of his own imperfection, to which in all humility and honesty he gives occasional expression. Yet he advances, and he is aware that he is advancing; and he has within him the hope and the assurance of the ultimate perfection of character which belongs to those who are in Christ.

V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL
HEALING

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V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL HEALING

THE term "spiritual healing" may have two meanings: it may mean the cure of spiritual conditions, or it may signify the cure by spiritual means of morbid conditions whether of body or mind. Generally speaking, this distinction is not of great importance, for bodily diseases are usually treated by physical agencies, and spiritual by spiritual. But this is only generally true, for there are diseases of the soul, such as a morbid sense of sin, which may be due to diseases of the brain, and the cure of which should be along physical lines. At the same time, there are many "physical" ailments, such as hysterical paralysis, which are due to mental and emotional causes, and which may therefore be treated by "spiritual" or mental means. On the whole, it is perhaps better to use the term "spiritual healing," not merely of the treatment of spiritual conditions, in which sense the term becomes practically synonymous with the cure of souls, but to use it (as we use the term "psychotherapy") to mean the treatment by spiritual means of morbid conditions whether of body or mind. It is in this sense that the term "spiritual healing" or "faith healing" has been most

commonly used; for such healing is directed not only to spiritual and moral disorders, but to bodily ills, as in our Lord's miracles, the ministry of the Early Church, the cures at Lourdes, and amongst Christian Scientists.

There is a sense, of course, in which all healing is spiritual, and some would extend the use of the term to surgical and medical as well as psychical healing, on the ground that we have no right to exclude the work of the physician or surgeon from the sphere of the spiritual, for all healing is of God. This interpretation seems to have been favoured by the Lambeth Committee on Spiritual Healing recently appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury. In principle no exception can be taken to this view; in the same sense the work of the tailor and of the lawyer is spiritual—or perhaps it is truer to say that it *may be* spiritual. But it is obvious that if we are to use the term "spiritual" of all forms of healing, or even if we limit it to such work as is done with a spiritual aim, we shall rob it of its special significance, and we shall be compelled to find some other term to connote what we now know as "spiritual healing."

Spiritual healing is distinguished from ordinary physical treatment; but it also differs from faith healing and from mental healing or psychotherapy. The terms "faith healing" and "spiritual healing" are often used synonymously, and it would be pedantic to distinguish between them too sharply in ordinary language. Yet faith healing may be entirely non-spiritual, as when we are cured of a headache by a bread pill; and, on the other hand, faith is only one factor employed in spiritual healing, which may take

the form of investigating the hidden causes of the morbid state with a view to readjusting the personality in conformity with spiritual ends; in which form of treatment faith plays an unimportant rôle. We should further distinguish spiritual healing from mental healing. Mental healing includes all forms of healing by mental means, and embraces faith healing and spiritual healing on the one hand, and scientific psychotherapy on the other. Psychotherapy, as now commonly used by medical men, proceeds along purely scientific lines in the investigation of the causes and cure of mental abnormalities, whether these give rise to mental or to bodily symptoms. By spiritual healing let us mean, then, the treatment or healing of diseased conditions whether of body, mind, or spirit—by spiritual means, that is to say—by bringing the personality into relation with God.

I

A brief survey of the history of spiritual healing will help to give some impression of the main factors concerned in the process, and of the extent to which the Church has carried it out. Dr. Percy Dearmer, in *Body and Soul*, gives an excellent account of the development of spiritual healing. It may perhaps be well to mention in passing that some kind of spiritual healing was practised in the Temples of Æsculapius, Mithra, Isis and Osiris, long before the Christian era. Patients used to visit the temple and make a lengthened stay, during which they actually slept in the sacred building. What part was played by the priests themselves it is difficult to say; but the atmosphere of awe and worship would no doubt stimulate the hopes of the sick. Cures must

have been effected, as the practice continued in the Temple of Æsculapius for over seven hundred years. It was imitated by the Christian Church and the practice of "incubation," as it is called, is carried on in some Eastern Orthodox Churches to-day. In heathen countries witch-doctors and medicine-men have a great influence over their patients. They work by magic charms, and doubtless certain sicknesses are influenced by them. But the advent of the medical missionary invariably puts the medicine-man in the shade, and the sick flock to the exponent of Western medicine. In Christ's own time the Jews were able to cast out devils, as is evidenced by our Lord's reply to the accusation that He was casting out devils by Beelzebub.¹

These non-Christian methods, or pre-Christian methods, as far as one can gather from the slender evidence available, are instances of cure by some kind of suggestion. The question as to whether both organic and functional diseases were cured cannot be answered with any certainty. But the practice of spiritual healing during the last 1,900 years draws its authority and its practice from our Lord's ministry of healing, together with His definite injunction to His followers to heal the sick.

Examination of the healing miracles of Christ, so far as the records go, shows that the conditions dealt with fall into three principal groups: (1) functional disorders, such as some forms of paralysis, hysterical outbursts, etc.; (2) organic disease, such as leprosy and issue of blood; (3) death. The methods employed are chiefly word and touch, often accompanied by a symbolic action. In some cases our Lord dealt specifically

¹ See St. Matt. xii. 22-28.

with the patient's spiritual condition, in addition to healing the physical disability; but as a rule there is no mention made of such separate treatment. The great essential seemed to be belief in Christ's power on the part of the patients and their friends. In fact, lack of this belief limited Christ's power. Prayer and fasting were also spoken of as important in serious cases. It is open to critics to-day to doubt the sufficiency of the evidence in the Gospels as to whether a disease was organic or functional, or whether those who were raised from the dead were actually dead at all. But if the documentary evidence of the broad facts of the cases is satisfactory, the question as to whether a condition was organic or functional is not of the first importance so far as the Gospel miracles are concerned. Even if all the conditions dealt with were functional, the field of spiritual healing is vast enough to engage the attention of the followers of Christ to-day. The healing of organic conditions through spiritual means may soon be more comprehensive, as another part of this essay will go to show. The patient's own powers may be reinforced. It seems evident that contact with Christ's personality brought healing in its train. Calm and quiet were brought to the most excited and agitated households. Confidence and hope were inspired in the most despondent and helpless folk. The assurance of God's power and will to heal was made very real to those who were sick and oppressed. Christ brought them a new outlook, and helped them to attain a new attitude of mind.

There were cases which Christ healed without ever seeing the patient. He cured the centurion's servant and the daughter of the Syrophenician woman, while

they were at a distance. Lack of knowledge makes it impossible to form an opinion as to how these cures were effected.

Accounts of healing in the Acts of the Apostles go to show that the Early Church continued the practice followed by Christ, and healing came to be one of the natural results of the Gospel in action. In addition to the ordinary methods of healing, we read that people brought their sick into the streets of Jerusalem, so that the shadow of St. Peter might fall on them and heal them. And in Ephesus handkerchiefs or aprons were carried from St. Paul to the sick and diseased, and evil spirits were expelled.

During the ministry of Christ we read that the disciples "cast out many devils and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them,"² and St. James bids the sick man send for the elders of the church that they may anoint him and pray for his recovery: "Is any among you sick? let him call for the elders of the church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall save him that is sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, it shall be forgiven him."³ This injunction of St. James is usually taken as the authority for the practice of unction, which has been one of the methods of healing most frequently employed since the days of Christ. This subject is dealt with by Canon Mason in Appendix I. of the Report of the Committee on the Ministry of Healing, in which he quotes from Father Puller's work *The Anointing of the Sick*. He there discusses its historical aspect. There seems to have been no great

²St. Mark vi. 13.

³Jas. v. 14, 15.

uniformity of practice; but formulæ for blessing the sacred oil are contained in most of the ancient service-books from about the year 215. Anointing was originally used for the *healing* of the sick, but the beginning of the ninth century unction began to be regarded as a preparation for death by remission of sins. Healing of the body fell into a second place, and the rite of Extreme Unction appeared in the Church in both East and West. It was generally applied only when the patient was *in extremis*, and the healing of the body was not looked for except as a remote possibility. This seems to be the practice in the Eastern and in the Roman Church to-day. It is a question as to whether the possibility of healing receded into the background owing to the fact that cures were rather rare.

In the first seven or eight centuries records of cures by anointing occur in various writers, such as Tertullian, St. Jerome, and Bede. Bede describes cures performed by St. Cuthbert by anointing with oil as well as by holy water and consecrated bread.

In addition to unction, and rather replacing it in the Middle Ages, was the use of relics, which were generally kept in shrines associated with some Cathedral or Abbey Church. The practice, which began in the Catacombs at Rome, soon spread through East and West. The tombs were originally the scene of prayers, and people used to take oil from the lamps, or touch the tomb with a garment or some other object and take them away. After the ninth century the tombs began to be violated, and fragments of relics were carried all over Europe and Asia Minor and deposited in shrines. By degrees certain shrines acquired a reputation for cures; pilgrims flocked to them in their thousands and

many found relief. The pilgrim was a familiar figure everywhere. Great preparations were made for the journey, and to many it was the event of their life. Anyone who has seen the Russian pilgrims visiting the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and prostrating themselves in simple faith at the sacred sites will realise something of the suggestibility and devotion of the mediæval pilgrim. The sophisticated twentieth-century invalid yearns for something less humbling, but more grotesque, to bring him to such a hopeful frame of mind. But the pilgrimage churches of Europe to-day bear their testimony that there are still simple-minded folk who find the religious atmosphere of a church like that of Notre Dame de Laghet above Monte Carlo, or of the Madonna del Sasso above Lake Maggiore, sufficiently stimulating for the cure of their troubles, as the large number of votive offerings in the churches testify.

A curious practice, said to have arisen out of the acts of Edward the Confessor, was that known as "Touching for the King's Evil." It was carried on from the days of Henry VII. to the reign of Anne, though William III. refused to do it. Charles II. laid hands on over 90,000 persons, chiefly for scrofula. There was a regular religious rite published in some prayer books up to the time of George I. The custom was greatly abused, and many people came to be touched for the sake of the money which was distributed at the same time.

That certain individuals seem to have the power of conveying healing to sick people is evident by the account which Dr. Dearmer gives of saints and worthies who have performed cures from the seventh century to

the present day. This includes people like St. John of Beverley, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Catherine of Siena, Martin Luther, George Fox, John Wesley, and Father John of Cronstadt. From the various accounts it seems clear that the strength of the individual personality, together with the suggestion of God's power, combined to bring about a state of mind which allowed a cure.

To-day the Christian Science Movement is the biggest organisation claiming to carry out spiritual healing. Its practitioners heal large numbers of people who have been treated unsuccessfully by medical men. But, on the other hand, there are many people who are not helped in this way. It is difficult to get well-attested information as to the actual details of cases healed, but it is no exaggeration to say that the exponents of Christian Science claim to be able to heal any kind of sickness. They base their treatment on the belief that there is no such thing as mind or body or sickness, and that God knows nothing about illness, because it has no reality. To quote from Mrs. Eddy:⁴ "The hosts of Æsculapius are flooding the world with diseases, because they are ignorant that the human mind and body are myths."

Without discussing the truth or absurdity of this statement, it is sufficient to point out that such a suggestion to many sick people would be of immense benefit. If your illness is unreal, there is nothing more to worry about. All over the world Christian Science practitioners are carrying on their work, quite independently of medical men. In many cases it seems to have been quite sufficient for the patient to read *Science and Health* to be cured from diseases like cataract,

⁴*Science and Health*, published in 1875, p. 150 f.

consumption, and valvular disease of the heart, or even a broken arm. Any intelligent person who reads the chapter "Fruitage," which comprises one-seventh of *Science and Health*, will know what to make of the evidence there set forth from patients who have been cured. It is difficult to attach very serious weight to it. The question of diagnosis is apparently of slight importance.

We must be content with quoting from one "testimony" only; it is headed "Cancer and Consumption Healed." The patient states, "I was a great sufferer for many years from cancer and consumption. I was treated by the best physicians in New York, Minneapolis and Duluth, and was finally given up as incurable, when I heard of Christian Science. A neighbour who had been healed of consumption, kindly loaned me *Science and Health*, by Mrs. Eddy, which I read and became interested in. In three months I was healed, the truth conveyed to me by this book being the healer, and not only of these diseases, but I was made whole mentally as well. I have not been in bed one day since, or rather in eleven years." Other testimonies include headings such as "Astigmatism and Hernia Healed," "Substance of Lungs Restored," "Liver Complaint Healed," "The Textbook Makes Operation Unnecessary." The remarkable thing is that such a book as *Science and Health* should be so widely read and heeded. But in spite of its contradictions and crudities it is obvious that Christian Science does embody ideas which are able to bring hope and confidence to the minds of many people, and its influence does help and cheer large numbers of unhappy folk.

It is impossible to mention all the various other heal-

ing movements in existence, but it is necessary to speak of one or two more, such as the Emmanuel Movement in Boston, U. S. A., which works always in conjunction with medical men. Its exponents combine spiritual and physical means, as described in *Religion and Medicine*, and believe in using any combination of methods according to the special needs of patients; they endeavour to take into account all the factors involved. They do not claim to treat organic disease.

The name of Lourdes is a household word all over the world as a centre of spiritual healing. This little town in the Pyrenees has been the goal of countless pilgrims since 1858, when a peasant girl of fourteen declared that the Blessed Virgin had appeared to her several times in a grotto, and had ordered a sanctuary to be erected on the spot. The grotto contained a spring, and reports of miraculous healings effected by its waters swelled the number of pilgrims. The water of the spring is carried off into baths and taps. Water from the latter is drunk, or carried away in bottles. Patients are usually immersed in the baths or the affected part is bathed with the water. But only a small proportion of the pilgrims are sick folk, the rest are mainly friends and sympathisers. It is estimated that about 600,000 pilgrims visit Lourdes every year. Between 1892 and 1908 2,440 cases of cures were officially filed at the Bureau des Constatations, Lourdes, which examines all claims to be regarded as cures. A medical man is attached to the Bureau to examine persons who claim to have been cured. Any medical man is allowed to join in this examination. Patients are required to bring a medical certificate on their pilgrimage. This must be produced at the Bureau if a cure is claimed. Various

persons who have been connected with the patient at Lourdes are questioned, and their evidence tested. The patient is then required to procure a second certificate on his arrival home, if possible from the doctor who wrote the first, in order that the change in the patient's condition may be described. The patients are not examined at the Bureau on arrival at Lourdes, but only if a cure is claimed. The examination is more or less superficial, as there are no facilities for bacteriological or pathological work, and there is no X-ray apparatus. So practically none of the usual methods of scientific investigation are carried out.

In a recent book, *Twenty Cures at Lourdes, Medically Discussed*, by Dr. de Grandmaison (English translation), cures of the following diseases are described among others: pulmonary tuberculosis, gastric ulcer, cancer of the tongue and cancer of the breast, tubercular disease of the spine, ulcer of the leg of twelve years' duration, compound fracture of the leg of eight years' standing, fracture of the femur of three months' standing. The dates of cure range from 1875 to 1911. It must be admitted that the accounts given of the cases are not always very convincing.

But the fact remains that sick folk continue to flock to Lourdes and kindred places. And the atmosphere of Lourdes during the pilgrimage season is very wonderful; the air is charged with emotion. Consider the pilgrim of to-day, like the pilgrim of old, starting out in great hope after a time of careful preparation, and coming to a place where thousands of other believing people are gathered together. No one who has visited Lourdes could fail to be impressed by the extraordinary scene of religious devotion with all that that implies

of healing suggestion. The beauty of the surrounding mountains, many of them making a silent appeal through the Calvary on the summit; the fervour of the immense crowds which throng the grotto and its precincts; the procession of the Host and the blessing with It of the sick people gathered round the square; the singing of hymns and the addresses which are constantly being given in various centres; all combine to produce a state of extreme suggestibility and hopefulness in the minds of the sick folk, who are given the first place in everything. Pilgrimage churches of this kind exist all over Europe, and similar scenes to those described at Lourdes are witnessed in many other places.

It will be seen that great emphasis is laid upon the healing of the physical disability, and less upon the patient's actual spiritual condition. But in the organisations which exist in England, Canada, and the United States of America, more emphasis is laid upon the mental and spiritual attitude of the patients. The chief agencies of this kind in England are the Guild of Health, which is an interdenominational society of members of the Christian Church, and the Guild of St. Raphael, which lays emphasis on Holy Unction and the laying on of hands for healing. Its members seek to promote the well-being of the sick on sacramental lines by Holy Communion and repentance and faith. They prepare for the rite of Holy Unction by a preliminary service, in which emphasis is laid on the power of God to heal. The Guild of Health seeks for the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in all efforts to heal the sick. It desires to exercise healing by spiritual means, in complete loyalty to scientific principle and method, and to cultivate both individual and corporate health. Its

members seek to prevent sickness by promoting right ways of thought, and they deal with it by helping patients to a reasonable attitude to it and by correcting the wrong outlook which may have led up to it. Both Guilds are doing very useful work in making more widely known the implications of the teaching of Christ in connection with health of soul and body.

A word of mention must be made of mass meetings for healing, which have taken place in various parts of the world. The Church of England, especially overseas, has witnessed Healing Missions, conducted usually in association with the clergy of the district. Conflicting reports are circulated as to the results of these missions, but those who believe in their value state that many sick people are cured and that the spiritual life of many more is quickened. It is obvious that much more powerful suggestion will be obtained with a crowd than by individual treatment, and accounts which have reached England bear witness to this. In Australia the Mission made a great impression, and was the object of a pastoral letter from the Bishops, who spoke of the great blessings, both physical and spiritual, which resulted.

This survey will show the variety of the methods employed in spiritual healing—in one case the power of a personality; in another, prayer, individual and collective; in another, faith in relics and wells—and also the emphasis on the miraculous healing of bodily disease, on the one hand, and on the necessity for spiritual regeneration on the other.

At the outset of our enquiry a problem presents itself for our consideration. Can all diseases, bodily and

mental, be cured by spiritual means? In principle, if we believe at all in the power of God, we must believe that God *can* cure by direct means of all kinds. Most spiritual healers, therefore, refuse to place any limitations to the exercise of spiritual healing; in answer to prayer, God can cure an abscess in a tooth as easily as an ill temper. That God *can* do so may be admitted; that God *does* do so is another question. If God has designed other means for the cure of organic diseases, it is presumptuous in the spiritual healer to devise other methods.

We shall perhaps best examine the question from the points of view of:

1. The relation of body and mind.
2. The evidence of psychotherapy.
3. The evidence of the facts of spiritual healing.

Without entering into a discussion of the relation of body and mind, we may accept the evidence of observation and common sense, that the mind can affect the body, and the body the mind, but that each can function without a *corresponding* change in the other. This would encourage us to believe that all diseases, even those of the body, can be influenced and cured by spiritual means. Experimental evidence is forthcoming to confirm this. There are several cases on record in which the body temperature has been raised and lowered by pure suggestion, and stigmata such as blisters have been produced by such mental influences alone. This implies a very marked change in the circulation, and if such physical conditions can be produced directly by means of suggestion, there is no reason why diseased conditions which depend largely on the circulation should not be very markedly influenced and even cured.

by mental influences also. Such a possible conclusion is one from which there is, we believe, no escape.

Nevertheless, medical men do not believe in treating all diseases by mental means, and restrict the use of this method to what are known as the psychogenic diseases—that is to say, those diseases which are deemed to be caused by mental and emotional disorders.

Medical men are in the habit of distinguishing between psychogenic or functional diseases, and organic.

(i.) The one class of disease is generally termed "organic," such diseases being presumed to originate in disorders of the physical organism. Besides giving rise to ordinary physical symptoms, these diseases may produce disorders of a mental kind. The proof of this is found in experimental tests which prove (1) that a man's conduct can entirely change when he is under the influence of some poison like that of alcohol or gout, (2) that when treated by organic means, not only is the body cured, but the mind is restored to sanity.

Of such cases some of the most remarkable are those due to disturbance of the glands of internal secretion, like the thyroid and sex glands. The deficiency or excess of these secretions in the body has a remarkable effect on character. Certain cases of pathological lying and stealing seem to be due to deficiency in these glands.

(ii.) Other diseases, bodily and mental, to which we are subject appear to originate in the mind, and are therefore termed "psychogenic." Of such are the so-called functional nervous disorders—hysteria, anxiety neuroses, obsessions. The evidence for the belief that they are psychogenic and emotionally caused is based on the fact that—

(a) No organic lesion, such as disease of the brain,

poisoning, or other physical cause, can be found to account for their existence.

(b) They are sometimes produced by an emotional shock, in the absence of any obvious physical cause—*e.g.*, a cabin-boy was smitten with hysterical blindness in a terrific storm in the Channel.

(c) They disappear, sometimes as the result of an emotional shock—*e.g.*, a man regains his speech at an exciting episode at the cinema—sometimes as the result of specific psychological treatment, such as suggestion and analysis.

(d) These diseases can be reproduced by suggestion. This was first demonstrated by Charcot; and we have personally produced paralysis, blindness, sickness, and other physical conditions, besides such abnormalities as hallucinations, anaesthesia, and headaches, by suggestion alone. By experiments in hypnotic suggestion we may reproduce any of the pathological conditions caused by morbid emotional conditions. In these hypnotic states the mind is made to control not merely the voluntary muscles of arms and legs, but the involuntary muscles and even the sensations. Thus the movements of the intestines and the circulation, neither of which is normally under the control of the will, may be regulated by suggestion, and severe pains and headaches, even with nausea and vomiting, may be induced.

An interesting feature, however, of these conditions is that whilst they appear to be mentally originated, they seem to be beyond the control of the will, so that people with nervous disorders of this kind are quite incapable of controlling their symptoms by force of will. They are presumed, therefore, to belong to a part of the mind in some way independent of the will, and variously de-

scribed as "dissociated" or "repressed." A further characteristic of the region of the mind from which these functional nervous disorders spring is that it is unknown to normal consciousness, for there is none who suffers from these disorders who is aware of the motives of his illness, which remain unconscious. Indeed, the origin can only be discovered by the use of special psychological methods, such as hypnotism and psycho-analysis, by which means the so-called "unconscious" material is brought under the control of the will.

It is true that we cannot make an absolute distinction between organic and functional diseases, because of the extraordinary interaction between mind and body. But in practice medical men distinguish between them and treat them by entirely different methods.

It is not that we deny the influence of the mind over organic conditions; we are prepared to admit the enormous power that the emotions have on the vegetative life of the organism. Hope and faith will not, we believe, cure an abscess in the chest; nevertheless, the medical man does not fail to encourage and strengthen the patient, nor does he despise this aid to recovery. In this part of the treatment he has, in times past, been ably backed by the clergyman or minister who, in his visitations of the sick, breathes hope and encouragement to the patient. This has always been recognised as a most valuable function of the clergyman. We have illustrated more fully elsewhere⁵ the influence which the mind may have on conditions like tuberculosis and cancer. What the medical man holds is not that mental conditions cannot actively affect physiological functions, but that in our present state of knowledge treatment by organic

⁵*Psychology and Morals* (Methuen).

means, such as medicine, operation, or open-air treatment, is the most efficient form of cure of organic diseases, and to treat such a patient primarily by suggestion, unction, or prayer, is to deny him the best chance of a cure. Against the doctor are quoted cases in which diseases have been diagnosed by doctors as organic, but have been cured by spiritual healing or by suggestion. This we believe to be a perfectly true statement of the case. Every psychotherapist has seen and cured such cases previously diagnosed as organic, which have passed through the hands of many physicians. But it would be rash to conclude that these are cured of organic disease, for there are several possible fallacies. One is as regards diagnosis. The fact that a case has been diagnosed as "organic" is not conclusive. An eminent medical authority has recently stated that a medical man does well if he makes 75 per cent. correct diagnoses. Keeping in view the natural prejudice of medical men in favour of the physical origin of symptoms, it is not surprising that many conditions of a functional or mental origin are diagnosed as organic. When such a diagnosis is one of a serious and perhaps hopeless character, the patient may seek cure from a psychotherapist or a spiritual healer, who may therefore cure him of his supposed organic disease. Every psychotherapist, like many spiritual healers, has treated and cured cases of this kind, but he regards them, not as cases of organic disease cured by mental means, but as cases of wrong diagnosis. In the second place, it is quite possible to treat a genuinely organic disease and dismiss the symptoms without curing the disease. The disease of locomotor ataxia, for instance, is an incurable disease of the nervous system in the region of the spinal cord. One

of the most distressing symptoms of this disease is an acute crisis of pain called the "gastric pains." Such pains can often be successfully cured by suggestion or by prayer, and the healer who so "cures" this symptom may be under the delusion that he has cured the disease, whereas he has merely dispelled the symptoms and masked the disease, leaving behind the radical disease to work the ultimate death of the patient.

In some cases such treatment is quite justified, for if the disease is incurable, to dismiss the pain and give relief to the patient is to render him the greatest service. This is a proper use of suggestion and spiritual healing in the sphere of organic disease.

But the case is different with the majority of organic diseases, which are not incurable, and for which the most adequate and proper treatment should be that of surgical and medical means. To treat such a patient by spiritual healing alone is to deprive him of the best chance of recovery.

We are thus led to the consideration of the third question, What evidence is there for healing by spiritual means? Most spiritual healers claim that they can cure diseases of all kinds, including organic diseases, by spiritual means, maintaining that there are no limits to the power of prayer. An investigation, however, was made by a special committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, which came to the conclusion that there is no evidence that spiritual healing can produce cures of a kind which cannot be paralleled by similar cures wrought by scientific psychotherapy without religion. Besides this there are instances of *spontaneous* healing, which often occur even in the gravest cases, such as cancer, which "cure themselves," and the cure

of which is quite naturally but wrongly attributed to the actual treatment prescribed, whether prayer, suggestion, or vegetarianism. This, we know, is denied by members of certain cults like the Christian Scientists and by certain Christians such as the authorities at Lourdes. The former seem to affirm that all disease may be cured by mind, simply by denying the distinction between organic and functional disease, or, indeed, denying the existence of disease at all. Such a belief will undoubtedly get rid of many functional diseases, such as hysteria, and moral diseases of temper and character; it may, and we believe often does, produce a calm tranquillity of mind and a strong character. But its supposed cure of organic disease is one open to the objection of false diagnosis mentioned above. The authorities at Lourdes honestly make an investigation of their cases, though it is superficial from the scientific point of view, and admit as "miracles" only those which cannot be classed as hysterical or psychogenic. Such cases of "real miracles" are, however, so few and far between that one is tempted to believe that they are cases of mistaken diagnosis, even though the mistake is an honest one. We must remember that even conditions like skin disease may be the outcome of a neurotic condition of mind which on account of worrying produces lack of nutrition with consequent devitalisation of the skin, which is left to the mercy of micro-organisms ever ready to attack any part of the body which is so devitalised.

Yet this is a question on which dogmatism is not called for. If, by confidence or hope, a diseased state of body can be more rapidly cured, is there any reason why the rapidity should not increase to the extent of being virtually instantaneous, and therefore "miraculous"?

There was a time when people said that "miracles do not happen," the implication being that the narratives of miracles in the Gospels are untrue. Nowadays practically all the healing "miracles" of the New Testament have been reproduced in shell-shock hospitals over and over again. So it may be that those who maintain that the mind may have instantaneous effect on morbid bodily conditions may prove to be right. But so far they have not proved themselves to be right; and we must, for the time being, accept the verdict of those who maintain that no disease can be cured by spiritual healing which cannot be cured by psychotherapy. We may grant that the enquiries of this committee were not sufficiently exhaustive to warrant us in accepting this as a final verdict. But considering the comparatively few organic conditions claimed to be so cured, and considering the probability of false diagnosis, the possibility of spontaneous cure, and the fact that many of these took considerable time to cure, and so might be regarded as cases which would have been cured anyway, we are justified in requiring very much more positive proof before being convinced of their claims, and accepting this as a distinctive feature of spiritual healing.

We may assume, then, that cures of functional disease occur by spiritual healing as they do by psychotherapy, but there is no sufficient evidence that organic disease is or can be so cured. The problem as far as it has reference to the New Testament miracles has been very accurately studied by E. R. Micklem in his book *Miracles and the New Psychology*.⁶ An accurate diagnosis, as he points out, is not possible, since we are presented only

⁶*Miracles and the New Psychology*, by E. R. Micklem, M.A., B.Litt. (Oxon) (Oxford University Press).

with the main symptoms of the diseases, and we now know that hysterical diseases can simulate practically every organic disease. "On the other hand, the particulars of the miracles of healing upon which most reliance can be placed are not themselves incompatible with the view that such healing was accomplished through the agency of ascertainable psychological laws." Micklem points out, however, that our Lord's method seems to have been not merely "to suggest away symptoms, but He restored the whole personality of the sufferer, placing him in a new and right relation to life as a whole." The "faith which Jesus undoubtedly taught to be imperative if a cure was to be wrought was ultimately a confidence in God, and involved a living relationship with God."

3

We must now come to the question of the methods employed in spiritual healing, and for this purpose we shall again find a reference to scientific psychotherapy of great assistance.

In psychotherapy, three general methods are used: Persuasion, Suggestion, and Analysis. Persuasion seeks to change the mental state by reason and argument, and is often immediately successful. Most neurotic symptoms are unreasonable, and if we make our reasoning strong enough, it will be sufficient to dispel the symptom, at least temporarily. A large number of cures are affected in this way, both by physicians and by others. They are rarely lasting, for the simple reason that they deal with the symptom, but they do not deal with the underlying cause.

Suggestion is also, as a rule, directed towards the

symptom, but it proceeds not by reasoning, but by influencing the subconscious mind, from which the symptom springs. It attempts to supplant the morbid symptoms by healthy thoughts and confident emotions. Thus a person who fears may be made confident; a person with a paralysed leg made to walk; and the blind man to see.

Analytic treatment, instead of dealing permanently with the symptom, deals with the latent cause, which, in the latest teaching, is supposed to be in unconscious conflicts: instead of suggesting healthy and energising thoughts it seeks to liberate the emotional energies, the repression of which causes the disease, and to redirect them to healthy aims.

In spiritual healing we observe all these factors at work. The *analytic* technique finds its religious counterpart in confession, and those healing cults which insist on confession and penitence as a preliminary to the healing are acting in conformity with modern scientific methods and ideas. *But confession does not go nearly far enough.* It necessarily deals only with the material of which the patient is conscious. This may be sufficient in dealing with conscious sins, but not in treating the neuroses, the sources of such morbid disorders being hidden from consciousness. For instance, in a condition of morbid remorse, the confession of sin may produce no healthy result, since it may be due to a forgotten sin of long ago, unrepented at the time, the suppressed emotion of which has become transferred to some more recent fault, which is therefore charged with far more blame than it deserves. The unaccepted guilt of a bad habit of childhood may thus transfer itself to a trifling fault of the present day and swell its shame. It is

obvious that to confess this recent sin will be beside the point. Or, again, such remorse may be due to a masochistic tendency which takes the form of a morbid love of self-depreciation and mental self-laceration; or it may be due to a fantasy of moral superiority. The sense of sin is for many people a form of self-gratification, which can be cured only by the exposure of this self-indulgence.

But a mere glance at the various forms of spiritual healing will convince us that the methods more commonly conform to the psychological method of suggestion—*i.e.*, the implicit acceptance of an idea depending upon the dominance of the mind by an emotional state. Under such conditions we are swayed by our emotions, and reason plays a secondary rôle. If, therefore, any idea is suggested to the mind forcibly enough and with sufficient persistence, the mind waives its normal function of criticising the truth of the statements and accepts them implicitly and without question.

Now, when we look at the methods of spiritual healing we find all the conditions for inducing a suggestible condition of mind. In mass movements of healing, like the pilgrimage to Lourdes and the “missions” of healing, the number of people and the atmosphere of expectancy reproduce exactly the emotional conditions necessary to suggestibility, for in such soil both faith and credulity flourish, and cures are consequently performed.

Again, treatment by suggestion relies very largely upon the credentials of the suggesting party; and a Church, as an organisation claiming to command the life and soul of men not only in this life, but in the next, has just that authority which carries suggestive power. Such suggestions given in the name and under the authority

of God have just that power to create reverence and awe which is characteristic of such forms of suggestibility. Having secured the condition of suggestibility, it matters little what method is employed, whether unction or the laying on of hands, just as any *method* of producing hypnosis is immaterial, whether it is by use of words, of fixed gazing, or of passes, so long as the patient expects it to be successful.

The laying on of hands by a person of authority, and specially ordained for that purpose, is a ceremonial calculated to induce a condition of suggestibility.⁷ When the sick person is in a suggestible attitude, any idea from the priest or minister carries with it the force of a suggestion, the mind becoming completely dominated by the idea, which tends to work itself out in action.

Similarly with the use of unction. Viewed from the psychological point of view this sacrament, impressive as it is to the patient, is a means of inducing a suggestible frame of mind, and as such may be used as legitimately as the various means employed by the doctor preliminary to his giving suggestions—e.g., the relaxed position of the body, the fixed gazing, the use of a metronome. These contrivances are not really necessary, but they assist in the production of the suggestible state of mind and so facilitate the healing. They do not possess any virtue in themselves, their virtue lies in what they suggest.

⁷M. Coué is always insisting that the patient cures himself because he gives the suggestions to himself. He omits to emphasise that the most important condition of such suggestions being successful—namely, suggestibility—is provided from without; the enthusiastic meetings, the hearing letters read from other patients who have been cured, the personal charm of M. Coué himself—all these influences produce the suggestibility of mind which is the most essential feature and without which suggestions would be futile.

Other means of cure, such as holy wells and the use of relics, obviously follow the same principle. Considered in this light, these methods of spiritual healing are merely aids to a suggestible condition of mind, the prelude to successful cure. They depend chiefly on their reputation to heal, and the bones of a criminal are as effective as the bones of a saint, provided they are believed to be the relics of a saint.

The use of prayer in spiritual healing is hardly in the same category as the other methods, for whereas the use of unction and the laying on of hands are incidental to the cure, prayer is considered to be essential. The subject of the psychology of prayer is dealt with elsewhere and goes beyond the scope of this paper. For us it is only pertinent to say that there is no sufficient evidence that prayer does actually produce cures which cannot be effected by psychotherapy. It is not a question as to whether God can cure directly by means of prayer; the question is whether God does in fact so cure, or whether he does not employ other means which we call scientific.

There is thus a distinct place for suggestion in the treatment of functional nervous disorders, whether this suggestion be of the scientific or the religious kind. It is immensely valuable as an expedient in acute cases, for the alleviation of pain, or when analysis is impossible. But it has certain defects that should be considered.

Take the illustration of a girl who has a functionally paralysed hand following a car accident. It is possible we could have cured her hand by the methods of "persuasion," so successfully used during the War; or we might have cured it by suggestion. A priest might have cured it instantaneously by prayer or unction. In doing so, we should have cured the physical symptom, but

failed to cure the moral disease, which was at its root. In her case the repressed complex, which perpetuated the paralysis of the hand, was a craving to be the centre of interest, the desire towards self-display, and more deeply still, a morbid exhibitionism. A man with a "nervous headache" may really be suffering from a latent craving to escape responsibility, although he may be quite unaware of this cause of his headache, and in fact may make a determined effort to meet his responsibilities. In such cases investigation brings to light these moral failings which lie at the root of the physical disorder.

No treatment can be considered adequate which does not deal with the moral cause at the root of the disease. We should have been wanting in our duty as physicians if we had cured the symptoms by suggestion or otherwise, without curing the cause—namely, the self-display or the shrinking from responsibility. For any doctor to concentrate upon the healing of the physical symptom and leave the moral cause untouched is unscientific; yet he may excuse himself on the ground that he is concerned merely to cure the physical ailment. It is unscientific in the doctor, it is inexcusable in the priest or spiritual healer, whose functions are particularly concerned with the moral regeneration of the patient. Indeed, in thus "miraculously" curing the paralysed girl we may actually encourage her morbid desire to be interesting, by making her a "wonder."⁸

The main criticism we should raise against treatment such as the laying on of hands and unction is that they treat diseases essentially moral by non-moral and quasi-

⁸It may have been for such a reason that Christ insisted that some of His patients should "tell no man."

magical agencies. Even when the treatment is accompanied by moral re-education, the specific moral cause is not necessarily touched. It may be accompanied by prayer, but such prayer is not necessarily moral, for it may encourage superstition or it may encourage a selfish attitude towards life which is opposed to the development of Christian character.

It is not denied that it is possible to cure these diseases by suggestion, unction, or prayer or holy water. Failing other cure, it is, of course, better to cure the symptom than to cure nothing. But there are distinct moral as well as physical dangers in treating ordinary functional nervous disorders by spiritual healing, and this should never be undertaken unless the main endeavour of the treatment is directed towards the moral disorders which lie at the back of the bodily disease.

We must therefore conclude that, viewed psychologically, the methods employed by spiritual healers are essentially the same as those used by psychotherapists—mainly analysis and suggestion. There is no reason to discredit the fact that they perform similar cures, and it is probable that they are subject to the same limitations with regard to the cure of organic disease.

4

Are we, then, to conclude that, after all, “spiritual healing” has no significance as distinct from scientific psychotherapy? Are the healing forces at work in spiritual healing essentially no different from those operating in scientific psychotherapy?

We must remember that the nature of the healing force is in any case a mystery. There is this that links

up every form of healing, bodily, mental, and spiritual —namely, that it is never the healer who heals. When the surgeon operates, it is not he that heals; he merely removes morbid conditions which have hindered the flow of life. The great French surgeon wrote on the walls of his hospital: “I dressed the wound, God healed it.” Even the stitching up of the abdomen would be useless, were it not for that mysterious *vis naturae medicatrix* which actively unites the opposed surfaces. So in psychotherapy, we do not *give* strength even in suggestion—we rather liberate energies in the soul of man, energies the nature of which we understand but little. So in spiritual healing all our endeavours are simply to put the patient in a condition of mind receptive to the working of certain forces we call spiritual, but of the nature of which we are ignorant. All forms of cure are, therefore, alike in this, that they merely liberate certain curative forces, call them the *vis naturae medicatrix*, instinctive emotional forces, or spiritual forces, which are alone the agents of healing. No physician, surgeon, psychotherapist, or spiritual healer ever healed anyone; they only put the patient in the way of healing.

It is obvious, therefore, that we cannot tell if spiritual healing is different from psychotherapy, until we know something more than we do at present of the nature of the healing forces of nature, and whether there be spiritual forces of a different kind from the natural forces already at the disposal of scientific healing. Nevertheless, spiritual healing, even if we exclude consideration of the direct divine intervention claimed by most spiritual healers, has certain advantages over scientific psychotherapy.

1. Spiritual ideals have a greater power of arousing

our emotional states and so liberating the repressed emotions. By placing before the patient an ideal different from that of a mere desire to get well, it awakens him to a new love, which lifts him out of self-centredness into healthy activity.

Further, if this ideal is a Personal one, as in Christianity, it may have the power so to arouse our latent forces that the repressing and inhibiting complexes are swept away by the omnipotence of love. So in religious conversion we frequently find that not only is the character changed, but old neurotic and hysterical diseases disappear. Could we command such a revolution of love in the soul, it would be at once the most direct and the most effective treatment for those diseases now laboriously treated by psychotherapy. But "we cannot kindle when we would the fire that in the soul resides."

2. The spiritual ideal has a greater power of harmonisation. In psychotherapy it is not sufficient to liberate the repressed emotions; these must find some outlet in which they may be directed in harmonious expression. This is commonly left for the patient to do for himself. Mistakes are sometimes made by the analyst trying to lead the patient to conform to a type of character, whether libertine or moral, to which the physician himself adheres. It is nevertheless necessary, if the patient is to find harmony and happiness, that he should have some principle in life, some aim or purpose to which his liberated instinctive impulses may be redirected. The psychotherapist as such is not primarily concerned with what are the ultimate ideals, but only with the cure of the patient's morbid condition. The function of the minister goes a step further; he seeks for that ultimate ideal by which man may attain happiness.

If he believes he has found it, there is no reason why he should not offer it to his patient for the cure of his soul and for happiness.

3. In every form of healing the personal element counts, even in the treatment of physical disorders like pleurisy and indigestion. It counts very much more in psychotherapy, in which the relation of physician to patient means so much. In suggestion there is the rapport between patient and physician; in analysis the confidence of the patient in the analyst, which sometimes develops into a phenomenon called "transference," in which the personal relation between the two becomes morbid and of dominating importance. Where the relation consists of confidence in the skill of the physician, it is normal and valuable for cure. But in so far as the treatment depends on a personal relation, it may lead to distortion of character; for in so far as the physician is not perfectly adjusted to life or psychologically healthy, the patient's mind will so far be distorted and maladjusted.

When, on the other hand, the individual is brought into relation with a personality of the moral purity and spiritual power of our Lord, the adjustment of his life is healthy. In true spiritual healing we are brought into personal relation with a God who is as perfect as we can conceive Him, and not with an imperfect man. In the Christian religion we discover our ideal in the life and character of our Lord, to whom our adjustment is made, and the personal relation between Him and the sufferer, pre-eminently a relation of love, can sweep away the repressing barriers of egotism and liberate the forces lying latent in the soul of the patient, restoring him to life and health. Every neurosis and functional nerve

disorder is based on selfishness and a return to infantile egotism; for the characteristic of the child is to be loved, and of the adult to love. Anything that can awaken the soul to real love will liberate it from its self-centredness and therefore incidentally from its neurotic symptoms. Every mission which seeks to achieve this conversion from selfishness to love will inevitably be a healing mission. The "religious" man who remains a neurotic has not experienced that true miracle of religion.

We conclude, then, by saying that in spiritual healing we are not so much dealing with a force different in kind from that which operates in other healing, but that it is spiritual in the sense that it brings the diseased soul into conscious personal touch with the spiritual, and that these religious influences have a power to awaken love and to bring peace and happiness unpossessed by scientific treatment alone. The strength of the Church's position in treating moral diseases by modern methods is that she is in a position to present to the patient a personal ideal by which alone the individual can be completely synthetised.

But perhaps the most promising field for the exercise of spiritual healing is that of moral disorders. Probably two-thirds of those who at present go to psychotherapists for treatment suffer from disorders which are not merely mental and moral in origin, but moral in symptom—sex perversions, morbid aggressiveness, jealousy, obsessing evil thoughts, impure habits. The term "spiritual healing" may most aptly be referred to the treatment of these disorders, for they may not be sins in the ordinary sense of being voluntary, but are diseases in the sense that they are beyond the power of the patient to control or cure, and require the special min-

istrations of those who can be real physicians of the soul. These may be treated and cured by suggestion, but in this case they are liable to emerge in some other form. We may "cure" fear and produce intolerance; we may cure self-abuse and produce egotism, which is its psychical counterpart; we may "cure" vanity and produce self-righteousness. The only satisfactory means of cure of such moral conditions is to discover, liberate, and redirect the repressed emotions which emerge in these perversions, but which, rightly directed, may be utilised under the full control of the will. It is a task to which those who are interested in the lives and conduct of men should seriously address themselves. It is, however, essential that those who would seek effectively to practise such spiritual healing shall study the causes of these diseases of the soul in order that they may adequately deal with them.

We hold that all who have to deal with the soul—teachers, doctors, and clergy—should take the greatest advantage of all modern knowledge in psychology. An understanding of such conceptions as "unconscious motive," "over-compensation," "repression," etc., is invaluable to a proper understanding of character. There can be no objection raised by the medical profession to *thoroughly trained* psychotherapists within the Church treating, by the most up-to-date and scientific methods, moral diseases that are not only moral in symptom, but moral in origin, in the sense that most complexes are due to the repression of emotional conditions by the conventions of morality. But the public has the right to demand that both moral and nervous diseases should be the specific care of experts, and not left to untrained people, inexperienced in disorders of character. The

methods they adopt should be in line with the most advanced scientific knowledge of the time, whether they be clergy or doctors. Anything short of the most skilled and expert knowledge should neither be sanctioned by the Church nor countenanced by those who have the highest good of humanity at heart.

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